

OPUS2

Scottish Covid-19 Inquiry

Day 55

June 28, 2024

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1 Friday, 28 June 2024
 2 (10.00 am)
 3 THE CHAIR: Now, just before we start a number of
 4 housekeeping matters. I'm sorry. The running order has
 5 been changed this morning or not the running order, but the
 6 timing, I suppose is a more accurate way of saying. There
 7 was a participant, Core Participant, who is going to address
 8 the Inquiry between 10.30 and 10.45, but they no longer wish
 9 to address the Inquiry. So we have simply advanced everyone
 10 up.
 11 Now, there is a slight problem there. That had
 12 you due to speak, Ms McCall, at 10.45. But Mr Crabb is not
 13 here, I understand yet. Do you mind terribly going forward
 14 another 15 minutes? And if Mr Crabb arrives, he can come at
 15 10.45. But I notice that he's due again at 11.15, so we may
 16 have double bagged Mr Crabb, but we will sort that out.
 17 So apologies for all that.
 18 The only other thing is to remind you all -- since
 19 some of you weren't here yesterday -- that there's 15
 20 minutes allocated. The reason for the relatively short time
 21 is because of course we have the full statement, which has
 22 already been considered and will be looked at again; and,
 23 therefore, in terms of accommodating the large number of
 24 Core Participants within a confined timetable, we have to
 25 restrict it to 15 minutes; and I will keep you to 15

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1 minutes.
 2 So with that, hopefully not too stern, warning,
 3 could I ask Mr Anwar for Scottish Covid Bereaved to address
 4 us first, please.
 5 Thank you Mr Anwar.
 6 Closing statement by MR ANWAR
 7 MR ANWAR: Thank you, my Lord.
 8 My Lord, these are submissions on behalf of the
 9 Scottish Covid Bereaved. I am relying on our written
 10 submissions but focusing on particular issues.
 11 The Scottish Covid Bereaved originally started out
 12 as part of the Facebook group Covid Bereaved Families for
 13 Justice, which was formed in June 2022. In September 2022,
 14 the Scottish Covid Bereaved formally left the group and
 15 became a completely separate, autonomous, group: the
 16 Scottish Covid Bereaved.
 17 Since July 2020 and a first press Article on care
 18 homes with the BBC, the group have been a consistent and
 19 positive campaigning presence in the media and our
 20 communities.
 21 The Scottish Covid Bereaved's political campaign
 22 ultimately led to the formation of this Inquiry.
 23 The Scottish Covid Bereaved are a group of
 24 like-minded bereaved individuals with a common goal of not
 25 wanting their loved ones' deaths to have been in vain, and

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1 for lessons to be learned to stop others having to suffer in
 2 the same way they have. The bereaved have identified
 3 consistent areas of concern amongst their members and have
 4 shared these concerns with senior politicians and both this
 5 Inquiry as well as the UK Inquiry where they are
 6 represented.
 7 The Scottish Covid Bereaved have repeatedly raised
 8 the issue of the deaths of patients who acquired Covid in
 9 hospital. They have raised issues around NHS services and
 10 testing criteria focusing on the three cardinal symptoms:
 11 temperature, persistent cough and the loss of sense of taste
 12 or smell. The group also proposed that the Crown Office and
 13 Procurator Fiscal's investigation into care home deaths
 14 should also consider the issue of Nosocomial deaths.
 15 Regards to the Scottish Inquiry, the Scottish
 16 Covid Bereaved wish to make some observations on the
 17 progress of the Inquiry to date. The Inquiry's
 18 administration and communications have been beset with
 19 problems, although the bereaved appreciate that the Chief
 20 Executive that has been appointed aimed to resolve these
 21 issues and, in the last several months, your team have
 22 worked night and day to deliver.
 23 However, on the issue of funding, despite the
 24 award for funding of legal representations, difficulties
 25 with that funding have limited the work that can be carried

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1 out on the bereaved's behalf. I am aware, from other Core
 2 Participants, that remains the issue for them also. The
 3 Scottish Covid Bereaved consider that, with an award for
 4 funding of legal representation in place, representatives
 5 should not be expected to work for free for the Inquiry's
 6 behalf. The bereaved hope that, given we are now some two
 7 and a half years after this Inquiry was announced, these
 8 matters can be resolved as a matter of urgency.
 9 It is clear, when I look around the room, that the
 10 army of lawyers that act on behalf of the Government or
 11 hospitals never face such issues; yet, time and time again,
 12 it is always the bereaved, as Core Participants, who are
 13 told they will be front and centre, who face these problems.
 14 Moving on to the Impact Hearings.
 15 When the evidence in these Impact Hearings began
 16 to be heard, it became apparent that the Restriction Order
 17 in place was inhibiting witnesses from mentioning the names
 18 of their loved ones. It caused unnecessary anxiety, pain
 19 and difficulty for witnesses for giving evidence. Scottish
 20 Covid Bereaved call on the Inquiry to reconsider the terms
 21 of the Restriction Order. It is submitted that in its
 22 current form the order is unduly onerous and creates an
 23 unnecessary additional administrative burden on Core
 24 Participants and the Inquiry.
 25 The Scottish Covid Bereaved are concerned that the

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1 scope of evidence being elicited does, on occasion, also
 2 fall outwith the scope of the Module. It is submitted that
 3 the thematic approach to evidence adopted by the Inquiry can
 4 lack focus and clarity; and it is not clear to the bereaved
 5 the status, if any, of this evidence. Whilst the bereaved
 6 welcome the opportunity to tell their stories, they're
 7 conscious that it has now been over four years since
 8 COVID-19 arrived in Scotland. The UK Inquiry has powered
 9 ahead in calling politicians, civil servants, advisers,
 10 scientists and medics to give evidence. There have been
 11 three Prime Ministers and three First Ministers since the
 12 start of the pandemic. By the time this Inquiry comes to
 13 hear evidence from the key decision makers, there will
 14 already have been a UK General Election; there may have been
 15 a Scottish Parliament election. The bereaved hope that the
 16 Inquiry can capture the evidence of the key decision
 17 makers as soon as possible.

18 With regards to the need for evidence, the members
 19 of the group gave evidence, like many others from across
 20 Scotland, to allow the Inquiry to understand the impact of
 21 decisions made by the authorities during the course of the
 22 pandemic. The Scottish Covid Bereaved do not hold
 23 themselves out to be experts witnesses. Those are matters
 24 which it is submitted require a proper evidential basis.
 25 Whilst the bereaved can offer a lay perspective, it is

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1 submitted that the Inquiry urgently requires to establish an
 2 evidential basis to allow it to consider whether Scotland
 3 was prepared for the pandemic.

4 On the submissions with regards to evidence, the
 5 group's representatives have not, as restricted by the
 6 Inquiry, been given funding to watch all of the evidence of
 7 the other Core Participants. This is considered to be
 8 particularly unfortunate given the Chair's request for
 9 submissions on that evidence and for consideration to be
 10 given to issues such as foreseeability and future
 11 investigations. However, it is submitted that there are
 12 several recurring themes which can be highlighted in respect
 13 of the evidence before the Inquiry.

14 These include:

15 The total lockdown of care homes. It is submitted
 16 that allowing at the very least one named visitor per
 17 patient would have helped staff, as those visitors would
 18 have been able to assist with the residents' care and would
 19 have had the benefits for their mental health. Care home
 20 staff, of course, suffered as a lack of PPE.

21 NHS24 and 111 services provided inconsistent
 22 advice and stuck too rigidly to the three cardinal symptoms
 23 for test referrals.

24 There was poor communication, or a complete lack
 25 of communication, with family members in relation to the

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1 treatment for, and the wellbeing of, individuals in
 2 hospitals. This was particularly keenly felt in relation to
 3 the use of the do not attempt CPR notices.

4 In his submission yesterday, Mr Gale said that
 5 this is an area that will be subject to thorough
 6 investigation. The SCB are concerned that the DNACPR
 7 decisions were made on flimsy and irrelevant clinical
 8 information. In some instances we understand our members
 9 were concerned that their relatives didn't have the capacity
 10 to make such decisions, especially when they were denied the
 11 opportunity to discuss matters with them. This has resulted
 12 in our members feeling guilt and not doing enough for their
 13 loved ones.

14 There was problems of infection control and care
 15 in care homes, hospitals and prisons.

16 The issue of Nosocomial infection is a major issue
 17 for the Scottish Covid Bereaved and therefore must be
 18 thoroughly investigated by the Inquiry.

19 The numerous contributory issues, including
 20 testing, capacity, PPE, patient cohorting, the failure of
 21 the Scottish Government to recognise airborne transmission,
 22 ignoring asymptomatic transmission, constantly changing
 23 guidance, aged clinical environments and inappropriate
 24 clinical environments are some of the issues that the
 25 Scottish Covid Bereaved urge the Scottish Inquiry to

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1 investigate; and of course the failure to ensure that
 2 families could be with their loved ones at the ends of their
 3 lives.

4 With regards to foreseeability, the Scottish Covid
 5 Bereaved do not make any claim to be experts or skilled
 6 witnesses, but it is submitted that many of the problems
 7 caused by COVID-19 were foreseeable. A pandemic was the
 8 highest natural threat risk to our society, identified for
 9 many years by epidemiologists as an inevitability.

10 It should come as no surprise that the years of
 11 austerity left health and care facilities understaffed,
 12 under-equipped, demoralised and barely able to cope in
 13 pre-pandemic circumstances. With no apparent attempt to fix
 14 the roof while sun was shining, our core services were not
 15 prepared when the storm arrived.

16 It should not have come as surprise to our
 17 politicians that when problems arise in society, it is the
 18 weakest and the most vulnerable who are the most likely to
 19 be badly affected. It is submitted that those in hospitals
 20 or care homes clearly fall within these categories, yet time
 21 and time again the Inquiry was presented with evidence which
 22 made it clear there had been no special consideration given
 23 to vulnerable groups.

24 As a result, seemingly nonsensical rules were put
 25 in place. For example, there was an apparently total

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1 lockdown of care homes to avoid infections of residents; but
2 whilst this took place they were allowing for the discharge
3 of patients from hospitals into the same care homes without
4 testing. No consideration was given to the realities of
5 care home staffing who frequently worked within more than
6 one such establishment.

7 The Scottish Covid Bereaved submit that those in
8 authority who imposed rules in relation to care which could
9 not possibly have been obtempered. Policies which resulted
10 in the isolation of those with mental health issues or
11 dementia showed a complete lack of planning and forethought
12 or compassion. A failure to consider how healthcare
13 professionals should best communicate with relatives about
14 their loved ones in hospitals, in care or prison meant that
15 there were no proper systems in place to allow for such
16 communication. There is, it is submitted, no better example
17 of this than the issues surrounding the implementation of do
18 not attempt CPR notices.

19 It is no answer to these criticisms to say that
20 those in charge do not know what the pandemic will be until
21 it strikes and therefore only limited plans can be made.
22 The Scottish Covid Bereaved are tired of hearing the words
23 "with hindsight".

24 The Inquiry has heard evidence in relation to PPE.
25 There was a clear lack of suitable PPE before the pandemic.

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1 Once the pandemic hit, there were difficulties in procuring
2 PPE and issues surrounding the quality and the suitability
3 of the available items. Staff were not properly trained to
4 dispose of the PPE and in the social care setting there was
5 an insufficient risk assessment and training on how to use
6 the items. Staff were required to reuse items of PPE and
7 found that some of the available items had been re-directed
8 to the NHS, with social care being treated as the poor
9 relative.

10 While efforts were made to utilise technology to
11 assist care home residents and hospital patients to
12 communicate with their families, there were issues
13 surrounding digital exclusion. This was perhaps most
14 acutely demonstrated by the difficulties faced in
15 communicating with relatives suffering from dementia.

16 The Inquiry has heard evidence of a great many
17 issues surrounding infection prevention and control, whether
18 it was a lack of guidance and education of basic IPC, such
19 as care home staff not being trained in relation to
20 infectious diseases, or confusions surrounding the
21 interpretation and the enforcement of guidance. Symptomatic
22 workers were being pressured to return to work until they
23 were able to produce confirmed test results. Staff were
24 being pressured to work even when contacted by test and
25 trace workers or when they had been in contact with Covid

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1 positive workers. The movement of patients from hospitals
2 to care homes without testing proved to be the fatal mistake
3 and, when coupled with a lack of testing for staff and
4 residents, allowed for the rapid spread of disease and
5 death.

6 The Scottish Covid Bereaved have sympathy for the
7 staff who risked their own health and lives to work in these
8 environments. They faced confusion as to the rules and the
9 guidance which applied, particularly in Scottish care homes
10 owned by English companies. The guidance did not take into
11 account those working in different environments such as
12 prisons.

13 Many of the bereaved felt most keenly the
14 seemingly inconsistent rules around visitation in hospital
15 settings. These rules appeared to differ not only across
16 the health boards or hospitals but also within individual
17 hospitals.

18 This was perhaps most vividly demonstrated when it
19 came to the end of life care. There appeared to have been a
20 blanket approach taken towards many elderly care home
21 residents rather than a human rights based approach. In
22 some cases, especially within care homes, many had reached a
23 point where quality of life was more important than
24 duration. Whilst lockdown was initially understandable as
25 an effort to keep those vulnerable individuals safe, as time

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1 went on other fundamental rights became equally as
2 important.

3 The Inquiry has heard evidence that dying
4 residents were not given the end of life care that they
5 would normally have received and that in some cases there
6 appeared to be a focus on providing end of life medication
7 to residents.

8 In conclusion, my Lord, despite many of the
9 difficulties we have outlined in our written submissions,
10 the Scottish Covid Bereaved remain committed to assisting
11 the Inquiry in any way they can. They hope that the stories
12 the members shared with this Inquiry, often with great
13 difficulty and pain, in the midst of their grieving, can
14 educate the Inquiry as to the experiences of many across
15 Scotland and to ensure that no other families have to suffer
16 in the same manner as the Scottish bereaved have.

17 Thank you very much, my Lord.

18 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much Mr Anwar.

19 Now Mr Gray for Central Scotland Care Homes.

20 Closing statement by MR GRAY

21 MR GRAY: Good morning, my Lord, ladies and
22 gentlemen.

23 I appear on behalf of Central Scotland Care Homes
24 or CSCH, a group of independent care home operators that was
25 formed for the purposes of assisting the Inquiry in

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1 fulfilling its terms of reference.
 2 We wish to focus today on some of the impacts more
 3 fully described in our written closing statement, starting
 4 with guidance.

5 CSCH has highlighted the pertinent issues faced by
 6 the care home sector in dealing with COVID-19 guidance
 7 issued by a range of public bodies; but it is noteworthy
 8 that these experiences chimed with those of witnesses from
 9 other parts of the health and social care sector.

10 The primary issues, as our members see them, are
 11 that the guidance was issued at less than appropriate times;
 12 was lengthy and confusing; changed regularly; was difficult
 13 to disseminate to staff; came from multiple sources; and was
 14 often conflicting.

15 The impact of these issues upon the care sector
 16 was substantial. The approach taken was demoralising and
 17 frustrating for staff at all levels but particularly those
 18 on the front line. Workers, who had been following guidance
 19 with the best of intention, were told, sometimes multiple
 20 times on the same day, that guidance had changed. That
 21 brought quite natural fears that following the earlier
 22 guidance may have endangered residents.

23 Guidance was issued almost on a one-size-fits-all
 24 approach. There was no input from specialists; and the
 25 guidance often failed to recognise the different environment

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1 in care homes. IPC guidance, for example, applied the
 2 standards ordinarily expected of acute care settings.

3 During the Inquiry, guidance has been described as
 4 being simply "advice" rather than a mandatory set of rules.
 5 The truth was that the status of the guidance was unknown.
 6 The approach of our members may have been, at times, to
 7 adopt a conservative interpretation, but it must be
 8 understood that the care sector is highly regulated, is
 9 subjected to a high incidence of litigation and, further,
 10 during the pandemic, operators did not have immunity.

11 When advice or support on guidance was sought from
 12 governing bodies, requests rebuffed and operators were told
 13 it was their responsibility to interpret it. Is it any
 14 wonder that within this sector, against that background,
 15 guidance was generally approached as mandatory rather than
 16 discretionary?

17 The legal status of guidance should be made clear
 18 in future. Care providers should be empowered to depart
 19 from it where appropriate.

20 The issues may have been avoided if there was a
 21 single centralised provider of guidance to the care sector,
 22 which could issue agreed guidance following proper
 23 collaboration with stakeholders, which brings me to the lack
 24 of consultation with the sector.

25 Prior to and during the pandemic there was a

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1 disconnect between those drafting industry guidance and
 2 those required to implement it. The lack of involvement of
 3 those with a social care voice has been described as a
 4 "dangerous failure".

5 The social care sector is an essential part of the
 6 fabric of health and wellbeing in Scotland. We will all
 7 either know someone who uses these services, or will come to
 8 use them for ourselves at some stage in our lives.

9 As one witness put it "everyone in this room is an
 10 accident or illness away from needing care and we need to be
 11 thinking about how we would want to be treated if we were to
 12 end up in full-time care".

13 Engagement with the sector before and during the
 14 pandemic would have ensured that the rights of residents in
 15 care homes were on an even footing with those in wider
 16 society.

17 When efforts were made to obtain the views of the
 18 sector, the impression was that the care sector was there in
 19 ceremony only — they "were tolerated rather than
 20 respected".

21 In his evidence Dr Donald Macaskill said that the
 22 current pandemic planning by the Scottish Government still
 23 does not have any participants which represent the social
 24 care sector. Our members feel that it is imperative that
 25 this is changed immediately and that this crucial sector is

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1 involved in policy making for the responses to future
 2 pandemics.

3 Turning next to hospital admissions and
 4 discharges.

5 The relationship between the care sector and
 6 hospitals is important and delicate. It ought to be an
 7 equal relationship, but all too often during the pandemic,
 8 the care sector felt like the poor relation being told what
 9 to do and how to do it.

10 One concern was that, particularly at the outset
 11 of the pandemic, patients were discharged from hospital into
 12 care homes without testing. Given the asymptomatic
 13 presentation of some with COVID-19, this created the risk
 14 that patients could be a conduit for the virus from
 15 hospitals to care homes. This was a particular concern for
 16 our members; and we note that other groups referred to it as
 17 being like a "death sentence for the elderly".

18 The Inquiry has asked participants to identify
 19 areas worthy of further investigation. Our members believe
 20 that the determination of this issue is an important matter
 21 which would benefit from further scrutiny.

22 The unilateral nature of the relationship was
 23 emphasised when care homes sought to admit residents to
 24 hospital. Staff would phone ambulances who would refuse to
 25 convey residents. Those who were taken to hospital found

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1 that consultants refused to admit them because they had come
2 from a care home.

3 The Inquiry has committed to taking a human
4 rights—based approach. The refusal of hospital treatment
5 for care home residents is a stark example of the denial of
6 what should be fundamental rights in any modern society.
7 The delicate relationship which exists between care homes
8 and hospitals must be properly addressed prior to any future
9 pandemic to ensure that residents can access hospital care
10 where it is needed.

11 The care sector can, at times, alleviate pressure
12 within the NHS, but it should not come at the expense of
13 care home residents who may be at a heightened risk of harm.

14 Turning to DNACPR requests, which are a normal
15 part of care home practice.

16 During the pandemic the perception was that there
17 was a push from the NHS to get more of these decisions in
18 place. Concerns were raised that conversations between GPs,
19 residents and residents' families were not happening. This
20 was a foreseeable issue which could have been prevented by
21 engagement with residents and their families to ensure that
22 appropriate discussions were being had about this sensitive
23 and complex subject.

24 Turning next to the impacts of the increased
25 administrative burden of the pandemic, which our members

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1 described as "staggering" and "immense". We note that the
2 experience of other groups was similar. This exacerbated
3 stress and pressure on staff but also reduced valuable care
4 resources.

5 CSCH acknowledges the need for external agencies
6 to receive information to allow them to manage the overall
7 pandemic response. However, this must be proportionate and
8 should not impede the ability of care staff to focus on
9 their primary duties. The effects of this could have been
10 reduced or minimised with a single reporting channel which
11 could be easily accessed by all relevant bodies.

12 Turning now to Operation Koper.

13 As the Inquiry has heard, reporting to Operation
14 Koper created a huge increase in workloads. It should be
15 remembered that this requirement was isolated to the care
16 sector. We note that this led to nursing staff feeling they
17 were treated differently to colleagues in other sectors.
18 They had to shoulder the burden while continuing to fight
19 the pandemic. We must remember that the requirement to
20 report to Operation Koper began before the second wave of
21 the pandemic hit.

22 Operation Koper had, and continues to have, a
23 devastating impact upon the morale and mental health of care
24 home staff. We would ask the Inquiry to reflect on the
25 evidence of one of our members about an experienced staff

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1 member who broke down upon receipt of an Operation Koper
2 e-mail with the subject, "Major crime".

3 Turning next to inspections and external agency
4 visits.

5 The approach to which during the pandemic had a
6 significant and detrimental effect upon staff wellbeing.
7 Those carrying out visits often had little or no experience
8 of care homes. They would attend expecting hospital
9 standards of infection control, with no recognition that
10 care homes were the homes of residents.

11 Our members found staff leaving in significant
12 numbers due, in part, to the approach in treatment by
13 regulators and external agencies. Staff felt like they were
14 being interrogated.

15 On the subject of lockdown decisions and visiting
16 restrictions, it is submitted that these were an essential
17 protective factor, but it was also not known how long the
18 lockdowns would last.

19 Once the first set of national lockdown rules were
20 relaxed, the position within care homes remained heavily
21 restricted.

22 The measures eventually introduced were far from
23 ideal. Garden visits were described as being "horrendous"
24 with no privacy. Window visits were only suitable for
25 residents on the ground floor and could not be introduced in

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1 every home, creating a lottery between homes and residents.

2 Attempts to introduce technology were also met
3 with mixed success, but providers were trying their best to
4 accommodate family interactions in whatever way they could.

5 Restricted visiting caused stress and tension
6 between residents, family members and staff, with the latter
7 placed into enforcing roles which they had no prior
8 experience of. It is an issue which could have been
9 minimised with a better approach to the relaxation of rules
10 in care homes when they were relaxed for the rest of
11 society.

12 With that in mind, I can say that each of our
13 members fully supports the campaign for Anne's Law. They
14 agree that it is essential for care home residents to have
15 the physical presence of, and connection with, their family
16 members, and hope that we never again find ourselves in a
17 situation where residents are without vital, nourishing
18 contact from their families for any length of time.

19 Turning now to the impacts of the pandemic on care
20 staff, who have reported high levels of stress and burnout
21 while working in care homes during the pandemic.

22 The sector has always suffered from staffing
23 issuing, but they have been exacerbated hugely by the
24 pandemic. The Royal College of Nursing has reported that
25 its members felt deaths in care homes were reported more

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1 critically in the media than deaths in, for example, NHS
 2 hospitals.
 3 Nurses found this stressful, distressing and often
 4 reported that, where other health staff were being portrayed
 5 as heroes, they felt they were seen as villains. These
 6 feelings are echoed by the staff of our members.
 7 One care home manager said she says "friends who
 8 worked in the ... sector who left and will never return
 9 because of the way they were portrayed. They came into the
 10 sector to help people, not hurt them, or do them harm. Some
 11 have gone to work in supermarkets because it is less
 12 stressful".
 13 In illustrating the wider impacts of the pandemic
 14 on care home staff, my Lord, we can do no better than speak
 15 the words of some of the witnesses the Inquiry has heard and
 16 received statements from.
 17 A representative from Unite stated:
 18 "We need to be eternally grateful for what workers
 19 did during the pandemic to ensure the people in this country
 20 survived. Health and social care workers put themselves in
 21 front of the pandemic with unknown consequences ... And now
 22 the pressures on health and social care are even bigger than
 23 they were in the pandemic because the sector has not
 24 recovered from it. Staffing levels are so low people are on
 25 their knees, they are absolutely done because they've not

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1 had a break and not been allowed to process what they did
 2 for this country."
 3 One experienced care home manager described the
 4 fear felt by staff working in care homes during the
 5 pandemic. Describing her memory of the pandemic she
 6 explained that "everyone was fighting ... an invisible
 7 enemy". In her youth she had travelled extensively through
 8 war-torn nations. She had been in positions of real fear
 9 and significant danger. Later in life, she had battled
 10 cancer, at one point planning her own funeral. She recalled
 11 that neither of these experiences stirred the same level of
 12 emotion that she felt during the pandemic. She stated,
 13 "During Covid I wasn't just in fear for my own life, I was
 14 in fear for the lives of the staff, the residents of the
 15 care home, my family, my friends, and the fear was intense."
 16 In conclusion, our members will continue to
 17 contribute to the Inquiry to assist it in fulfilling its
 18 terms of reference; and our members hope that the Inquiry
 19 will bring about positive change for the benefit of care
 20 home staff, residents and their families.
 21 To say that the pandemic was difficult for care
 22 home staff is an understatement. We have considered the
 23 evidence provided to the Inquiry and note the traumatic and
 24 distressing circumstances that were experienced by staff.
 25 We acknowledge that this was mirrored by residents and

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1 family members.
 2 Our members wish to thank my Lord, Inquiry counsel
 3 and the wider Inquiry team for the significant effort
 4 expended to get us to this stage. They also wish to thank
 5 the witnesses and the other Core Participant groups for the
 6 evidence heard and the contributions that have been made.
 7 While this may be classed as a closing statement,
 8 the Inquiry is still at the beginning of a long process and
 9 COVID-19 remains a dominant presence in our society.
 10 For the time being, we offer the following memory
 11 from one of our members' care home managers as a poignant
 12 illustration of the myriad impacts of the pandemic on
 13 residents, their families and care staff.
 14 She stated:
 15 "I remember, on one occasion, I stayed at the
 16 bedside of a woman who was dying of Covid. I sat with her
 17 that evening into the early hours of the morning till she
 18 passed away because I promised her family I would not leave
 19 her alone. This was the first resident admitted to the care
 20 home when I joined 10 years prior, so she was the resident
 21 that I had known for the longest. My mask was becoming
 22 compromised because I was crying into it as I sat there but
 23 there were no new ones available. I was holding her hand and
 24 holding my phone on Facetime to one of her daughters (who
 25 was also on the phone to the other daughter at the same

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1 time) throughout the night so they could 'be with' their
 2 mum. They said their goodbyes and told her how much they
 3 loved her they spoke to her about their lives together,
 4 their memories. I felt like an intruder but I also felt so
 5 privileged to share such an intimate time. My phone battery
 6 died at 3am but I still stayed with the lady, I used her
 7 rosary beads and read it to her. I am not religious but I
 8 prayed because I knew how important her faith was to her and
 9 in some way found some solace. I didn't leave her and her
 10 memory will never leave me."
 11 Our members wish, once again, to express their
 12 deepest condolences to the bereaved family members and
 13 friends of all those that have tragically lost their lives
 14 as a result of COVID-19.
 15 Thank you, my Lord.
 16 THE CHAIR: Thank you Mr Gray.
 17 Now, I think Mr Crabb may be here. Yes, he is.
 18 So you're saved for 15 minutes Ms McCall.
 19 So Mr Crabb on behalf of Care Home Relatives
 20 Scotland.
 21 Closing statement by MR CRABB
 22 MR CRABB: Good morning, my Lord. Good morning
 23 ladies and gentlemen. I appear on behalf of Care Home
 24 Relatives Scotland and CHRS — Loss Loved Ones — CHRS.
 25 I move at the start, my Lord, to adopt my written

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1 submissions which are already before the Inquiry. In
 2 respect of the terms of reference, I submit that CHRS'
 3 evidence is of particular relevance having regard to
 4 sections 2(a), (b), (g), (h) and (i).

5 At the outset, my Lord, on behalf of CHRS, I would
 6 like to extend their sincere thanks to all members of the
 7 staff of the Inquiry for the respect, understanding and
 8 compassion that they've shown them throughout this process.

9 They sincerely hope and believe that their
 10 evidence will assist the Inquiry and that their evidence is
 11 reflected in your Lord's recommendations and findings.

12 In respect of impact, it is submitted that the
 13 evidence has demonstrated a clear overarching impact on
 14 those residents in care homes. The restrictions imposed on
 15 them during the COVID-19 pandemic reduced their quality of
 16 life and their dignity of life.

17 The restrictions affected them in many different
 18 ways and to different extent but overall it is clear that
 19 care home residents are one of the groups of society that
 20 were disproportionately impacted by the restrictions.

21 The majority of residents in care homes are
 22 elderly, often with a range of mental and/or physical
 23 impairments; and, while they represented a high risk group
 24 in terms of both infection and death from COVID-19, they
 25 were also a group of society whose last years and months

25

1 were precious and for who contact with loved ones was often
 2 a vital lifeline.

3 This group are not simply confined to their homes:
 4 many lead valuable and full lives in the community --
 5 enjoying trips out, visiting friends and family and
 6 socialising. Further, it is important to remember that not
 7 all residents are elderly; there are many young adults
 8 living in homes or supported accommodation who enjoy playing
 9 an active and valuable role in society.

10 The right to contact and socialisation with loved
 11 ones and to engage in wider society is one of the most
 12 fundamental human needs. Its denial and isolation is a most
 13 extreme form of punishment. All care home residents, young
 14 and old, have a right to have these rights respected.
 15 However, there were excessive and prolonged periods where
 16 significant restrictions were placed on visits and their
 17 ability to socialise outwith their homes, which impacted on
 18 their health and wellbeing as well as infringing their human
 19 rights. There was little apparent balancing of risk that
 20 the impact of such severe restrictions and isolation could
 21 have on people, particularly those with conditions such as
 22 dementia.

23 In this respect, it is vital to remember the
 24 impact of the many who died not of Covid but alone and
 25 craving contact from their loved ones.

26

1 The denial of contact had a devastating effect.
 2 The Inquiry has heard many harrowing tales of the ways in
 3 which basic and essential contact with loved ones was denied
 4 and the impact that this had on residents and their
 5 families. In many instances, residents, quite simply, did
 6 not understand what was happening to them. Cathie Russell's
 7 mother and Gillian Duncan's father both asked whether they
 8 were in prison; and Verona Gibson's daughter said she felt
 9 like a prisoner. Perhaps effectively they were. It should
 10 be recognised that this kind of isolation is a form of
 11 restraint.

12 While for many in "normal" society technology
 13 eased isolation, many in care home residence simply could
 14 not understand or operate devices, often having hearing or
 15 eyesight difficulty which made the exercise futile.
 16 Alison Leitch spoke of having to watch her mother claw at
 17 her face, as she didn't understand where her daughter's
 18 voice was coming from.

19 There was a clear evidence that the lack of family
 20 contact and being isolated for days on end took a physical
 21 and mental toll on many residents. Many spoke of a decline
 22 in posture, muscle fatigue and general marked change.
 23 Tracey McMillan felt that her mother was "getting lost
 24 within herself" and ultimately her treatment hastened her
 25 death.

27

1 There were also significant impacts felt by
 2 relatives of those in care homes. They felt distress and
 3 frustration at being kept away from their loved ones,
 4 particularly when the rest of society moved towards
 5 normality.

6 Verona Gibson explained that before the pandemic
 7 daughter's home had been an extension of her own. She could
 8 go there any time, knew all the staff and was involved in
 9 every aspect of her life.

10 Relatives felt powerless and were overcome with a
 11 sense of guilt. Some felt that they should have pushed more
 12 to see changes in conditions. Frequently families felt like
 13 troublemakers or a nuisance if they challenged or sought to
 14 question decisions. Families were learning quickly that we
 15 had to learn to be compliant. While all parts of society
 16 endured limitation on interaction during the pandemic, it is
 17 submitted that care home relatives experienced a
 18 disproportionate limitation and were discriminated against,
 19 particularly towards the end of 2020 and 2021, when the rest
 20 of normal society was returning to social interaction, there
 21 was no justification for continued restrictions in care
 22 homes.

23 Donald MacAskill, Scottish Care, said "such
 24 extended periods of isolation are unacceptable
 25 disproportionate, unnecessary and hugely damaging".

28

1 Now, what were the reasons for those impacts?
 2 There was a clear lack of understanding of the life ,
 3 realities and priorities for those in care home settings,
 4 their families and staff by decision and policymakers. It
 5 is clear that for people who did not have a loved one in a
 6 care home they simply did not know what it was like on the
 7 ground.

8 There was a misconception about who lives in care
 9 homes. Nobody else was taking account of other harms that
 10 were happening. The fact that Public Health Scotland
 11 produced Covid guidance that amalgamated care homes with
 12 prisons demonstrates clearly such a lack of understanding.

13 There was also a clear lack of understanding that
 14 people in care homes live full and valuable lives , they
 15 visit in the community and engage in activities across
 16 society.

17 There was also a failure to understand and
 18 appreciate the importance of family members as essential
 19 care givers as members of the care team. Similarly, there
 20 was a failure to understand that family members would always
 21 have a paramount interest in keeping their relatives safe
 22 and indeed were often already experts in infection control.

23 There was a clear lack of planning. If there had
 24 been pandemic planning in relation to care homes, few
 25 witnesses, if any, spoke of being involved. It was said

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1 that if they had any plan at all , it was to do nothing to
 2 reunite people and wait on a vaccine. The evidence
 3 demonstrated that the Covid response was based on a knee
 4 jerk reaction about just slamming the gates shut, which had
 5 the effect of terrifying people. There was a lack of
 6 leadership.

7 It should not have taken the formation of CHRS
 8 in August 2020 for the Scottish Government to take
 9 residents' and their families' rights into account. As
 10 stated by Sheila Hall, "we needed someone to be that
 11 spokesperson, to provide clear and consistent advice and not
 12 treat care homes as institutions or clinical settings where
 13 residents were treated like dogs in quarantine".

14 CHRS had to be formed to push and to defend those
 15 rights, but even then their solutions were not implemented.

16 Guidance was not consistently interpreted or
 17 implemented. The evidence demonstrates a widespread failure
 18 to consistently interpret and apply guidance. This ended up
 19 often being the responsibility of individual care home
 20 managers and, given the lack of clarity , managers would
 21 often err on the side of caution, to the detriment of
 22 residents' rights.

23 The evidence demonstrated that visiting was a
 24 postcode lottery in respect of the interpretation and
 25 implementation of guidance and the lack of consistency

30

1 related in unfairness. Alison Leitch commented that "until
 2 Anne's Law is in place relatives and friends will always be
 3 at the mercy of someone making a decision, just because they
 4 can".

5 In CHRS' submission, Anne's Law would have
 6 minimised many of the impacts suffered by them and their
 7 loved ones. Anne's Law, properly implemented, would
 8 safeguard all of their fundamental human rights.

9 Now, CHRS is aware of senior counsel's position
 10 yesterday; and, of course, while they respect his submission
 11 they do not agree. CHRS has campaigned for Anne's Law for
 12 many years. They will continue to advocate, strive and
 13 fight for this right to be enshrined in legislation .

14 The evidence of interference with human rights
 15 from individuals and organisations is both compelling and
 16 overwhelming and is supported by academic research which is
 17 before the Inquiry. The overall impression is that the
 18 Inquiry is to have a human rights based approach. But the
 19 pandemic showed that people did not have human rights.

20 As a result , I would submit that the Chair is well
 21 placed to make findings and recommendations based on
 22 systemic adverse impacts on human rights. Of course the
 23 recourse to an effective remedy is an essential and
 24 undeniable element of any human rights compliant response to
 25 a future pandemic.

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1 The evidence heard during these Impact Hearings
 2 demonstrated eloquently the desperate and compelling need
 3 for Anne's Law to be implemented. Residents of care homes
 4 should have a right to appoint an essential care giver , a
 5 family member or a special contact or friend, who would form
 6 part of their care team; and they should be able to have
 7 contact with and access to them at all times.

8 As part of the team, these unpaid carers would be
 9 subject to the same restrictions and rules of paid carers,
 10 particularly during periods of specific control
 11 requirements. As the Inquiry has already heard, these
 12 people are often already knowledgeable and expert in
 13 infection control. They should be seen as having a positive
 14 and enabling role and not as posing some sort of threat or
 15 hindrance to care.

16 The Inquiry has heard the futile effect of
 17 guidance or letters from officials or ministers. What is
 18 required is a cast iron right that could form the basis, for
 19 example, of judicial review, if necessary. Guidance or
 20 deference to Public Health Scotland is not good enough. It
 21 should be noted that the guidance continues to fail to
 22 acknowledge the concept of an essential care giver. It
 23 should be Anne's Law we're talking about and not Public
 24 Health Scotland's law.

25 Because Anne's Law is not yet enacted in

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1 legislation , there remains no guarantee that another
2 prolonged lockdown, which would imprison care home residents
3 and deny them access to loved ones, could not happen again.

4 There has been widespread cross party support for
5 Anne's Law; and this Inquiry has heard no evidence to
6 suggest that it should not be enshrined in law.

7 On 7 September 2021 then First Minister
8 Nicola Sturgeon pledged that "we will introduce Anne's Law,
9 giving nominated relatives or friends the same access rights
10 to care homes as staff".

11 However, the current provision, as set out down in
12 section 40 of the National Care Service Bill , does not
13 fulfill this pledge and would not deliver Anne's Law. It is
14 an insipid provision which simply directs Ministers to issue
15 visiting directives . There is no specific provision that
16 offers to confer any right. While this Bill claims to
17 embody a human rights approach, this is not the case as no
18 right is conferred; and recent communications from the
19 current First Minister with CHRS have not reduced their
20 concerns.

21 This Bill is currently proceeding through the
22 legislative process at Stage 2. This is accordingly a
23 critical phase in the development of the provision and the
24 Chair could play an important role at this stage by making
25 recommendation.

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1 The Chair is accordingly invited to make this
2 recommendation: that there should be clear and specific
3 provision for residents in care homes or in supported
4 accommodation to have a right to access to and contact with
5 one named essential care giver, who will have the same
6 rights and responsibilities as paid carers.

7 Thank you.

8 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much, Mr Crabb.
9 Now Ms McCall for Bereaved Relatives Group (Skye).
10 Closing statement by MS McCALL

11 MS McCALL: Thank you, my Lord. The Bereaved
12 Relatives Group (Skye) welcome the opportunity to make this
13 closing statement to supplement our written submissions.

14 The impact of the response to the pandemic on
15 those who had loved ones in care homes and those who worked
16 there was profound.

17 Each individual who has given evidence to the
18 Inquiry recounted their own personal story, but what is
19 striking is the commonality of their experiences and the
20 foreseeability of many of those outcomes.

21 The Inquiry heard some witnesses speak of concerns
22 around the apparent misuse of do not attempt CPR notices.
23 This directly engages Article 2 of the European Convention
24 and is a matter of grave concern .

25 In addition, although in a pandemic some excess

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1 deaths are to be anticipated, what was not anticipated and
2 what was not inevitable was the sheer numbers of excess
3 deaths in care homes.

4 The Inquiry has heard evidence about the
5 transmission and spread of the virus into care homes and the
6 apparent inadequacy of infection control measures. Again,
7 Article 2 is engaged.

8 The Inquiry has heard about conditions in some of
9 the care homes. Witnesses described the neglect of
10 residents and their environment. The Inquiry has heard
11 concerns about the lack of basic hygiene, issues around food
12 safety, residents being injured as a result of being
13 unattended. While of course it is understood that there
14 were pressures on care home providers resulting from the
15 pandemic, including around staffing, in our submission, the
16 extent of the deterioration of conditions may have breached
17 the Article 3 rights of residents .

18 No less serious than these Article 2 and Article 3
19 issues was the impact of the lockdown and the accompanying
20 visiting bans and restrictions . Residents were suddenly cut
21 off from family and friends who play an integral part in
22 their care. The effect, particularly on those with
23 dementia, of this isolation , as well as the removal of their
24 personal items, cannot be overstated.

25 The approach to lockdown was nothing short of a

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1 callous disregard of people's right to family life . The
2 impact on residents' mental health and physical wellbeing
3 was devastating and that impact was, we say, entirely
4 foreseeable.

5 Unlike other citizens , residents were not allowed
6 to bubble with a family member. Care homes were not
7 equipped to facilitate effective remote communication.
8 Little or no alternatives were put in place for residents
9 with cognitive impairment or communication issues. Garden
10 visits were monitored closely making families feel like
11 their residents were prisoners.

12 There was no consistency in the approach to end of
13 life visits as between the different care home providers.
14 The denial of such visits to some close relatives continues
15 to cause great distress . At such times people should not
16 have to fight for their right to see a dying loved one.

17 There was a chronic failure in communication. Not
18 only does it appear that Government guidance was interpreted
19 differently across different care providers, it appears that
20 providers may have implemented their own, sometimes
21 stricter , policies . None of it was properly communicated to
22 families. There was no independent reliable source of
23 information to tell residents and relatives what their
24 rights were.

25 So, as the Inquiry progresses to the next phase of

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1 its investigation into health and social care, there are a
2 number of questions that need to be answered by those who
3 made the decisions around policy and those who implemented
4 the policies.

5 In relation to Article 2, the Inquiry must find
6 out during the currency of the pandemic what instructions or
7 guidance were issued about the signing of do not resuscitate
8 notices by residents or their welfare attorneys. If such
9 instructions or guidance were issued specific to the
10 pandemic, why was that thought necessary? What was its
11 purpose? And how did it differ from the approach prior to
12 the pandemic?

13 What oversight was there to ensure that proper and
14 lawful processes were being followed and that people were
15 not pressured into agreeing to something they did not want?

16 In relation to the transmission of the virus into
17 care homes and the spread within, how did policymakers and
18 those with organisational responsibility for the provision
19 of care take into account and meet their obligations under
20 Article 2 in implementing various infection control
21 measures?

22 In relation to Article 3, in the absence of
23 routine visitors and routine inspections, what steps did
24 care home providers take to ensure that standards of care
25 were being properly maintained in their homes? What

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1 oversight was there to guard against the neglect?

2 In the context of Article 8, in deciding to lock
3 down, what consideration did Government give to ensuring the
4 maintenance of family life for those in care homes? What
5 preparations did care homes carry out in order to enable
6 family relationships to be maintained during a lockdown?
7 What reasonable adjustments were made to enable those with
8 communication difficulties or cognitive impairment to
9 maintain relationships? How did the inconsistent approach
10 to end of life visits come about?

11 And, more generally, because the Inquiry is taking
12 a human rights based approach, it should ask what human
13 rights impact assessments were undertaken by Government in
14 determining the non-pharmaceutical measures that were put in
15 place in relation to care homes. And in implementing
16 Government policy, what human rights impact assessments were
17 undertaken by care home providers in relation to each
18 residential setting. How did the public authorities ensure
19 compliance with their Article 14 obligation not to
20 discriminate against those resident in care homes in respect
21 of their right to life, their right to be free from
22 degrading treatment and their right to family life?

23 The Bereaved Relatives Group (Skye) looks to the
24 Inquiry to get to the truth; to hold to account those who
25 failed in their human rights duties; and to ensure that

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1 lessons are learned.

2 It is their fervent hope that no one in need of
3 care, no family or care worker, will have to repeat the
4 experiences of this pandemic.

5 I'm grateful.

6 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much Ms McCall.

7 Very good. We will take the break now. We're a
8 few minutes early. So we're due back at 11.15. Thank you
9 very much.

10 (10.52 am)

11 (Short Break)

12 (11.15 am)

13 THE CHAIR: I think we're next going to have a
14 presentation on behalf of PAMIS; and, again, it's Mr Crabb.

15 Closing statement by MR CRABB

16 MR CRABB: Thank you, my Lord.

17 I appear on behalf of PAMIS — Promoting A More
18 Inclusive Society.

19 Again, I adopt my written submissions.

20 In terms of the Inquiry's terms of reference,

21 I would submit that PAMIS' evidence is of particular
22 relevance to parts 2(a), (b), (g), (h) and (i).

23 The impacts felt by persons with profound and
24 multiple learning difficulties (PMLD) and their families,
25 engage their fundamental human rights. Accordingly, the

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1 impact of the strategic response to the pandemic on their
2 Convention rights should be at the forefront of the
3 Inquiry's mind.

4 My Lord will note that in the written submissions
5 there is also reference to further areas for investigation
6 by the Inquiry and PAMIS' support of Anne's Law. PAMIS
7 aligns itself with the submissions of CHRS. Anne's Law
8 should equally apply to people with PMLD who are cared for
9 in different care settings, such as supported accommodation.

10 In the time available, I intend to focus on the
11 points which PAMIS considers should be at the forefront of
12 the Inquiry's mind.

13 In respect of impact, people with PMLD were
14 disproportionately impacted by the strategic response and
15 the pandemic restrictions. Their quality of life was
16 greatly reduced in a sudden, unplanned, chaotic and
17 traumatic manner. Much of that impact, sadly, is still felt
18 today.

19 Members of PAMIS and personal carers explained
20 eloquently that this group was, and remains, invisible, and
21 marginalised in society. Additionally, there's been a
22 failure to understand the group's diversity and the
23 particular needs of individuals within it.

24 The evidence before the Inquiry in respect of
25 impact can be seen in four interrelated aspects.

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1 Firstly, the withdrawal of services, including
 2 health and social care services and the lack of access to
 3 allied health professional services.

4 This crucial framework built around individuals
 5 and families crumbled overnight. Schools closed. Day
 6 services ceased. Crucial therapies were withdrawn. Vital
 7 services for family carers were also withdrawn. And there
 8 has been a significant and long-term impact caused by the
 9 loss of services, both in terms of quality and quantity of
 10 available support.

11 By November 2022, day services were at 75%
 12 capacity and respite services at 68% of capacity. The cuts
 13 in service provision have resulted in significant financial
 14 burdens for families.

15 Secondly, the denial of contact with family and
 16 loved ones.

17 For people with PMLD a connection to and contact
 18 with their family and socialisation can be vital. Although
 19 many are non-verbal and their understanding and responses
 20 may not be readily understood, that is not to say that they
 21 do not crave, need and enjoy social contact.

22 Due to the very specific communication of
 23 individuals, families will have expertise in understanding
 24 and translating their communication, which allows
 25 individuals to be listened to and part of life. Families

1 were and remain key to providing meaningful engagement and
 2 activity.

3 During lockdown those individuals in care homes or
 4 supported living accommodation faced the horror of summarily
 5 being denied contact with loved ones. Many would simply not
 6 understand why. Witnesses spoke to the unsatisfactory
 7 nature of measures, such as garden visits, or the use of
 8 technology. People with a profound learning disability
 9 could not understand what was happening or why. For those
 10 living away from their families, many people enjoyed regular
 11 visits home. And this was all removed from them causing
 12 distress to all.

13 Thirdly, there was a decline in health. Several
 14 witnesses spoke of the marked decline in the health of their
 15 loved ones physically and mentally. Individuals had
 16 services such as physiotherapy withdrawn, which had an
 17 impact on physical conditions.

18 Furthermore, there were no regular checkups on a
 19 range of health conditions, such as epilepsy, and outgrowing
 20 equipment, which led to injuries. If injuries were suffered
 21 this added complexity. Due to limited communication, a
 22 person could not tell staff they were hurt or injured and
 23 therefore falls or other injuries remained undiagnosed.

24 Postural care is a key aspect of care for people
 25 with PMLD. There is a dramatic effect when it is reduced.

1 Michelle Morrison explained how this is something that most
 2 people take for granted and learn instinctively; but for
 3 many with PMLD that is not the case. Poor posture can have
 4 a consequential effect on the body and, importantly, on
 5 respiratory function, which was of particular importance
 6 during the pandemic.

7 Stephanie Fraser spoke of seeing those with
 8 cerebral palsy suffering increased pain and stiffness, with
 9 a decline in function because the person was not able to
 10 keep as active.

11 There was also evidence that the Covid
 12 restrictions have caused a long-term impact on the mood and
 13 behaviour, with a loss of confidence and a decline in
 14 cognitive ability, leading to irretrievable loss of skills.

15 Fourthly, the impact on families. The Inquiry
 16 heard about the dramatic impact on families who were brought
 17 to their knees during the pandemic as virtually overnight
 18 they were denied the help and support that they'd previously
 19 relied on.

20 For individuals who lived away from their family,
 21 there was an overnight loss of contact. Lorraine Mackenzie
 22 explained that her main job was caring for her son. She was
 23 considered part of his care team; but when the Covid
 24 restrictions were put in place, she felt this was a slap in
 25 the face. Pat Graham found it insulting to be told that she

1 could not care for their daughter.

2 For those who had a person with PMLD living with
 3 them, they became their full time carers overnight. They
 4 became exhausted, with no respite and were denied the basic
 5 service provision which they had relied on. Academic
 6 research confirms that family carers' health was impacted by
 7 factors including tiredness, stress, disturbed sleep,
 8 feelings of depression, being short tempered and physical
 9 strain.

10 Why did this happen? Pat Graham explained in her
 11 evidence "if you don't understand the value of a person's
 12 life, then you can't possibly appreciate what COVID took
 13 away from them". Put short, people with PMLD were and
 14 remain an invisible and forgotten group in society.

15 The impacts felt by them during the pandemic came
 16 from the following sources: firstly, there was a lack of
 17 understanding about PMLD. Lorraine Mackenzie remarked that
 18 "I've always said that I would like one of the top
 19 politicians to do an eight hour shift in a care home or in
 20 supported accommodation, which would give them a little bit
 21 of understanding".

22 Many health professionals also did not understand
 23 what it means to have PMLD, or to be a family carer who has
 24 a relative with it.

25 There was a failure to understand the importance

1 of people with PMLD being engaged in physical and
 2 multisensory activity or that being trapped indoors was
 3 incredibly difficult for them. The mental health of people
 4 with PMLD was not considered. The importance of postural
 5 care would still not be understood if there was another
 6 lockdown tomorrow.

7 Finally, there was also a failure to understand
 8 the need for multiple agency input and care.

9 The assumption on the part of those making
 10 decisions that families would be able to cope without all
 11 the services and support that enable caring for a person
 12 with PMLD was particularly distressing.

13 People with PMLD were lumped in with other groups.
 14 There was a lack of real understanding of what distinguishes
 15 them from others. For example, with PMLD in supported
 16 accommodation they should have been treated as if they were
 17 in their own homes, but that took a very long time to filter
 18 through.

19 Secondly, there was a lack of preparation.

20 In the response to a question from your Lordship,
 21 Jenny Miller confirmed that PAMIS had never been asked about
 22 a thought process which might have outlined possible
 23 responses in the case of a pandemic.

24 Thirdly, the guidance was diluted, changed and
 25 ignored, to such an extent that there were 32 versions of

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1 the truth as each local authority chose how to interpret
 2 national guidance.

3 Finally, there was a lack of accountability when
 4 the guidance and the rules were not followed.

5 Pat Graham stated that response to complaints were
 6 typified by a lack of empathy, flexibility and
 7 understanding.

8 So what could have minimised those impacts? A
 9 proper understanding and a will to understand what
 10 distinguishes people with PMLD from others. That means
 11 being properly listened to and engaged with.

12 As stated by Jenny Miller, "We were listened to,
 13 but in the end, nobody heard us properly. By listening to
 14 understand you achieve more. There is also a need for a
 15 collaborative risk assessment to support our most vulnerable
 16 communities".

17 Secondly, a recognition of the importance of
 18 family carers as an essential part of the care team for
 19 people with PMLD.

20 Thirdly, guidance should be clear, unambiguous and
 21 consistently interpreted. This would have reduced stress
 22 and anxieties felt by families and also would have ensured
 23 greater accountability.

24 In conclusion, it is submitted that the evidence
 25 demonstrated the considerable value of third sector

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1 organisations, who demonstrated reliance, flexibility and a
 2 can do attitude to seemingly impossible situations. PAMIS
 3 was a valuable source of information, advice and support to
 4 those caring for people with PMLD. The Inquiry should
 5 recognise this.

6 Furthermore, public bodies should also recognise
 7 that value and work collaboratively moving forward.

8 Finally, my Lord, PAMIS would like to thank the
 9 Inquiry, the Chair, Inquiry counsel and staff for their
 10 positive engagement throughout this process. They've felt
 11 listened to and valued. They hope their evidence will
 12 assist the Inquiry and will be reflected in your Lordship's
 13 findings and recommendations.

14 Thank you.

15 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much, Mr Crabb.
 16 Now, Mr Webster on behalf of Long Covid Kids.

17 Closing statement by MR WEBSTER

18 MR WEBSTER: Good morning, my Lord, Mr Gale.
 19 My Lord, Long Covid Kids Scotland's interest in
 20 this Inquiry is to seek to give voice to the experience,
 21 fears, challenges and frustrations of children and young
 22 people with Long Covid and those who help and support them.

23 So can I, first of all, begin by recording and
 24 commending the Inquiry for seeking advice and accepting that
 25 Long Covid falls within the terms of reference of the

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1 Inquiry, at least so far as encompassed within the strategic
 2 elements of the handling of the pandemic, as specified in
 3 the terms of reference. That includes the Scottish
 4 Government's planning, without restriction of time, and all
 5 other terms of reference during the periods of the years
 6 2020, 2021 and 2022.

7 Of course Long Covid remains an ongoing issue for
 8 many; and the prospect of Long Covid remains for those who
 9 may yet be infected. Whilst for many lockdowns and
 10 restrictions of movement are a thing of the past, for many
 11 children and young persons they may never go back to what
 12 they had before. Long Covid is an aspect of COVID-19 that
 13 continues to require attention as a realtime problem, not
 14 one just to be viewed in the rear view mirror of a public
 15 Inquiry.

16 We note with interest the Royal College of Nursing
 17 in Scotland has written to the First Minister seeking an
 18 amendment to the current terms of reference to the Inquiry
 19 to explicitly include Long Covid. Mr Gale KC has
 20 understandably advised the Inquiry awaits the First
 21 Minister's decision on that matter and it will comply with
 22 any variation directed.

23 However, I submit that, until that decision is
 24 taken, the Inquiry should not falter in its consideration of
 25 Long Covid in the context of the existing terms of reference

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1 up to the 31 December 2022. For even if the Inquiry must
2 bring its Long Covid investigations to an end at that point
3 in time, its findings will provide a valuable point of
4 reference for discussions that might take place elsewhere as
5 to the adequacy of ongoing actions and support.

6 So what of the evidence that the Inquiry has
7 heard? Well, it has heard and, in its background reports,
8 it has been advised that the prospect of long-term sequela
9 from SARS-type virus was known prior to the arrival of
10 SARS-CoV-2.

11 The prospect of long-term symptoms was raised in
12 NERVTAG as early as March 2020. We know that the Cabinet
13 Secretary acknowledged long-term effects in May of 2020.
14 Yet, despite that, the Scottish Government's December 2020
15 policy document "Framework for Decision-Making Assessing the
16 Four Harms of the Crisis", was depressingly devoid of any
17 analysis of Long Covid, far less specific to the interests
18 of children who might succumb to the illness.

19 The Inquiry has also heard eloquently of the
20 devastating physical and emotional reality of Long Covid;
21 and in due course the Inquiry will hear of the educational
22 challenges for children with Long Covid. The Inquiry has
23 also heard of professional and institutional scepticism
24 regarding Long Covid. The Inquiry has heard of the shock
25 and fear of parents seeing their children's health

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1 deteriorate so quickly and so dramatically, not relieved
2 when they faced a professional lack of knowledge and, at
3 times, hostile suspicion.

4 Despite what the Scottish Government tell us in
5 their written submissions as to money allocated for the
6 future, the evidence before the Inquiry painted a picture of
7 unsatisfactory paediatric Long Covid care during the period
8 of the terms of reference of this Inquiry. The evidence was
9 of sparse, variable and, at times, unsympathetic care
10 provision and, at times, ignorant and uninformed dismissal
11 of symptoms.

12 There was evidence of a Kafkaesque difficulty in
13 getting a positive Long Covid diagnosis in the absence of a
14 positive test for Covid, when, at the time of apparent
15 infection, testing was either not available or not offered
16 due to the age of the child.

17 Not the least disheartening, we've heard evidence
18 of parents having to seek and pay for private healthcare,
19 the ultimate abjuration of the ethos of our National Health
20 Service. The Inquiry must look to see whether there was an
21 inappropriate reluctance on the part of those working in the
22 NHS to diagnose Long Covid and, if so, what the reason for
23 that was.

24 So what do LCKS wish the Inquiry to focus on?
25 Well, firstly, planning. As the Inquiry has heard, the

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1 prospect of long-term health consequences from a Coronavirus
2 pandemic was known and foreseeable prior to the arrival of
3 COVID-19. It ought to have formed an integral part of the
4 planning for the national response to a Coronavirus
5 pandemic. Decisions, as Mr Gale observed yesterday, have
6 consequences.

7 What the public expect this Inquiry to do is to
8 investigate and assess the quality of the strategic
9 decision-making that was undertaken. LCKS looks to the
10 Inquiry to ascertain what information was available to the
11 Scottish Government and the NHS in Scotland as to the
12 long-term health risks of Coronavirus especially as regards
13 children. And then to ascertain, in addition, to what
14 extent, if any, that information was taken into account in
15 determining priorities for care and protection from risk.

16 Harm exists in more than one dimension. The
17 protection of life does not necessitate the abrogation of
18 consideration of other achievable protections. It does not
19 excuse a failure to be sophisticated in approach. And
20 urgency in the face of a pandemic that has arrived does not
21 excuse a failure to plan in the calm space before the storm.

22 Yesterday I encouraged the Inquiry to approach its
23 investigations around three As — awareness, assessment and
24 actions — so as to inform the issue of accountability. It
25 will come as no surprise that I continue to advocate and

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1 encourage that approach. The Inquiry needs to identify what
2 the planners were and ought reasonably to have been aware
3 of; what assessments they made of that information; and the
4 reasonableness of the action that was identified as
5 appropriate in response.

6 As I did yesterday, I submit that the Inquiry's
7 terms of reference, whilst not explicit on the issue of NHS
8 Scotland's strategic planning, for the terms of reference to
9 be fulfilled the Inquiry should and must at least consider
10 the state of preparedness of the NHS in Scotland as at
11 1 January 2020, in order to comprehend fully the quality of
12 the response then and thereafter.

13 Second, beyond planning, the same investigatory
14 approach should be adopted towards the policies and actions
15 of the Scottish Government and the NHS in Scotland once the
16 pandemic was upon us. The Inquiry should investigate and
17 ascertain, on a time line basis, the developing professional
18 knowledge and literature as to long-term sequela on Covid
19 infection, particularly as regards children; then ascertain
20 the extent to which the relevant decision-makers sought
21 and/or were provided with that information, considered it
22 and applied the learning from it. Was their response
23 informed? Was it timely? Was it reasonable?

24 Within that, particular enquiries, I say, should
25 be focused as following:

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1 1. The criteria for assessment of infection. As
2 the Inquiry has heard, there can be significant problems in
3 diagnosis of Long Covid if there is no primary diagnosis of
4 Covid itself. Children do not present symptoms as adults
5 do. That was foreseeable. So the question that arises is
6 whether, in the light of the same, the criteria and time
7 line for testing set by the Scottish Government and the NHS
8 in Scotland was sensitive to that foreseeable challenge.

9 2. Access to health and social care. A child in
10 Caithness is entitled to the same protection and support and
11 healthcare as one in the central belt of Scotland; but it is
12 foreseeable that without proper sharing of information,
13 analysis and learning, care provision may not fairly be made
14 available throughout the country. So did the Scottish
15 Government and the NHS in Scotland rise to the challenge of
16 developing knowledge? Did they bring together the learning?

17 As respiratory and geriatric disciplines took the
18 brunt of the impact, did Scotland's professional paediatric
19 community, coordinated by the NHS centrally, rise to the
20 occasion created by the closure of wards, to accommodate an
21 anticipated influx of Covid patients, to contemplate the
22 science, the risks and their ability to provide appropriate
23 and valuable long-term care to all of Scotland's children,
24 wherever they might be? Or did they take their eye off the
25 ball?

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1 Scottish Government tells us of the money being
2 allocated now, but that is, with respect, to distract from
3 the issues of learning from and accountability for what was
4 done or, perhaps more correctly, not done earlier. Better
5 to avoid the consequences that have now having to be
6 responded to.

7 3. Professional scepticism. The issue here is of
8 the mentality and mindset of clinicians and of those in
9 support professions within the National Health Service.
10 Long Covid is real. I shouldn't have to say that, but the
11 evidence before the Inquiry suggests that some people have
12 still not got that message.

13 The concern here is pervasive as it affects not
14 only the ability to access healthcare but also other
15 services, such as education support and social welfare
16 support. What hope is there of an informed response to the
17 needs of children with Long Covid if the very existence of
18 the illness is doubted?

19 I submit that the Inquiry, in order to fulfil its
20 terms of reference, must debunk, once and for all, this
21 attitude of disbelief. It should set out the facts and
22 knowledge relating to Long Covid, identify the shortfalls of
23 the provision of health and social care and of course, in
24 due course, education for children with Long Covid so as to
25 put an end to the scepticism of the naysayers and the

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1 doubters.

2 4. Mitigation measures.

3 It is well known that children were treated
4 differently from the rest of the population. The perception
5 that they were at less risk resulted in greater interactions
6 and larger gatherings. Air transmission rates were
7 infamously considered to be effectively achieved by cutting
8 the bottom off of classroom doors.

9 Having regard to the foreseeable risks of
10 long-term sequela for children, the Inquiry should ask
11 whether the specific arrangements for children, in terms of
12 masking, assembly of attendance at school and for making
13 schools a safe place of study, were reasonable,
14 proportionate and adequate.

15 And, finally, 5, I turn to the issue of support
16 for Scotland's children with Long Covid. The virulence of
17 the virus may have waned but the risk of Long Covid remains;
18 and, with each infection, the risk of developing Long Covid
19 increases.

20 Yesterday — yesterday — Public Health Scotland
21 advised that it had detected an increase in Covid in waste
22 water for the last few weeks, accompanied by a rise of
23 laboratory confirmed PCR and self-reported cases.

24 Covid has not gone away. So, in order to inform
25 the national response to the pandemic, the Inquiry should

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1 look at what the Scottish Government and the NHS in Scotland
2 has done to ingather information to understand the illness
3 and how it might best be combated. What exchange of
4 information has been coordinated? Has there been an
5 international engagement and learning?

6 The terms of reference are, at least for now,
7 limited in point of time; but an assessment by this Inquiry
8 of the state of coordination at the end of 2022 will, as
9 I've said before, provide an appropriate benchmark to test
10 the adequacy of what has been done since. The discussion
11 can then be continued elsewhere and in an informed manner.

12 One aspect of that discussion is likely to be the
13 adequacy of the financial supported to be provided to those
14 who care for children with Long Covid.

15 As Long Covid was foreseeable, significant and
16 avoidable or ameliorable for many, and its effects can be
17 physically, emotionally and economically debilitating, it
18 is, in my submission, appropriate for the Inquiry to
19 consider, and report, on the financial support available to
20 Long Covid sufferers and their carers and to make
21 recommendations as to whether, in response, a cause exists
22 for better State financial provision to be made available to
23 them.

24 As I did yesterday, my Lord, may I remind the
25 Inquiry of what I said in my opening statement: the children

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1 of Scotland should be able to thrive and look forward to a
2 positive future. The Inquiry may be their best opportunity
3 to have their voices heard. They are the future. The
4 obligations on your Lordship's shoulders sit no more heavily
5 than they do for Scotland's children.

6 THE CHAIR: Thank you Mr Webster.

7 Now, Ms Merchant is going to address us twice,
8 first on behalf of Scottish Hazards and then on behalf of
9 the STUC. I think you can probably just stay there for the
10 whole time. It will perhaps be clear, but tell us when
11 you're changing from one to the other please. Thank you.

12 Closing statement by MS MERCHANT

13 MS MERCHANT: Thank you, my Lord.

14 Firstly on behalf of Scottish Hazards, I would use
15 this opportunity to adopt my written submissions, which the
16 Inquiry already have.

17 By way of background, Scottish Hazards are a
18 charity focused on the advancement of health and safety at
19 work. It is in that context that these submissions,
20 relating to the impact of the pandemic and the strategic
21 response on health and social care, are presented.

22 My Lord, Scottish Hazards had good engagement with
23 the Scottish Government during the COVID-19 pandemic. They
24 had funding which allowed them to provide a telephone
25 helpline for non-unionised workers. It is from this direct

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1 evidence that much of Scottish Hazards' evidence to this
2 Inquiry comes.

3 Further, Scottish Hazards were a member of the
4 Scottish Government's Covid Safer Workplaces Group, which
5 was set up to consider workplace issues during the pandemic.

6 However, despite this good engagement, and the
7 apparent willingness on behalf of the Scottish Government to
8 engage with Scottish Hazards, the issues that arose in
9 health and social care workplaces mainly derived from the
10 lack of enforcement of guidance and/or employers' lack of
11 knowledge with regard basic health and safety requirements.

12 It is Scottish Hazards' view that the impact of
13 the pandemic and the strategic response was felt greatest
14 amongst those health and social care workers who were most
15 vulnerable; women, black and ethnic minority workers and
16 those working in the non-unionised care sector were
17 disproportionately affected, exacerbating long-standing
18 socioeconomic differences and inequalities.

19 Turning, first, to the lack of enforcement of
20 guidance. My Lord, health and social care staff went to
21 work during the pandemic. Workplaces were one of the few
22 places that people were allowed to go during the pandemic;
23 and that being the case, Scottish Hazards believe that more
24 consideration ought to have been given by decision makers to
25 COVID-19 as an occupational health matter.

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1 The impact of not considering COVID-19 in this way
2 was that employers and enforcement bodies focused almost
3 exclusively on community spread; and this ignored the fact
4 that, for a significant proportion of Scotland's population,
5 Covid was spread and contracted in the workplace.

6 Turning to the guidance itself, Scottish Hazards
7 believe that the reason that some employers were so willing
8 to ignore the guidance was because of a lack of monitoring
9 and enforcement. Put simply, there was insufficient
10 monitoring. There was no penalty and no consequence for
11 employers who failed to follow it.

12 Further, in situations, which have been outlined
13 by other Core Participants, Scottish guidance differed from
14 UK guidance, meaning that Scottish workers were, in effect,
15 unable to secure those workplace protections set out for
16 them here in Scotland.

17 That lack of enforcement is akin to another set of
18 circumstances described by witness Pat Graham from the
19 charity PAMIS. There was a passage of Ms Graham's evidence,
20 my Lord, that struck me as essentially summing up the issue.
21 It was on day 23 of evidence.

22 Ms Graham and my Lord had an exchange around a
23 letter which had been sent from the Cabinet Secretary to
24 various NHS bodies and social care partnerships, in line
25 with PAMIS' main aim that those with profound learning

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1 difficulties were supported by their carers at hospitals.

2 Ms Graham's evidence was despite the letter being
3 sent, PAMIS' experience was ignored. There was a lack of,
4 as Ms Graham said, being able to make somebody do it. The
5 witness confirmed that this was because there was no legal
6 power. My Lord posed the question:

7 "If the Government think that it is that serious,
8 you could argue that they should ensure that it is
9 mandatory."

10 In my submission, that is exactly the situation
11 that we find ourselves in with workplace guidance. And also
12 in relation to the Social Care Fund, which the Inquiry has
13 heard much evidence of to the effect that some employers
14 refused to use it, some have said it didn't apply, some
15 delayed in paying wages until they had recouped the money
16 from the Scottish Government.

17 In my submission, this is yet another example of
18 the limits of a non-mandatory scheme. The impact of these
19 measures was lessened because it was not legally
20 enforceable.

21 Scottish Hazards do accept, however, my Lord, that
22 the regulatory regime is complicated and some of these
23 matters undoubtedly fall out of scope of this Inquiry.
24 However, what does strike at the heart of this Inquiry and,
25 therefore, in my submission, is in scope is the impact of

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1 the decisions made by the Government on health and social
2 care workers. And it is Scottish Hazards' position that the
3 impact of the guidance issued by Government, aimed at
4 protecting workers, was weakened by the fact that it was not
5 backed up by a clear monitoring and enforcement regime. The
6 lack of this regime meant that social care workers were left
7 under-protected and unnecessarily exposed to contracting and
8 spreading COVID-19.

9 While accepting that the Scottish Government were,
10 of course, limited in relation to matters involving health
11 and safety, which remains reserved to Westminster, Scottish
12 Hazards believe that there were powers which the Government
13 could and should have used to enforce measures in
14 workplaces. As the Inquiry moves to consider the
15 implementation and examine decision-making in relation to
16 healthcare, Scottish Hazards consider that the Inquiry
17 require to review the lack of investigations, monitoring and
18 enforcement of guidance.

19 In particular, the Inquiry should seek to
20 understand the reasons for this, including the legal and
21 practical limitations of the enforcement regime. In my
22 submission, this is particularly important as we seek to
23 learn lessons for the future.

24 Scottish Hazards believe that Scotland cannot go
25 into another pandemic with a regulatory regime that has

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1 enabled some employers to ignore guidance with impunity.
2 Such a system raises huge questions about the confidence and
3 integrity of the system by which we are governed and
4 Government information and guidance in general.

5 Moving on to the lack of understanding of health
6 and safety requirements amongst employers. Ian Tasker, the
7 Chief Executive of Scottish Hazards, said in evidence at the
8 outset of the pandemic workers calling the hot line were
9 aware that their employers should have been taking some
10 action but were unaware what protections were being put in
11 place.

12 This was the start for them of much evidence that
13 showed that employers appeared to be unaware of their legal
14 duties around health and safety; in particular their
15 requirements to consult their workforce about measures and
16 to carry out risk assessments.

17 As Mr Tasker said in evidence, there was little of
18 consultation, rather communication of management
19 instruction. That is not the same thing; and does not take
20 account of the views of those carrying out the work and
21 therefore requiring the protection from COVID-19.

22 The impact of this on workers was an increased
23 sense of fear and panic. The difference that that
24 consultation would have made: it would have given workers a
25 voice and it would have allayed many fears, in particular

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1 like simply knowing that things were being considered would
2 have gone a long way; instead workers were seeking
3 information and were getting nothing back.

4 Scottish Hazards are deeply concerned by some
5 employers' failure to conduct adequate risk assessments or
6 indeed risk assessments at all. The impact of this was that
7 risk assessments did not adequately address the concerns
8 raised by employees or adapt to an ever changing situation.

9 This left Scotland's workers exposed to COVID-19
10 with no control measures being identified. Scottish Hazards
11 believe that the impact of this could and should have been
12 mitigated, had employers carried out their legal
13 obligations.

14 From Scottish Hazards' helpline it was clear,
15 my Lord, that the pandemic has affected those in health and
16 social care workers who are most vulnerable and working in
17 the most of precarious of employments. Within social care
18 those working in the non-unionised private care sector were
19 particularly vulnerable. The helpline provided the need for
20 a central point of advice. The lack of such made it
21 difficult for the non-unionised workforce to seek
22 independent advice that they needed to keep themselves safe
23 and to prevent the spread of the virus at work. Scottish
24 Hazards believe that an independent advice resource should
25 be central to future pandemic planning; and it may be that

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1 this covers advice both to employers and employees.

2 Within the social care workforce, Hazards picked
3 up concerns, particularly from workers who were going into
4 households to treat patients. This Inquiry has heard
5 similar evidence in relation to the allied healthcare
6 professions and other workers who went in and out and
7 between people's homes. For example, workers would attend
8 to provide care at someone's home and family and friends
9 would be there. This might have been when gatherings were
10 restricted. The individuals might not have been wearing
11 masks. These situations put workers at risk of contracting
12 and spreading COVID-19.

13 The guidance in relation to the care at home
14 sector, which was eventually issued by the Government, did
15 not apparently appear to appreciate the fact that workers
16 were in fact going in and out and between people's homes.
17 It appeared that there was little consideration given to the
18 fact that they were going into an entirely uncontrolled
19 environment. Simple issues such as social distancing,
20 relatives and friends not being in attendance during care
21 visits wearing masks, were not considered. Those were all
22 essential measures to keep workers safe.

23 The impact of this was that workers were entering
24 service users' houses unsafe from COVID-19 with the
25 potential to then spread it throughout their community.

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1 Workers did, as the Inquiry has heard, seek advice
2 from their employer in relation to these matters, but too
3 often they were — in the words of Scottish Hazards —
4 instructed to enter houses and perform their duties
5 regardless.

6 The effect of this was that workers were put at
7 risk. Some employers failed in their duties to keep their
8 staff safe; and the gaps in the guidance on the issue
9 hampered the ability of the workers to protect their own and
10 their clients' health.

11 Pregnant women were also vulnerable during the
12 pandemic, many seeking advice from Hazards in relation to
13 risk assessments, as required by law when a woman advises
14 her employer of pregnancy. This, during the pandemic,
15 included additional consideration of the COVID-19 risk to
16 the health of the worker and her pregnancy. Unfortunately,
17 in Scottish Hazards' experience the generalised lack of risk
18 assessments was also true for pregnant women. As Mr Tasker
19 said in evidence, pregnant women were often being asked to
20 choose between continuing to work and risking the health of
21 their unborn child. This increased their stress levels, put
22 them at risk of contracting Covid, thereby risking their and
23 their unborn child's health and wellbeing.

24 In my submission, this is an impact which was
25 foreseeable. It was avoidable had basic health and safety

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1 and pregnancy related legislation been followed. In any
2 event, at the start of the pandemic, given the lack of
3 knowledge about the impact of COVID-19 on pregnancy and
4 pregnant women, the precautionary principle should have been
5 applied.

6 Another vulnerable group were those who required
7 to shield. Scottish Hazards provided advice to shielding
8 workers, particularly after the requirement to shield was
9 lifted. This decision and the failure to provide any
10 guidance for employers or workers had a significant impact
11 on shielding workers.

12 When considering shielding workers you have to
13 remember that these workers essentially had been told to
14 stay at home for months. They'd had limited contact with
15 anyone because they were told of their increased risk to
16 serious illness if they became infected with COVID-19.

17 From those contacting Scottish Hazards, as you
18 would imagine, their main concern was contracting the
19 disease. Again, Scottish Hazards found that when individual
20 risk assessments were carried out — if they were —
21 employers would often ignore the outcome and/or refuse the
22 measures necessary, such as allowing workers to work from
23 home.

24 In Scottish Hazards' experience, control measures,
25 such as reallocation of tasks, removing an individual from a

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1 customer facing role, were basic control measures which
2 would have been reasonable to keep previously shielded
3 workers safe, but many employers were reluctant to do this.

4 And, in my submission, that is another example of
5 some employers failing to fulfil basic current health and
6 safety legislation.

7 That, my Lord, essentially sums up Scottish
8 Hazards' position in relation to the handling of the
9 pandemic. Guidance, while lacking in places, was there.
10 What wasn't there was an enforcement regime to back it up;
11 and this was compounded by a lack of understanding by some
12 employers of basic health and safety requirements.

13 When looking back at this pandemic and this
14 Inquiry, in times of a future pandemic, hopefully in many
15 years to come, decision makers and politicians of the future
16 must have the opportunity to learn lessons. The response to
17 the next pandemic must be better than this one. We cannot
18 go into another pandemic where compliance with guidance is
19 voluntary because we all know that some — not all but
20 some — will look at this pandemic and they will think there
21 was no consequence for not following guidance last time, so
22 why should we follow it this time? And that, my Lord, in a
23 world of ever increasing disinformation, scepticism of
24 science and Government guidance in general, could be very
25 dangerous. Government decisions and guidance must mean

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1 something; and, therefore, they must be enforced.

2 That concludes my submissions on behalf of
3 Scottish Hazards.

4 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

5 MS MERCHANT: In relation to the Scottish Trade
6 Union Congress, the submission focused on the strategic
7 response to health and social care.

8 I think at the start of this submission it is
9 important to put on record that COVID-19 resulted in a
10 myriad of impacts for health and social care workers, some
11 of which, while undoubtedly significant, did not come from
12 strategic decision-making and the strategic response.

13 The focus, however, of these submissions is on the
14 impact from strategic decisions, rather than generalised
15 impacts on workers.

16 The STUC would like to highlight overarching
17 themes this morning.

18 1. The failure to understand the roles carried
19 out by those working on the health and social care front
20 line.

21 2. Occupational exposure in workplaces and
22 decisions of employers.

23 As with many of the other Core Participants,
24 within both of these sections, the disparate impact on the
25 low paid is indefinitely intertwined.

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1 Turning first to the roles carried out by health
2 and social care workers. The Scottish Government's failure
3 to understand and consult with those workers working on the
4 front line has been demonstrated throughout this section of
5 the Inquiry. It is a thread that runs through decisions on
6 many of the key issues including guidance, PPE, essential
7 workers, what procedures were carried out.

8 As stated in our written submissions, and heard in
9 various closing submissions yesterday and today, much of the
10 guidance appears to have been influenced predominantly by
11 its application in the acute clinical setting. The impact
12 of this, in my submission, was felt most by those working in
13 social care and the allied healthcare professions. The
14 guidance did not reflect the reality of their work or their
15 workplaces.

16 It is the STUC's position that this impact could
17 have been minimised and potentially excluded had those
18 drafting the guidance, firstly, prioritised their
19 understanding of these key job roles and secondly consulted
20 with those doing the job.

21 The Inquiry has heard much evidence on this point
22 from a variety of different workers, so I would only seek to
23 draw the Inquiry's attention to two today.

24 Care homes.

25 In relation to care homes guidance was described

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1 by witnesses as unrealistic, as an impossibility, as a
2 failure to recognise patients' conditions, particularly
3 around dementia, as highlighted by Mr Gale yesterday. It
4 failed to recognise a care home as a residence home.

5 Car sharing.

6 This meant that care staff and prison staff,
7 despite having worked a 12-hour shift together, were unable
8 to travel together in the way that they usually would. The
9 financial impact of that and the mental health impact of
10 travelling long distances alone cannot be underestimated.

11 Moving on to PPE.

12 The Scottish Government restricted FFP3 masks to
13 those responsible for carrying out aerosol generating
14 procedures. However, again, due to the lack of
15 understanding about job roles, about medical procedures and
16 what jobs did what procedures, there was unnecessary
17 conflict at employer level. This led to things like
18 ambulance staff and speech and language therapists not being
19 given FFP3 masks and, therefore, left unprotected and
20 vulnerable, despite a job requirement to carry out AGPs.

21 "Pound shop protection" was how the GMB ambulance
22 members would describe the PPE they were provided with;
23 leaving ambulance workers, in the words of one witness,
24 "like lambs to the slaughter".

25 Other witnesses describe a hierarchy of PPE

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1 whereby lower grade blue collar staff, for example porters
2 and domestics, were not provided with sufficient PPE. And
3 this was despite the fact that porters were in direct
4 contact with patients and domestics were responsible for the
5 cleaning of Covid positive wards.

6 The STUC consider that the Inquiry is required to
7 investigate why PPE was issued in this way.

8 My Lord, the intersection between the workers who
9 were not provided with adequate PPE and the social economic
10 gradient cannot be understated.

11 The Inquiry has heard much evidence that those
12 working in low paid, arguably less valued roles, such as
13 care home staff, home carers, porters and domestic had to
14 fight to secure adequate PPE.

15 In my submission, this was summed up by
16 Peter Hunter of UNISON who said that care workers were
17 telling them they would use bin bags: they would cut them
18 up, they would wrap themselves in them. They would welly
19 boots or they would use Marigolds. They would improvise.
20 In contrast, Mr Hunter said, "I don't remember an NHS nurse
21 contacting us with that level of distress or with the
22 examples of extreme improvisation".

23 The STUC considers that the Inquiry is required to
24 investigate why FFP3 masks were limited to staff carrying
25 out AGPs. Why were they never provided to all health and

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1 social care staff? And to what extent were those decisions
2 around PPE led by science, when compared with other
3 considerations, such as cost and supply?

4 For care at home workers, at the start of the
5 pandemic there was no PPE guidance; and this was despite the
6 fact that these workers go in and out of and between
7 people's homes. They provided care at home to some of the
8 most vulnerable in our society. And when considering the
9 impact of this on these predominantly women workers, it is
10 important to remember back to the early days of the
11 pandemic. We didn't know what we know now. The crisis was
12 escalating. People feared contracting the virus. They
13 feared their relatives contracting the virus. People were
14 told to go home, stay at home, not go out, not mix with
15 others. And it was that context that these women — care at
16 home workers — were going in and out of and between
17 people's homes providing crucial care.

18 The Inquiry has heard much evidence about this.
19 However, put simply, care at home workers were working at
20 great risk to themselves, their service users and their
21 family. At the start of the pandemic they were terrified
22 that they would become vessels of Covid. They feared
23 contracting Covid from service users or giving it to service
24 users. They feared spreading it amongst service users.
25 They feared taking it home to their families and spreading

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1 it in their communities.

2 When the PPE guidance was issued for this group of
3 workers, the fear was compounded. The protection proposed
4 was less than other workers. Care at home workers were told
5 that they didn't require to wear a mask unless they were
6 dealing with patients who were showing signs of Covid.

7 An example of the stark reality of that message
8 was a care at home worker going to provide care in a service
9 user's home at the same time as a community nurse was
10 leaving that person's home. The community nurse was wearing
11 full gown, mask, gloves; and yet the care at home worker was
12 being told not to even wear a mask — that same mask,
13 my Lord, that everyone was wearing on the bus and in the
14 supermarket within a matter of weeks.

15 This led to the workforce losing confidence in the
16 Government. They did not believe they were being taken
17 seriously; and, more importantly, their work was not being
18 valued.

19 On 4 April 2020, 1,500 care workers sent a letter
20 to the First Minister, and I quote:

21 "We do not feel safe at work. You have lost our
22 confidence by publishing guidance without consultation with
23 front line workers and by forcing us to work with
24 insufficient PPE."

25 Following the publication of that letter, much

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1 media coverage, and repeated questions at the First
2 Minister's regular press conferences, the guidance was
3 changed and the Cabinet Secretary did apologise.

4 The STUC believes that this shows this crisis in
5 care at home was avoidable. It was avoidable had the
6 Government prioritised this group of workers, understood
7 their job roles and protected them accordingly.

8 Looking again at occupational exposure. Research
9 suggests that exposure at work was around four times higher
10 amongst workers in health and social care when compared to
11 the average rate across industries. Further data suggests
12 that a disproportionately high number of those who died from
13 COVID-19 were engaged in the care sector when compared to
14 the average for all occupations.

15 Exposure at work, my Lord, was foreseeable during
16 the pandemic and it was known before the pandemic.

17 The STUC are concerned that the difference in
18 death rates across the workforce appears to reflect
19 occupational risk and the social class gradient.

20 The intersection between occupational exposure and
21 socioeconomic inequalities is another significant part of
22 where the uneven impact of the pandemic can be found. The
23 STUC agrees with the Health and Safety Executive where they
24 say that there was widespread under-reporting of COVID-19
25 workplace deaths.

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1 The guidance placed the onus on employers to make
2 a judgment as to whether workplace exposure was an issue.
3 The impact of this was to minimise that obligation, leading
4 to under-reporting of workplace deaths.

5 In the STUC's submission, that was foreseeable.
6 It was unsurprising that few employers reported in these
7 circumstances, instead choosing to judge that outbreaks were
8 a result of exposure outside of work premises.

9 Again, the Inquiry has heard a wide range of
10 evidence on this point, from British Medical Association,
11 the Royal College of Nursing and Unite the Union.

12 The STUC consider that the Inquiry, when looking
13 to its next stages, require to consider what was the
14 thinking around the role of occupational exposure when
15 taking decisions and developing guidance. Was the guidance
16 regarding the reporting of workplace deaths adequate?

17 The STUC also consider that the Inquiry should
18 review why legally required risk assessments were not
19 carried out by employers and what consideration was given to
20 employers to prevent and report workplace deaths.

21 Moving on to employers failing to follow guidance.
22 As the Inquiry has heard in evidence, workers in health and
23 social care were often met with employers who failed to
24 follow the guidance. In some care homes the theme of low
25 paid women workers being ignored and forgotten continued.

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1 Staff had to fight for PPE. A witness before the Inquiry
2 described how the management of a care home she worked in,
3 and I quote "rolled their eyes and had an attitude that we
4 were being ridiculous and dramatic" when they asked to wear
5 their own masks at work because their employer failed to
6 provide them.

7 These decisions left staff fearful,
8 under-protected and under-appreciated. Even when PPE did
9 arrive, the Inquiry, again, has heard a myriad of evidence
10 about PPE being rationed, PPE being kept in a locked
11 cupboard, staff being told to reuse PPE. And in specific
12 relation to care homes this was compounded by the Scottish
13 Government's decision to discharge Covid positive patients
14 into care homes without testing, placing social care staff
15 and care home residents at significant risk.

16 The impact of this decision meant that care staff
17 were exposed to unprecedented levels of death and suffering.
18 The impact of these decisions on this group of low paid
19 workers cannot be underestimated. This is the same group of
20 workers that the Social Care Fund was established for.

21 The Social Care Fund was established after
22 significant trade union campaigning to force the Government
23 to understand that a system of guidance, which was
24 predicated on low paid workers losing pay due to the
25 self-isolation requirement, did not survive contact with

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1 reality. Most social care workers were entitled to
2 statutory sick pay only. In 2020 to 2021 this was £95 a
3 week; and it was only payable after a three day waiting
4 period — three days where these weekly paid workers would
5 receive no pay.

6 As witnesses before the Inquiry have said, many
7 social care workers were scared to test in case it was
8 positive meaning they required to stay at home, meaning they
9 would not be paid. The guidance put workers in an
10 impossible position: financial jeopardy on one hand, versus
11 potentially taking COVID—19 into their workplace, a
12 workplace where they were looking after vulnerable and
13 elderly residents, and where they did not think had
14 sufficient PPE on the other.

15 The problems with employers and the Social Care
16 Fund are well—known and, given the time constraints, I don't
17 intend to rehearse those arguments here. Except to say that
18 the STUC consider the Scottish Government were restricted in
19 what they could do to compel employers to use the fund.
20 Employment law is reserved to Westminster. The Scottish
21 Parliament can't pass legislation which says: you have to
22 pay workers X number of pounds for X number of work. We
23 accept the intricacies of the devolution settlement are not
24 in the scope of this Inquiry.

25 However, the limitations on the powers of the

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1 Scottish Government meant that the fund was less effective
2 than it could have been. Its impact was lessened because of
3 the devolution settlement.

4 In conclusion, my Lord, the STUC believes that the
5 evidence heard by the Inquiry points to a clear link between
6 the social gradient and the impact of COVID—19. The poorest
7 had the least ability to work from home. They were more
8 likely to be exposed to Covid at work, on their way to work
9 on public transport. They were more likely to have
10 underlying health conditions, meaning they were more
11 susceptible to COVID—19.

12 Those attending work, many of whom already faced
13 economic disadvantage, faced increased occupational exposure
14 and risk of death, when compared to those who could work
15 from home.

16 Through this Inquiry, the STUC have highlighted
17 instances of concerns being raised by workers who simply
18 didn't believe that the circumstances of their workplace had
19 been given sufficient consideration. Many of those workers
20 lost confidence that they were being sufficiently protected
21 by their employers and through their trade unions those
22 workers raised the alarm. And, as the Inquiry moves to its
23 next phase, in my submission it needs to look at when the
24 Government recognised that the alarm was ringing how long it
25 took the Government to respond to the alarm; and whether or

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1 not the alarm ought to have been required to have been rung
2 at all. Because in the STUC's view the protection of front
3 line workers in health and crucially in social care ought to
4 have been sufficiently planned for.

5 Unless I can be of any more assistance, those are
6 my submissions.

7 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed
8 Ms Merchant.

9 Now, next we have Mr Di Paola for CrossReach.

10 Closing statement by MR DI PAOLA

11 MR DI PAOLA: Good afternoon, my Lord, ladies and
12 gentlemen. I'm here to day on behalf of the Church of
13 Scotland in the guise of CrossReach.

14 CrossReach welcomes the opportunity to provide a
15 closing statement to the Inquiry. Since the Health and
16 Social Care Impact Hearings commenced back in October 2023,
17 CrossReach has willingly participated in and paid close
18 attention to the evidence as it has emerged during the
19 course of the Inquiry.

20 The evidence has shown that organisations across
21 the country involved in care sector provision and their
22 dedicated teams of staff faced an unknown and unenviable
23 task during the entirety of the pandemic. And that impact
24 is still being felt across the sector today.

25 The people whom the care sector is there to

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1 support — many of them vulnerable — suffered greatly as a
2 result of the pandemic, as did their friends and families,
3 many of whom have also given evidence of that impact.

4 CrossReach provides its statement in accordance
5 with the directions of the Chair, focusing on (1) impacts
6 which we consider to be foreseeable; (2) impacts which were
7 most significant and/or detrimental; and (3) impacts which
8 might have been minimised or excluded had reasonable steps
9 been taken to do so.

10 1. Impacts which CrossReach considered to be
11 foreseeable.

12 The fragility of the care home sector was already
13 under discussion with the Scottish Government before the
14 pandemic hit. Protection, including financial underpinning
15 of essential residential care services, was needed. It was
16 a much rehearsed mantra that the NHS should not become
17 overwhelmed with capacity being built like additional
18 hospital units at the SECC.

19 However, what was lost in this principle was the
20 importance of the social care sector to health provision and
21 the critical nature it plays in preventing the need for
22 access to acute services.

23 When a protective ring was eventually thrown round
24 care homes as the impact of COVID—19 on a frail, older
25 community became starkly clear, it became more like a noose.

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1 We believe that the consequence of isolating residents from
2 their families for longer than necessary should also have
3 been foreseeable, given the mental health repercussions of
4 isolation in the community generally and caused unnecessary
5 additional suffering to those in care homes, many of whom
6 who are without capacity and their families.

7 However, social care does not just exist as an
8 adjunct to the health service. It is there to help people
9 in situations where additional support is required, often as
10 a result of physical disability or mental health issue, to
11 overcome challenges and live life to the full, whether in a
12 residential setting or in a community.

13 This has also been the subject of discussion with
14 the Scottish Government. It is accepted that everybody had
15 their freedom curtailed, but it was reasonably foreseeable
16 that those in greatest need of support to live a normal life
17 would feel the greatest impact of a pandemic and deserved
18 special consideration.

19 2. Impacts which were most significant and/or
20 detrimental.

21 Guidance.

22 The guidance at various times, and particularly
23 initially, did not cover all areas and was open to differing
24 interpretations. It lacked consistency and clarity and
25 changed too frequently to reasonably be kept pace with by a

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1 nurse or care worker.

2 As guidance was issued to social care settings by
3 the Scottish Government, it became clear that there was not
4 a full understanding of the range of care settings that
5 existed or that these were not all clinical settings. There
6 was a lack of distinction between distinct types of setting
7 and a failure to take into account the fundamental
8 differences in these services caused difficulties.

9 Changes in regulations and guidance also had a
10 significant impact. It took a significant effort to
11 interpret and implement guidance which came thick and fast
12 and often needed further clarification as it was unclear,
13 sometimes unhelpful, and came with short implementation
14 windows.

15 The sector representatives, CCPS and Scottish
16 Care, had to intervene to stop critical guidance notes from
17 being issued by the Scottish Government late on a Friday
18 with an impossible short lead in time, often involving a
19 Monday morning.

20 There was no clear distinction between regulation
21 and guidance, to the point that CrossReach decided that the
22 only safe course was to treat both as regulation. The
23 default applied by CrossReach was to comply with everything
24 or to go beyond it. On the few occasions that the guidance
25 was not followed because it simply did not make sense to

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1 apply it in the way suggested, this was approved at the
2 highest level within the organisation.

3 The sheer quantity of guidance from a number of
4 regulators, combined with the frequency of changes, made
5 this overwhelming; and the inability to have sufficiently
6 quick, cost appropriate, independent scrutiny and guidance
7 led to feelings of powerless and frustration.

8 Scottish Government lack of understanding of the
9 nature, extent and purpose of social care.

10 Care homes are not short-term, high level clinical
11 settings. Care homes are people's homes. The people who
12 are supported by social care services are not patients and
13 the staff are not clinicians. Good social care is about
14 supporting people in vulnerable situations and whatever
15 challenges they face to live as independently as possible
16 and to live life to the full.

17 The command and control structure adopted for the
18 NHS was not appropriate for social care, which needed a
19 different approach when it came to keeping supported people
20 and those supporting them safe.

21 There was a failure by the Scottish Government to
22 distinguish between different types of care setting.
23 Recommendations which made sense from a Covid infection
24 control perspective and were appropriate in an ordinary
25 setting did not work where other risks to health or

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1 wellbeing specific to the context were overlooked.

2 3. A clinical standard of inspection.

3 Infection protection and control, IPC, was a
4 critical activity for CrossReach services. It was a focus
5 of Care Inspectorate inspections. During the pandemic,
6 inspections were often accompanied by IPC specialists with
7 care homes being expected to meet clinical standards of
8 inspection.

9 Inspections using clinical standards impacted
10 CrossReach by increasing the burden on care staff and
11 managers as the way in which the guidance was applied by IPC
12 specialists accompanying the Care Inspectorate on visits
13 meant they were directed to seek out the specific brands of
14 cleaning fluid, rather than simply meet the standard
15 required composition of chlorine solution.

16 It also created a sense of disempowerment leading
17 to a lack of confidence at a critical time by being
18 over-prescriptive for staff who were well-versed in IPC
19 methods as they had to manage seasonal flu, Norovirus and
20 other types of infection on a regular basis. Inspections
21 using clinical standards, also reduced care inspection
22 evaluations.

23 4. Vulnerability of care home staff and care home
24 managers.

25 Deaths in social care services were referred to

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1 the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal service and are being
2 investigated by the police. Some managers continue to have
3 the prospect of potential prosecuting hanging over them some
4 four years after the pandemic began. This was not
5 replicated in the National Health Service, where the
6 majority of Covid deaths actually occurred and where all of
7 the infrastructure to support the critically ill was in
8 place.

9 This was particularly difficult given the
10 pressures on care homes because the infrastructure to deal
11 with the pandemic simply was not there; and the guidance at
12 the time was that older people in care homes, who were
13 suspected to have COVID-19, should not be hospitalised,
14 despite the fact that some people who were untested were
15 being moved from hospitals to care homes and, in fact,
16 increasing the risk there.

17 The NHS was given priority and protection, leaving
18 care services to fend for themselves in these initial days
19 of the pandemic, and we still face the consequences today.

20 NHS staff were applauded for their efforts during
21 the pandemic, whereas care sector staff became the subject
22 of media scrutiny and were blamed and shamed for Covid
23 deaths which occurred in their homes.

24 One further area of difficulty in care homes was
25 the complete cessation of visits. Managers could see

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1 significant deterioration in some residents, particularly
2 with dementia, which might have been ameliorated should some
3 controlled visiting have been allowed.

4 4. PPE — demand and financial difficulties.

5 Care homes were effectively requisitioned by the
6 Scottish Government. However, the supply of PPE, initially
7 at least, was a matter for the front line service to deal
8 with under their normal purchasing arrangements, as the
9 procurement and use of PPE was not new to care homes, who
10 were used to taking infection control measures and dealing
11 with infectious diseases on a routine basis.

12 However, because of the unprecedented quantity of
13 PPE needed, much earlier effort was directed by the
14 organisation in sourcing good quality PPE and trying to take
15 the burden off managers directly.

16 While residential care settings were eventually
17 prioritised, housing support and daily support services felt
18 relegated. These services, in particular, experienced
19 financial difficulties obtaining PPE. Managers reported
20 that it took three days to get supplies, but even then
21 visitors could not be provided; this is despite them being
22 required by the guidance.

23 5. Self-insurance.

24 CrossReach experienced both income shortfalls and
25 extra costs not adequately covered by the Scottish

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1 Government payments. There was a rise in insurance premiums
2 and major difficulties in renewing cover which eventually
3 led to the withdrawal of cover for COVID-19 incidents.

4 The latter was due to the COPFS investigations
5 into COVID-19 deaths and the level of loss of society awards
6 seen in Scotland, as against lower, fixed bereavement awards
7 in England and Wales. This ultimately required the Church
8 of Scotland to underwrite CrossReach for risks arising from
9 COVID-19, effectively forcing it into self-insurance in this
10 respect. The sector called for the same indemnity as
11 offered to the NHS in these circumstances, but this was
12 denied.

13 6. Disruption of services.

14 Service users in our adult care services in
15 particular experienced a diminution in the services provided
16 by the public sector. Where service users attended external
17 day centres, Crossreach staff were not required during the
18 day because of these alternative arrangements for their
19 care.

20 Suddenly, as these were withdrawn, there was a
21 requirement to support people 24 hours per day and this was
22 often only achievable by using agency staff. The cost of
23 the additional staffing hours was eventually recoverable
24 from Covid funding but it took resources to evidence the
25 extra costs, and there was a significant delay in costs

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1 being reimbursed under the sustainability payments which led
2 to cash flow pressures.

3 Pressure was placed on care homes and services to
4 undertake Covid testing of residents. However, we resisted
5 this because we felt that it was a clinical task. This was
6 particularly important when considering the prevalence of
7 dementia in the care home population.

8 Lastly, impacts which might have been minimised or
9 excluded had reasonable steps been taken to do so.

10 Guidance.

11 Requirements and expectations were put on care
12 services that were unfair and unrealistic; and whilst it is
13 acknowledged that it would have been impossible for the
14 Scottish Government to provide regulations and guidance
15 covering all settings and all scenarios, there should have
16 been more effort put in engaging with the sector.

17 CrossReach is grateful for the opportunity to have
18 contributed to the health and social care impact theme of
19 the Inquiry. We look forward to hearing the Inquiry's
20 response to the pandemic, learning lessons from it and to
21 making recommendations for the future.

22 Thank you.

23 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much Mr Di Paola.

24 And then the last submission is for Refugees for
25 Justice, Mr Kiddie.

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1 Closing statement by MR KIDDIE
 2 MR KIDDIE: My Lord, I appear, again, as junior
 3 counsel for Refugees for Justice, as instructed by that
 4 group's solicitors, Birnberg Peirce. My learned senior,
 5 Hugh Southey, is also instructed.
 6 This oral submission is supplementary to the
 7 written closing statement already submitted for Refugees for
 8 Justice, which I here by formally adopt.
 9 I would also refer back to our opening statement,
 10 our oral submissions of 24 October, our witnesses' testimony
 11 of 15 March, and their documentary evidence and included in
 12 their documents Baroness Helena Kennedy's 2022 report on the
 13 Independent Commission of Inquiry into Asylum Provision in
 14 Scotland.
 15 First, therefore, turning back to Baroness
 16 Kennedy's report, your Lordship will remember that she
 17 speaks of the vulnerability of asylum seekers and refugees,
 18 where she says, in her report, for example:
 19 "It is the current systems of asylum determination
 20 and support that makes them vulnerable" and "it places
 21 people into marginalised social and economic situations
 22 without adequate support and leaves them there with ever
 23 diminishing hope for the future".
 24 And "for those who have experienced trauma, this
 25 same system can compound the problem. We've heard almost

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1 countless stories of re-traumatisation and further trauma as
 2 a result of treatment".
 3 Therefore, in my submission today R4J's witnesses'
 4 testimony bears all of that out. And that in the context of
 5 the experience of asylum seekers and refugees during the
 6 Covid pandemic at the material time of interest to this
 7 Inquiry — 1 January 2020 until 31 December 2022.
 8 First we heard from Savan Qadir, one of Refugees
 9 for Justice's founding members, and himself a former asylum
 10 seeker. He told us that before April 2020 Scottish asylum
 11 seekers lived in safe housing, mostly in Glasgow, while they
 12 also received financial support, could take care of their
 13 own basic needs and could integrate into Scottish society at
 14 large.
 15 However, with Covid all of that changed. Asylum
 16 seekers were summarily rounded up and relocated into
 17 hostel-type accommodation in six Glasgow city centre hotels,
 18 all as orchestrated by the Mears Group plc under appointment
 19 by the Home Office. And they were relocated, thus,
 20 sometimes on as little as one hour's notice.
 21 And Mr Qadir spoke of lack of regard for their
 22 mental health, at the outset of this relocation, and
 23 throughout the entire experience in these hostels;
 24 abdicating any meaningful concern for mental wellbeing,
 25 Mears simply referred back to the asylum seeker's initial

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1 screening interview, itself cursory in nature. Therefore,
 2 mental health problems, including severe problems, went
 3 unrecognised at the point of relocation and were often
 4 exacerbated by that very relocation itself. And, thus, it
 5 didn't take long for tragedy to strike.
 6 When in May 2020 one asylum seeker took his own
 7 life, followed soon after, in June of that year, by another
 8 who had sought help many times yet was shot dead by police
 9 during a stabbing attack.
 10 Meanwhile, Mr Qadir reminded us that financial
 11 support was often entirely withdrawn, creating a situation
 12 of almost complete reliance on the hostel, despite it being
 13 poorly appointed. Food was provided but was often
 14 inadequate or culturally inappropriate. Yet there was no
 15 alternative besides starving. Asylum seekers were also, in
 16 effect, forced to self isolate in their rooms, unable to
 17 contact those they needed to, including advisers and family.
 18 Meanwhile members of Mears' staff would summarily
 19 enter rooms unannounced invading privacy and undermining any
 20 sense of security. Asylum seekers also faced fresh
 21 difficulty registering with new GPs which prompted Mr Qadir
 22 to e-mail the First Minister. Yet when her office replied
 23 simply to say GPs must allow asylum seekers to register, it
 24 was clear that the Scottish Government simply failed to
 25 understand Home Office policy; thus indicating general lack

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1 of information sharing and lack of communication across the
 2 board.
 3 In closing Mr Qadir also spoke of the Scottish
 4 Government's New Scots refugee integration strategy for the
 5 years 2018 to 2022 and of the Government's failure to give
 6 effect to this, including during lockdown. Now, I'll return
 7 to that later.
 8 But, moving on, the next witness of Refugees for
 9 Justice to give testimony was Amanda Purdie of AMMA Birth
 10 Companions. She spoke of experience of pregnant and new
 11 mothers who, along with their babies, were also summarily
 12 relocated by Mears and into re-purposed bedsit accommodation
 13 which hitherto had been used for single homeless men, yet
 14 had been deemed unsuitable for them.
 15 This was the so-called "mother and baby" units.
 16 The summary nature of their relocation which was typically
 17 on less than one week's notice was contrary to the Scottish
 18 Government's own guidance; and rooms were much too small,
 19 open plan, overcrowded and hazardous for babies crawling
 20 around. Social distancing was virtually impossible, thus
 21 forcing non-compliance with official guidance for pregnant
 22 and new mothers and their babies. The rooms were also dark,
 23 poorly ventilated, not suitable for cooking, fire alarms
 24 occurred sometimes almost daily. There was no television,
 25 no wi-fi, no means of entertainment or distraction.

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1 In particular, lax security was a major source of
2 anxiety for those who had previously experienced the trauma
3 of human trafficking.

4 R4J's next witness was Pinar Aksu. She told us of
5 the experience of third sector organisations attempting to
6 help asylum seekers during lockdown. The Scottish
7 Government had failed to put the third sector on advance
8 notice of plans for asylum seekers. Had it done so, in her
9 view, the third sector could have done more. As it was, it
10 tried as much as it could to help, such as by way of advice,
11 providing data for mobile phones, handing out internet
12 devices, arranging transport to shops and hospitals, and
13 money for school uniforms and school meals.

14 However, despite these interventions the same
15 problems would recur time and time again, due to our public
16 authorities failing to recognise them time and time again.

17 Refugees for Justice also produced one witness
18 whose identity was not made public under a Restriction
19 Order. She, herself, had been an asylum seeker residing in
20 the hostel at the time of said stabbing tragedy and had
21 found the entire experience of hostel life to be utterly
22 dehumanising.

23 In my submission, all of Refugees for Justice's
24 witnesses spoke frankly, knowledgeably and with conviction.
25 There can surely be no doubting their honesty. Their

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1 evidence provides a reliable account of the experiences of
2 asylum seekers during lockdown and should be recorded in the
3 Inquiry's official digest of evidence.

4 It should be recorded, as it appears, that from
5 the very outset of lockdown asylum seekers came from a
6 background of trauma, were vulnerable and had particular
7 needs, including human rights needs. Yet during lockdown
8 their particular group dynamics were ignored and
9 unaddressed.

10 Those apparent facts being a matter of record, at
11 this point, should serve as a basis for shaping and steering
12 the further progress of this Inquiry and our Scottish public
13 authorities' response to it as we move forwards.

14 Therefore, moving forwards on that basis, the
15 Inquiry should be in a better position to consider what
16 could have been done differently. However, as part of this,
17 it's also important to take a moment of pause for reflection
18 on what Scottish public authorities could competently and
19 legally have done differently in the context of asylum law,
20 at large, being a reserved matter in terms of the devolution
21 settlement.

22 R4J must, and does, accept that some of the
23 decision-making that led to the experience of asylum seekers
24 in Scotland is outside the scope of the Inquiry. However,
25 not all of it is.

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1 The Scotland Act 1998 operates by way of specific
2 reservation, rather than by way of specific devolution.
3 Thus, any sphere of Government not specifically reserved to
4 the UK is axiomatically devolved. This means, in effect,
5 that Scottish public authorities did have relevant powers at
6 the material time, including in the fields of housing,
7 Social Services, health and education, for example.
8 Therefore, examples of questions moving forwards include as
9 follows.

10 In the sphere of housing, did Scottish public
11 authorities fulfil their functions in enforcing the
12 tolerable standard for the types of accommodation to which
13 asylum seekers were relocated? Also did they fulfil their
14 functions under planning and building controls, such as with
15 regard to change of use? And in the sphere of public
16 health, did Scottish public authorities, including Public
17 Health Scotland, do enough, for example, with regard to
18 asylum seekers' mental wellbeing, particularly given their
19 said vulnerability?

20 More generally, did the Scottish Government do
21 enough to engage and cooperate with the UK Government
22 regarding the experience of asylum seekers here? Did it
23 share information? And did it seek to contribute to
24 decision-making by means of sharing information?

25 Finally, as an example of questions, yet by no

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1 means least and, indeed, of crucial importance, and as
2 already mentioned by Mr Qadir, since before lockdown the
3 Scottish Government has had a New Scots refugee integration
4 strategy for integrating refugees into our society.

5 A lengthy official policy document, this shows
6 that the vulnerability of asylum seekers was not only
7 foreseeable but had actually already been foreseen
8 pre-lockdown, and states, for example, that:

9 "The New Scots strategy aims to support refugees
10 and asylum seekers in Scotland's communities ..."

11 And that:

12 "Asylum policy is reserved to the UK Government
13 ... However, the Scottish Government has control over a
14 range of matters that relate directly to the asylum process
15 ..."

16 At the core of the New Scots strategy is
17 recognition that refugees and asylum seekers have particular
18 needs and vulnerabilities; and that is important because, in
19 our submission, it imposed legal duties on Scottish public
20 authorities to act or at least to take account of the plight
21 of asylum seekers in our country.

22 The evidence so far tends to show that the
23 Scottish Government and other Scottish public authorities
24 did not do enough under the foregoing powers available to
25 them. By contrast, the overall impression is that during

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1 lockdown our authorities simply took the view that asylum
 2 seekers were already taken care of by the Home Office; thus,
 3 they could be, in effect, conveniently forgotten about.
 4 They could be simply locked away, in effect, in six Glasgow
 5 hotels — one less thing for the Government to worry about.
 6 Yet, as the evidence also shows, they were far
 7 from being cared for and that despite their being a
 8 vulnerable group.
 9 Accordingly at the heart of the Inquiry’s role
 10 moving forwards should be, in our submission, with respect,
 11 your Lordship’s anxious concern to ask whether that
 12 impression, given by the evidence, reflects the actual
 13 reality of our Government’s attitude and approach to asylum
 14 seekers during lockdown and, if so, why was that the case?
 15 And how can this situation be improved for the future?
 16 That concludes the oral submissions for Refugees
 17 for Justice. Thank you very much for this opportunity —
 18 we’re very grateful for it — to make the submission today.
 19 THE CHAIR: Thank you Mr Kiddie.
 20 Now, with that submission, that brings to an end
 21 our hearings examining the public impacts of the COVID-19
 22 pandemic on the health and social care sector. Again,
 23 I want to thank everyone who has contributed to the
 24 Inquiry’s hearing so far.
 25 Before finishing today, however, I want to set out

1 the Inquiry’s focus for the rest of 2024.
 2 In the autumn the Inquiry will shift its focus to
 3 examine the public impacts of the pandemic on two other
 4 themes: first, we will examine evidence looking at the
 5 impact of the pandemic on education, certification and young
 6 people. Then we will examine the impact on financial and
 7 welfare support offered to businesses and individuals in
 8 Scotland. Dates for these will be — for these hearings
 9 will be published very shortly on our website.
 10 I also want to assure you that the Inquiry’s work
 11 continues when we are not in public hearings, as we’re not
 12 going to be for the next several months. Our investigative
 13 work on all the Inquiry’s terms of reference remain a
 14 priority. This includes the examination of tens of
 15 thousands of documents already received by the Inquiry and
 16 requests for further evidence where that is necessary.
 17 The Inquiry will also examine written statements
 18 provided by witnesses and help those witnesses selected to
 19 give oral evidence at the Inquiry’s future Impact Hearings.
 20 I would like to reiterate what I said at the start
 21 of this week’s session. Given time and cost constraints not
 22 every witness will be selected to give oral evidence at a
 23 public hearing; but rest assured all written statements will
 24 be continued to be read and analysed and these written
 25 statements form part of the bank of evidence that will

1 ultimately be considered and instruct the Inquiry’s
 2 findings.
 3 In addition to all that, the work of Let’s Be
 4 Heard, the Inquiry’s public participation project,
 5 continues. Let’s Be Heard has been gathering personal
 6 experiences from across Scotland and will continue to
 7 analyse the 5,500 responses received so far. Let’s Be Heard
 8 has entered its next of stage of focused engagement that
 9 will help broaden the Inquiry’s understanding of the
 10 pandemic’s impact on communities across Scotland.
 11 We and the Inquiry have some very busy months
 12 ahead of us and I’m grateful for your continued support and
 13 contribution to the Inquiry. Thank you all for attending
 14 these hearings.
 15 That brings an end to these hearings.
 16 (12.45 pm)
 17 (Hearing Concluded)

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