

# OPUS2

Scottish Covid-19 Inquiry

Day 1

October 24, 2023

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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1 Tuesday, 24 October 2023  
 2 (10.00 am)  
 3 Opening statement by THE CHAIR  
 4 THE CHAIR: Good morning and welcome to the first session of  
 5 the Scottish COVID-19 Inquiry’s substantial evidential  
 6 hearings, which will focus on the health and social care  
 7 impacts of the pandemic.  
 8 I wish to begin by reiterating my sincere  
 9 condolences and those of the Inquiry team to those who  
 10 lost loved ones to COVID-19 and our sympathy to the many  
 11 people who have been and continue to be affected by the  
 12 pandemic. I am aware that some people experience  
 13 physical and mental health issues after contracting  
 14 COVID-19 and continue to suffer from those long-lasting  
 15 impacts. For the families of the bereaved and those  
 16 still living with COVID-related conditions, the  
 17 pandemic’s legacy will never end. We extend our deepest  
 18 sympathies.  
 19 During our Health and Social Care Impact Hearings,  
 20 we will hear from some of the people most profoundly  
 21 impacted by COVID-19. Witnesses will include bereaved  
 22 family members, care home relatives and people who were  
 23 required to shield because of underlying health  
 24 conditions. We will also listen to the accounts of  
 25 others who continue to suffer the pandemic’s

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1 consequences, such as people with long COVID and those  
 2 who were unable to receive the urgent medical treatment  
 3 they required because of the pressures the pandemic  
 4 placed on the NHS.  
 5 In addition, in the next phase of hearings  
 6 commencing in February of next year, we will hear the  
 7 accounts of key workers, including front-line health and  
 8 social care staff, who did all they could to try and  
 9 alleviate others’ suffering, at times putting their own  
 10 health at risk. These hearings will give a voice to all  
 11 of these people. Their experiences will help inform the  
 12 Inquiry’s ongoing investigations, including into the  
 13 decisions taken by Scotland’s leaders, which we will  
 14 turn to at a later date.  
 15 As I have said previously, the Inquiry team is  
 16 resolutely committed to conducting a robust  
 17 investigation without fear or favour. We will not take  
 18 sides and we will act with fairness towards everyone  
 19 involved. By delivering a robust independent inquiry  
 20 with a clear set of recommendations, we hope to reduce  
 21 suffering and deaths in the event of any future pandemic  
 22 and prevent others from having to experience the  
 23 distress and sorrow which COVID-19 caused.  
 24 I should remind you, however, that the Inquiry is  
 25 not a court. It cannot make any findings of civil or

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1 criminal liability nor is it set up to be able to award  
 2 any compensation. Giving evidence at a public inquiry  
 3 will be daunting for many of those involved,  
 4 particularly for those grieving for loved ones and  
 5 others living every day with the legacy of COVID-19.  
 6 I would like to thank everyone who gives evidence to  
 7 this Inquiry for their courage, commitment and public  
 8 service, for which we and the Inquiry are all immensely  
 9 grateful.  
 10 We recognise that, for some witnesses, being asked  
 11 to re-live traumatic experiences can be extremely  
 12 challenging, which is why the Inquiry has adopted  
 13 a trauma-informed and human-rights-based approach in  
 14 conducting both its investigations and hearings.  
 15 We have set aside a dedicated room at Regus Princes  
 16 Street for use by any attendees who are upset or  
 17 distressed during the proceedings and need to take time  
 18 out of the viewing room. We also have dedicated private  
 19 rooms for witnesses at George House. Inquiry staff  
 20 trained in trauma-informed practice will be available  
 21 here and at our viewing room at Regus Princes Street to  
 22 provide emotional support and signposting to specialist  
 23 organisations. A CRUSE Scotland bereavement counsellor  
 24 is also available at both venues. In addition, we have  
 25 published on the Inquiry website a list of independent

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1 organisations which can provide support to people  
 2 affected by the pandemic. If you require any assistance  
 3 while attending the hearings, please speak to a member  
 4 of Inquiry staff, who can be identified by their orange  
 5 lanyards.  
 6 My aim is to report as soon as possible, while  
 7 ensuring the Inquiry conducts a robust and thorough  
 8 investigation. This means that by necessity we have to  
 9 limit the number of witnesses who will give evidence.  
 10 In discussion with core participants’ legal  
 11 representatives, to whom we are grateful, we have sought  
 12 to bring forward the accounts of people whose  
 13 experiences are representative of the issues and themes  
 14 the Inquiry will investigate.  
 15 Through Let’s Be Heard, our listening project, we  
 16 are encouraging as many people as possible to share  
 17 their experiences of the pandemic in Scotland with us,  
 18 to tell us how they were affected and to share the  
 19 lessons they believe should be learned. You can find  
 20 out more about Let’s Be Heard on the Inquiry’s website.  
 21 I wish to assure you that everyone’s experience is  
 22 valued and all information shared with us will be  
 23 analysed and will inform our reports and  
 24 recommendations. We anticipate that the Inquiry’s  
 25 Health and Social Care Impact Hearings will conclude in

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1 spring 2024. However, with a public inquiry of this  
 2 unprecedented breadth and scale, it may be the case that  
 3 we will need to revisit this and other timescales.  
 4 I am joined today by several Inquiry colleagues who  
 5 will be assisting me during the course of these Impact  
 6 Hearings. Stuart Gale KC, who is sitting in front of me  
 7 and has just nodded in acknowledgement, is co-leading  
 8 counsel to the Inquiry, Alan Caskie KC, who is sitting  
 9 behind him, is senior counsel to the Inquiry and  
 10 Gordon McNicoll is the interim solicitor to the Inquiry,  
 11 and he's the gentleman who is not nodding at you -- but  
 12 has now. Mr Gale and the counsel team will be  
 13 responsible for questioning witnesses during our Health  
 14 and Social Care Hearings.  
 15 However, before Mr Gale begins, I wish -- in fact  
 16 I think I have to share a few housekeeping points with  
 17 you. We have shared witness statements in documentary  
 18 bundles with core participants who have an interest in  
 19 health and social care and who I have granted leave to  
 20 appear. These will be published on the Inquiry's  
 21 website, where we will also publish transcripts of our  
 22 hearings. Any directions or orders, including  
 23 restriction orders that I have made or will make in the  
 24 future, will also be published on the Inquiry's website.  
 25 Ordinarily hearings will begin at 10 o'clock and run

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1 until approximately 4.00 pm. There may be occasions  
 2 when hearings begin earlier than 10.00 am and I would  
 3 ask you to please check the hearings calendar on the  
 4 Inquiry's website for details or follow our social media  
 5 channels. All attendees should arrive in good time to  
 6 be seated in the hearing room for the start time. We  
 7 will break for lunch at about 1.00 pm and there will be  
 8 a short morning and afternoon break.  
 9 The health, safety and well-being of all those  
 10 attending the hearing is a priority for the Inquiry.  
 11 Hand sanitiser and disposable face coverings will be  
 12 available for use by all attendees who wish to avail  
 13 themselves of that. The hearing room is ventilated by  
 14 mechanical means, with capacity managed to meet the  
 15 British Council for Offices standards. I would also ask  
 16 that if you are feeling unwell, you please do not attend  
 17 and follow the hearing via the broadcast on the  
 18 Inquiry's YouTube channel, if you are able to.  
 19 Eating and drinking is not allowed in the hearing  
 20 room, except for water. Smart phones and other  
 21 electronic devices are allowed, though they should be on  
 22 silent mode at all times while you are in the hearing  
 23 room. You should not make or accept private calls, take  
 24 photographs or make video or audio recordings in the  
 25 hearing room at any time. Hearings should proceed

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1 without disruption or interruption. Anyone attempting  
 2 to disrupt a hearing may be required to leave the venue.  
 3 Inquiry proceedings are broadcast on the Inquiry's  
 4 YouTube channel where they may also be viewed and  
 5 watched on demand. Video cameras are located at the  
 6 rear and sides of the hearing room and face the front.  
 7 You should be aware that members of the public attending  
 8 our hearings may be captured occasionally on wide angle  
 9 or room overview camera shots. To assist with the video  
 10 recording and transcriptions, I would ask all parties to  
 11 state their names when addressing the Inquiry, speak  
 12 clearly into the microphone and not to speak too  
 13 quickly.  
 14 I will now hand over to Mr Gale KC, who will provide  
 15 more detail on how we intend to conduct these hearings.  
 16 Mr Gale.  
 17 Opening statement by MR GALE, Co-lead Counsel to the Inquiry  
 18 MR GALE: My Lord, thank you and good morning, and good  
 19 morning to everybody in the room. Good morning to  
 20 everybody who is listening to us and watching us on our  
 21 online service.  
 22 As will be appreciated by your Lordship, together  
 23 with everybody else here today and watching us, today is  
 24 a significant milestone in the progression of this  
 25 Inquiry. Today and tomorrow we will hear opening

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1 statements from core participants with leave to appear  
 2 in this section of the Inquiry and on Friday of this  
 3 week we will commence our first evidential hearings.  
 4 These will continue until the week ending Friday,  
 5 8 December. There will then be a pause in our  
 6 proceedings and in January of next year the UK Inquiry  
 7 will be conducting hearings in Scotland. This Inquiry  
 8 will resume in February next year and, as my Lord has  
 9 said, will continue until Easter of next year in these  
 10 hearings.  
 11 In the hearings between now and Easter we will hear  
 12 from those who have been impacted in Scotland by the  
 13 pandemic and its consequences. The focus is on the  
 14 impacts and health and social care. As we previously  
 15 stated, the Inquiry took a deliberate and considered  
 16 decision to commence its investigative work leading to  
 17 our first evidential hearings by considering the impacts  
 18 that the strategic decisions taken by the  
 19 Scottish Government and implemented by it, its agencies  
 20 and others, had upon the population of Scotland, all  
 21 within the Inquiry's terms of reference.  
 22 At the risk of some repetition, I would like to  
 23 reiterate the rationale behind that decision. The  
 24 strategic decisions taken during the pandemic affected  
 25 everybody in this country. They placed restrictions on

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1 our lives that had not been previously experienced  
 2 during peace—time. The former First Minister said on  
 3 23 March 2020 — and I quote:  
 4 "For everyone, you must stay at home unless it is  
 5 absolutely necessary to go out and that includes working  
 6 from home wherever possible."  
 7 The restrictions which followed on from that broad  
 8 instruction, whether they took the form of legislative  
 9 directions or guidance, had an ongoing effect on our  
 10 lives for the next two and a half years. In that  
 11 period, politicians, decision—makers and implementers  
 12 had to act in circumstances of developing and  
 13 fluctuating urgency, having regard to novel and  
 14 distressing circumstances. As your Lordship said in the  
 15 preliminary hearing which was held on 28 August of this  
 16 year — and I quote:  
 17 "The COVID—19 pandemic presented the most serious  
 18 public health crisis in living memory. It affected  
 19 everyone."  
 20 So why impacts? It appeared to us in the Inquiry  
 21 team that to properly understand both the  
 22 decision—making and the implementation of those  
 23 decisions, we should consider them having regard to the  
 24 impacts which they had. The Inquiry did not subscribe  
 25 to the view that impacts were matters apparent to us

1 without further examination. Consideration of the  
 2 statements that the Inquiry has taken and the  
 3 information that it has gathered has reinforced us in  
 4 that view. The detail and nuances of the impacts have  
 5 informed us and will be used by us when we come to  
 6 examine the decision—making process and, in particular,  
 7 whether the impacts and their adverse effects could and  
 8 should have been anticipated and factored into the  
 9 decision—making process and the implementation of the  
 10 decisions.  
 11 Recently I noted in a statement an observation by  
 12 a health professional that there required to be — and  
 13 I quote — "a better understanding of vulnerable groups  
 14 and their needs. The soft stuff (emotional and  
 15 spiritual care) is important, and we really only focused  
 16 on the hard stuff".  
 17 In addition, we've obtained a statement from  
 18 Dr Jennifer Burns, who I will refer to in more detail in  
 19 due course, and in her statement she says this:  
 20 "If there is another pandemic, it is likely to have  
 21 similar impact on older people and those with other  
 22 vulnerabilities."  
 23 She goes on:  
 24 "The need is to ensure a balance is achieved between  
 25 protecting care home residents from a virus that could

1 be fatal to them and also protecting the human rights of  
 2 individuals to see their families and loved ones.  
 3 Planning for the response to a pandemic should involve  
 4 experts on the population most affected by the illness  
 5 in question at the earliest possible stage."  
 6 That seems to us to encapsulate a very significant  
 7 issue which this Inquiry needs to address. The Inquiry  
 8 has also issued, as my Lord has said, a policy statement  
 9 on our trauma—informing and human—rights—based approach.  
 10 At paragraph 11 of that statement we say that, in line  
 11 with that approach, we took the decision to begin public  
 12 hearings with evidence that the impacts of the pandemic  
 13 had on people, giving a voice to those who are most  
 14 affected. Again with the benefit of having read many  
 15 statements, we hope that for some witnesses there will  
 16 be a cathartic relief in expressing their accounts of  
 17 deeply distressing experiences in public and to this  
 18 Inquiry, knowing that it will form a public record of  
 19 those experiences.  
 20 We also recognise for many people who will be giving  
 21 evidence to us in these Impact Hearings that they would  
 22 rather be in any place but here, that they could have  
 23 avoided the tragedy and the circumstances that have  
 24 brought them here. The Inquiry is extremely grateful  
 25 for all those witnesses who have given their time and

1 consideration to engage with us.  
 2 Can I indicate at this stage that the Inquiry's  
 3 investigations have been informed by material from  
 4 a number of sources. The Inquiry team has worked  
 5 tirelessly over the past month in assembling that  
 6 information and I would want to pay tribute to them all  
 7 for their work.  
 8 Members of the public have communicated directly  
 9 with the Inquiry in conveying information. Other  
 10 members of the public have engaged with the listening  
 11 arm of the Inquiry's operation, Let's Be Heard. Other  
 12 members of the public have engaged with us through  
 13 organised groups and, in particular, I would like to  
 14 thank the Care Home Relatives Scotland group and their  
 15 solicitors, Thompsons, and the Scottish Covid Bereaved  
 16 and their solicitors, Amer Anwar & Co, for the  
 17 assistance which they have given the Inquiry in  
 18 identifying witnesses and arranging for the Inquiry's  
 19 team of statement—takers to have access to those  
 20 witnesses.  
 21 The ultimate decision as to which witnesses provide  
 22 oral evidence to the Inquiry is mine. These decisions  
 23 have not always been easy and the aim, so far as I have  
 24 been concerned, is to identify those witnesses who will  
 25 give oral evidence so as to provide a broad range of

1 evidence of impacts. I would, however, as my Lord has  
 2 already done, like to emphasise to everybody who has  
 3 provided information to the Inquiry but who has not been  
 4 asked to give oral evidence, your information is  
 5 important to us and will be considered by us.  
 6 Also, in connection with the health and social care  
 7 portfolio, I would like to mention the academic research  
 8 that the Inquiry has commissioned. Introductory  
 9 academic research was published on the Inquiry website  
 10 in June 2022. That research covered the period up  
 11 to April 2022. Given the terms of the Inquiry’s remit,  
 12 reports for both Portfolios 1 and 3 — 3 is the Health  
 13 and Social Care Portfolio — have been updated to cover  
 14 the period up to 31 December 2022 and these were  
 15 published on our website last week.  
 16 In addition, the Inquiry has received from  
 17 Professor McKay and his team at Napier University the  
 18 first draft on the provision of social care support,  
 19 including the management and support of staff and the  
 20 recognition, involvement and support of unpaid carers.  
 21 The final draft of that report is expected shortly.  
 22 Other areas of ongoing academic research include  
 23 research into the impact of the pandemic on refugees and  
 24 asylum seekers and the impact of the pandemic on women  
 25 and girls. These reports are those which have relevance

1 to Portfolios 1 and 3. Further research has been  
 2 carried out in relation to Portfolios 2 and 4 and will  
 3 be available on the Inquiry website in the forthcoming  
 4 months.  
 5 I would like to also give an update on the work of  
 6 the Inquiry’s Let’s Be Heard project. Its national  
 7 engagement phase began on 23 May of this year, with the  
 8 aim of encouraging the Scottish public to share their  
 9 experience of the pandemic, to describe the impacts  
 10 which the pandemic had and to provide views of the  
 11 lessons they think should be learned. Let’s Be Heard  
 12 has had almost 4,000 responses from individuals and  
 13 groups from across the country. The national engagement  
 14 phase has been extended until 20 December of this year  
 15 and the Inquiry would like to thank everyone who has  
 16 taken part so far for their invaluable contribution to  
 17 the Inquiry’s understanding of matters across the board.  
 18 Over the previous months, the Let’s Be Heard team  
 19 has been involved in over 50 events across the country.  
 20 They have also supported group discussions, with a range  
 21 of people on different topics, such as unpaid carers,  
 22 people living with dementia, women who were pregnant  
 23 during the pandemic and those persons with sensory  
 24 impairments. Let’s Be Heard has heard from people in  
 25 every council area in Scotland and there has been

1 a particularly strong response from working-age Scots.  
 2 Those who have responded have offered a depth and  
 3 richness of experience on themes such as the trauma of  
 4 bereavement, separation from loved ones, how lockdown  
 5 impacted mental health, both positively and negatively,  
 6 the crucial role played by key workers and how school  
 7 closures affected children’s education. To extend the  
 8 range of information received, Let’s Be Heard would  
 9 particularly welcome hearing more directly from children  
 10 and young people so that adults aren’t speaking on their  
 11 behalf. Further communication from people of retirement  
 12 age as well as from men and from those who are less  
 13 financially secure would be appreciated.  
 14 Geographically, Let’s Be Heard has heard  
 15 proportionately less from people in North Lanarkshire,  
 16 South Lanarkshire, West Lothian, Renfrewshire and  
 17 Glasgow City. It is also seeking further insight into  
 18 the experiences of people across the Highlands and  
 19 Islands and is also keen to hear from people from  
 20 a diverse range of ethnic and religious backgrounds,  
 21 people born outside the UK and Scotland as well as  
 22 people whose first language is not English. The Inquiry  
 23 wishes to ensure that all your views are heard by us.  
 24 In addition, the Inquiry has followed carefully the  
 25 hearings in the UK Inquiry and is mindful of our

1 obligation not to duplicate material with that Inquiry.  
 2 Turning to the timetable. Our hearings will  
 3 commence on Friday this week and will continue next  
 4 week, when we will present evidence from a number of  
 5 witnesses speaking as representatives of organisations  
 6 that have advised and supported people during the  
 7 pandemic. In assembling information, it appeared to us  
 8 that the Inquiry would benefit from hearing from those  
 9 who saw at first hand the effects of the pandemic and  
 10 the strategic decisions that were taken on wider groups  
 11 of individuals.  
 12 We will hear first from Jane Morrison on behalf of  
 13 the Covid Bereaved Scotland group. She will speak  
 14 movingly about the loss of her wife, Jacky, from COVID  
 15 and provide us with detailed observations of both good  
 16 and bad practices gleaned from her experiences and from  
 17 those of members of the group who have encountered  
 18 bereavement during the pandemic in various  
 19 circumstances. She will also discuss prolonged grief  
 20 disorder in the context of a loss during the pandemic.  
 21 We will also hear from four core members of the  
 22 Care Home Relatives Scotland group, a group that was  
 23 established during the pandemic with the aim of  
 24 enhancing the quality of life of loved ones who were  
 25 resident in care homes by working to achieve the

1 resumption of essential family contact. In particular ,  
 2 we will hear the efforts to secure Anne’s Law. I think  
 3 it’s useful if I just indicate what those objectives  
 4 are. They are that every care home resident should be  
 5 entitled to have meaningful contact with one nominated  
 6 person despite any type of lockdown the care home  
 7 experiences; that the nominated person has to be  
 8 recognised as a partner in care and trusted to access  
 9 the care home in the same way as staff do; recognition  
 10 that the nominated person is there to provide emotional  
 11 and well-being care, something that a member of staff  
 12 cannot offer as much as we know they may try to do so;  
 13 to recognise that many people residing in care homes  
 14 have complex needs and that allowing one nominated  
 15 person to have meaningful contact can and will ease  
 16 distress for both of them and their families; and  
 17 finally to recognise that a nominated carer would also  
 18 help to support the work of care staff. We will also  
 19 see how the present legislative proposal on that matter  
 20 fits with those objectives .  
 21 Next week we will also hear from two witnesses,  
 22 Henry Simmons, the chief executive of Alzheimer’s  
 23 Scotland and Dr Jennifer Burns, who I mentioned earlier.  
 24 Dr Burns was the president of the British Geriatric  
 25 Society for the period of the pandemic up to her

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1 retirement at the end of November 2022. They both have  
 2 particular expertise in supporting those with  
 3 Alzheimer’s and dementia and those in need of more  
 4 general geriatric care. These witnesses will assist the  
 5 Inquiry in understanding dementia and frailty.  
 6 Your Lordship may remember that he raised the issue  
 7 of frailty when Dr Croft gave evidence — it’s Day 2 of  
 8 Dr Croft’s evidence at page 35 of the transcript — and  
 9 the evidence of Dr Burns assists in understanding  
 10 frailty . Both Dr Burns and Mr Simmons assist in our  
 11 understanding of the complexities and the various stages  
 12 of Alzheimer’s and dementia from diagnosis. This  
 13 assists us in setting some of the evidence that we’ll  
 14 hear from relatives and loved ones in context.  
 15 If there is one thing that comes out from reading  
 16 many of the statements, it is that for some whose loved  
 17 ones suffered dementia, there had already been a loss of  
 18 the person they knew. Coincidental with my involvement  
 19 with this Inquiry, I heard what I thought was a very  
 20 insightful song written from the perspective of a woman  
 21 whose husband was a resident in a care home, suffering  
 22 dementia. In the song they had — and I quote —  
 23 “moments when clarity reigned”, but a particular line  
 24 from that song came to me many times as I read the  
 25 various statements. It was that:

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1 “Surgery leaflets offer advice, but there’s no  
 2 preparation for losing him twice.”  
 3 In the course of next week we will also hear from  
 4 Sara Redmond, who speaks on behalf of the Health and  
 5 Social Care Alliance Scotland, which is the national  
 6 third sector intermediary for health and social care.  
 7 We will also hear from Tressa Burke of the Glasgow  
 8 Disability Alliance, an organisation which has over  
 9 5,500 members and which is now a leading example of  
 10 a grassroots community driving improvements in the lives  
 11 of disabled people.  
 12 We will hear also from Dr Marsha Scott, who is the  
 13 chief executive of Scottish Women’s Aid, who will  
 14 provide a statement, together with Catherine Murphy of  
 15 Engender, on behalf of five organisations: Scottish  
 16 Women’s Aid, Close the Gap, JustRight Scotland, Rape  
 17 Crisis Scotland and Engender, who together are referred  
 18 to as “Scottish Women’s Rights Organisations”.  
 19 We will also hear from Helen Goss, who is the chief  
 20 operating officer of Long Covid Kids Scotland, and the  
 21 Inquiry has previously announced, having taken legal  
 22 advice on the matter, that it would look at the  
 23 healthcare impacts of long COVID where those potentially  
 24 affected the strategic response to the pandemic.  
 25 Thereafter, we will embark on our detailed

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1 examination of individual impact statements. In the  
 2 period from early November until 8 December we will hear  
 3 from members of the Care Home Relatives Scotland group,  
 4 the Skye Care Home group, the Scottish Covid Bereaved  
 5 group and from individuals who are not part of any  
 6 organised group. Next year, when we resume our hearings  
 7 in February, we will hear from organisations who  
 8 supported those who were employed in the health and  
 9 social care sector and from individuals who will speak  
 10 to the personal impacts. We will also hear from unpaid  
 11 carers. We will hear from those who were impacted in  
 12 the hospital setting and those impacted in the  
 13 community. We will also hear from particular groups who  
 14 were impacted by the pandemic and its circumstances:  
 15 refugees and asylum seekers; those who are homeless;  
 16 those who are drug— and alcohol—dependent; those who are  
 17 in prison and custody; those from ethnic and minority  
 18 communities. We will also hear from Long Covid Kids and  
 19 those who have been impacted having been vaccinated. We  
 20 will also hear from representatives of those who are in  
 21 receipt of end of life and palliative care.  
 22 In considering all the statements that we have  
 23 received, a number of common themes do emerge. In  
 24 particular we will hear from witnesses of the emotional  
 25 trauma of bereavement during the pandemic. Death

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1 occurred in different locations and in varying  
 2 circumstances. Jane Morrison puts it this way when  
 3 she's talking of the bond that exists between those who  
 4 have experienced bereavement. I quote:  
 5 "I think we've all found out that bereavement during  
 6 a pandemic is a very different thing from, for want of  
 7 a better expression, normal bereavement. People were  
 8 denied the opportunity to be with loved ones in the  
 9 times before and the moments of their passing and then  
 10 in the period after death, all at times when comfort was  
 11 most needed. There were restrictions on funeral  
 12 services and, in particular, restrictions on the numbers  
 13 attending; the inability of families to grieve together  
 14 and to offer mutual comfort; the difficulties presented  
 15 by the restrictions with what should otherwise have been  
 16 the relatively straightforward arrangements in the  
 17 period after bereavement."  
 18 The harsh reality of bereavement is conveyed by the  
 19 number of deaths. As at 15 October, just over a week  
 20 ago, a little more than a week ago — and this is the  
 21 most recent date for which figures are available — the  
 22 number of deaths in Scotland in which COVID—19 was  
 23 mentioned was 18,037. As at the same date, the number  
 24 of deaths where COVID—19 was the underlying cause was  
 25 14,272. There have been frequent observations made by

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1 witnesses regarding the confusion they experienced in  
 2 navigating their way through the legislation and the  
 3 guidance which regulated the contact that they could  
 4 have with loved ones. Of particular concern was the  
 5 often rapid and sometimes contradictory changes. We  
 6 will hear of inconsistencies in the applications of  
 7 rules and guidance across different settings at the same  
 8 time and indeed, on occasions, within the same setting.  
 9 Many witnesses speak of the need for proper  
 10 considered and compassionate communication. This was  
 11 necessary in all situations where those in charge of the  
 12 care of an individual were communicating with that  
 13 individual and with loved ones. In particular it was  
 14 necessary in the circumstances of end of life care and  
 15 the use of do not attempt cardio—pulmonary resuscitation  
 16 notices.  
 17 Other common themes include the following:  
 18 The impact of social isolation and loneliness, which  
 19 was particularly acute when an individual's cognitive  
 20 functions were impaired.  
 21 The difficulties of communicating through windows  
 22 and by way of hand—held devices.  
 23 Relationships between family members and their loved  
 24 ones were adversely impacted, particularly where those  
 25 were people with dementia or impaired cognitive

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1 abilities and they experienced frustration in not  
 2 understanding the reasons for the restrictions .  
 3 Where an individual was cared for at home with  
 4 family members or they were otherwise in the community,  
 5 their carers, who were often unpaid, were placed under  
 6 increased and sometimes intolerable stress .  
 7 Family members witnessed the mental and physical  
 8 deterioration of their loved ones, deterioration which  
 9 they frequently put down to isolation and its  
 10 accompanying circumstances. Frequently there were  
 11 feelings of helplessness, feelings of frustration, of  
 12 anger, of guilt and inadequacy on the part of family  
 13 members. Family members and carers themselves suffered  
 14 adverse impacts on their mental and physical well—being.  
 15 Changes in care routines were frequently abrupt and  
 16 unexpected, from home or otherwise in the community to  
 17 care homes, from care homes to hospitals, from hospitals  
 18 to care homes.  
 19 Concerns were frequently expressed about the  
 20 availability of treatments for ongoing conditions.  
 21 There was also a lack of respite for carers, leading  
 22 often to carer exhaustion.  
 23 In the forthcoming weeks the Inquiry will hear  
 24 distressing accounts of enforced separation from loved  
 25 ones, the effects that isolation had on people, whether

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1 they were in institutions or in their own homes, whether  
 2 they were young or old, whether they were capable of  
 3 comprehending the circumstances or not. The nature and  
 4 extent of those impacts are largely presented by their  
 5 family members and friends who viewed the impacts from  
 6 the outside. Of particular force is the evidence from  
 7 loved ones who had to deal with the impact on elderly  
 8 relatives and, in particular, those who were affected by  
 9 dementia.  
 10 Witnesses express in varying ways their frustration  
 11 about their inability to have meaningful contact with  
 12 their loved ones. Many, but not all, of those suffering  
 13 from dementia were elderly and frail. In the famous  
 14 soliloquy in *As You Like It*, spoken by Jaques, and  
 15 begins "All the world's a stage", it talks of the  
 16 seventh age of life and the faculties that leave or  
 17 diminish in that age. What is apparent from many of the  
 18 statements the Inquiry has received is that in the time  
 19 of the pandemic many in the seventh age of life spent  
 20 their days sans the comfort, the compassion and the  
 21 understanding that would normally come from contact with  
 22 their families and loved ones.  
 23 As we embark on these hearings, on behalf of my  
 24 counsel team, the wider Inquiry team and myself, I take  
 25 this opportunity to convey to all those bereaved and to

24

1 all those who have suffered during the pandemic and  
 2 those who continue to suffer our sincere and genuine  
 3 condolences and sympathies.  
 4 Thank you, my Lord.  
 5 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed. Now, we will turn  
 6 to opening statements on behalf of the core  
 7 participants. We will hear firstly from the  
 8 Scottish Ministers, who I understand is represented by  
 9 Mr Geoffrey Mitchell KC. If you can come forward now.  
 10 Can I say while Mr Mitchell is coming forward, you are  
 11 all aware that you have been allocated 20 minutes each  
 12 and the reason for that will be pretty obvious. We have  
 13 a fair number to get through and, as a matter simply of  
 14 expedition and efficiency, we have had to limit you to  
 15 20 minutes. I don't want to sound rather headmasterly,  
 16 but I'll keep you to 20 minutes, and if that means  
 17 cutting you off in mid-flow, I will. I'm sure I won't  
 18 have to.  
 19 With that admonition, Mr Mitchell, please.  
 20 MR MITCHELL: Thank you, my Lord.  
 21 Opening statement by MR MITCHELL  
 22 for the Scottish Government  
 23 MR MITCHELL: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This is  
 24 the opening statement on behalf of the  
 25 Scottish Government. I appear today along with

25

1 Kenneth McGuire, Advocate. We are instructed by  
 2 Caroline Beattie of the Scottish Government Legal  
 3 Directorate.  
 4 I would like to thank the Inquiry for granting the  
 5 Scottish Government leave to appear at these hearings  
 6 and for the opportunity to make these opening remarks.  
 7 As the body that was responsible for steering a path for  
 8 Scotland through the pandemic, the Scottish Government  
 9 is well placed to explain the strategic decisions during  
 10 that time. Those decisions are not, however, the  
 11 immediate focus of the Inquiry. The focus of the  
 12 current hearings is the impact of the pandemic on and  
 13 experienced by those within the Scottish health and  
 14 social care sector. The Scottish Government is too well  
 15 aware of the loss and suffering experienced in that  
 16 sector and of course in Scotland as a whole.  
 17 Today, on behalf of the Scottish Government, I would  
 18 like to recognise that loss. All of Scotland suffered,  
 19 yet undeniably some suffered far more than others.  
 20 Thousands lost their lives and their families and  
 21 friends continue to grieve. The health of many  
 22 individuals has been affected in innumerable ways. Many  
 23 people lost their jobs whilst living circumstances of  
 24 others were affected in countless different ways.  
 25 Children and young people, often thought to be less

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1 susceptible to the virus than adults, nevertheless  
 2 suffered greatly also. Further, many people continued  
 3 to work through the pandemic in extremely challenging  
 4 circumstances.  
 5 This pain, suffering, sacrifice and endurance is  
 6 recognised, understood and acknowledged by the  
 7 Scottish Government, yet recognition, understanding,  
 8 acknowledgement are plainly not sufficient. The  
 9 Scottish Government understands that legitimate  
 10 questions arise as to whether the suffering needed to  
 11 have been so great. This was one of the reasons that  
 12 the Scottish Government established this judge-led  
 13 statutory Inquiry into the handling of the pandemic in  
 14 Scotland. It was also one of the reasons why, when the  
 15 Inquiry was first established by the former First  
 16 Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, she emphasised that it would  
 17 take a person-centred, human-rights approach. Indeed,  
 18 one of the Inquiry's terms of reference is "To  
 19 demonstrate how a human rights based approach by the  
 20 inquiry has contributed to the inquiry's findings in  
 21 fact and recommendations".  
 22 The Scottish Government understands that the most  
 23 meaningful and genuine way to recognise the loss  
 24 suffered is to listen to the evidence and to learn  
 25 lessons from it. To that end, it is important, as

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1 I stress, that the Scottish Government is fully  
 2 committed to the Inquiry process, to the Chair and to  
 3 the people of Scotland. That commitment is to assist,  
 4 to cooperate fully and openly, to listen and to learn.  
 5 I recognise that, for some people, the giving of  
 6 evidence at these public hearings will be a difficult  
 7 experience. I can reassure any such person that their  
 8 evidence will be listened to by the Scottish Government  
 9 with great respect and consideration.  
 10 I should firstly make clear one important point.  
 11 That is the distinction between, on the one hand,  
 12 decisions made on health and social care during the  
 13 pandemic by the UK Government and, on the other hand,  
 14 those made on behalf of the Scottish Government. This  
 15 is relevant since, as we know, Module 2 of the UK  
 16 Covid-19 Inquiry is currently hearing evidence that  
 17 relates to the UK's core political and administrative  
 18 decision-making in relation to the pandemic between  
 19 early January 2020 until February 2022. This will  
 20 doubtless include evidence on decisions taken by the  
 21 UK Government in relation to health and social care in  
 22 England.  
 23 The important point is this: public health, the NHS,  
 24 social care and social services are generally devolved  
 25 matters in Scotland; that is, in Scotland, the

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1 Scottish Government has primary responsibility for and  
 2 the powers necessary to make decisions in these areas.  
 3 Given the widely varying geographical and  
 4 epidemiological circumstances across Scotland and  
 5 conscious of the need to balance the impact on social  
 6 and economic activity of measures necessary to suppress  
 7 virus transmission, the Scottish Government took the  
 8 approach of tailoring restrictions to local  
 9 circumstances. The Scottish Government, where possible,  
 10 worked in partnership with a number of bodies,  
 11 including, for example, NHS boards, the Centre of  
 12 Sustainable Delivery and Public Health Scotland. The  
 13 decisions that it took in these areas were always taken  
 14 in the interests of people in Scotland.  
 15 I turn now to the issue of impact in the area of  
 16 health and social care and begin by setting out in  
 17 a little more detail the ways in which the impact was  
 18 felt. The entire health and social care system was  
 19 affected in multiple and varied ways. Structures,  
 20 services, processes and organisations were all impacted.  
 21 Most importantly, however, the impact was felt by  
 22 individuals, also in multiple and varied ways. Factors  
 23 such as COVID-19 infection control requirements, the  
 24 redeployment of staff, the ability of hospitals to  
 25 provide the capacity to treat COVID-19 patients, delayed

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1 discharges and COVID 19-related staff absences all had  
 2 a detrimental effect on the system and, consequently, on  
 3 individuals. Some people were reluctant to seek medical  
 4 help for fear of contracting the virus. Some adult  
 5 screening programmes, for example, for the detection of  
 6 cancer, were paused during the pandemic. Some of the  
 7 impacts continue to be felt. For example, there has  
 8 been an increase in waiting times for certain medical  
 9 treatment.  
 10 The impact on the social care sector was severe.  
 11 Deaths that occurred in care homes and that were  
 12 attributable to COVID-19 accounted for a significant  
 13 percentage of all COVID-19 deaths in Scotland. Visiting  
 14 restrictions caused great hardship for residents and  
 15 families. The suffering of residents and the continuing  
 16 pain of their relatives is palpable. Evidence on these  
 17 issues will surely and understandably figure prominently  
 18 in these hearings.  
 19 The pandemic affected the health and social care  
 20 workforce. In jobs that were already demanding and that  
 21 carried high levels of responsibility in any event, the  
 22 pandemic presented further challenges of stress and  
 23 fatigue for hospital and social care staff. Their roles  
 24 were further complicated by the shortage at times of  
 25 personal protective equipment or PPE, when unprecedented

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1 demand placed strain on the distribution mechanisms.  
 2 There has also been an impact on the health of the  
 3 Scottish people in a variety of ways. For example, in  
 4 addition to illness and death caused directly by the  
 5 virus, the mental health of the population suffered.  
 6 The full impact of long COVID has yet to be fully  
 7 understood and pre-existing health inequalities were  
 8 exacerbated. Truly the full effects of COVID-19 have  
 9 yet to become clear.  
 10 The Scottish Government is fully committed to the  
 11 recovery of the NHS and the social care system to its  
 12 pre-pandemic level and beyond. The detail for recovery  
 13 will no doubt be dealt with in future hearings, but  
 14 I shall briefly mention three aspects: first, the NHS  
 15 Recovery Plan of 2021 to 2026 sets out how the  
 16 Scottish Government will address the backlog in care,  
 17 meet the ongoing health needs of the population, enhance  
 18 primary and community care and enhance well-being  
 19 support; second, an early example of recovery planning  
 20 was the Scottish Government's Mental Health Transition  
 21 and Recovery Plan. Published in October 2020 and backed  
 22 by £120 million of investment in recognition of the  
 23 negative impact of the pandemic and associated  
 24 restrictions on people's mental health, coupled with the  
 25 limitations it placed on clinical services, the

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1 Scottish Government expanded the range of support  
 2 available from public messaging to new digital services;  
 3 third, a further early example of recovery planning was  
 4 the report "Coronavirus (COVID-19) initial health and  
 5 social care response: lessons identified", focusing on  
 6 the period March to September 2020. The report examined  
 7 what worked well and what improvements could be made so  
 8 that Scotland was better equipped for an ongoing  
 9 recovery and remobilisation plans.  
 10 I turn now to the Four Harms approach. Standing the  
 11 focus of the current hearings, it is not appropriate to  
 12 explore strategic decision-making. However, the  
 13 Scottish Government does consider that, if the Inquiry  
 14 is to hear evidence about impact, it should have an  
 15 understanding of the principles that were applied to  
 16 decision-making in an attempt to manage that impact.  
 17 What I propose to do is briefly explain to those  
 18 listening not the decisions themselves but, rather, the  
 19 steps that were taken to minimise the impact or harm  
 20 suffered during the pandemic.  
 21 COVID-19 posed an unprecedented systemic threat not  
 22 only to the health of those susceptible to infection but  
 23 also to healthcare systems, economic activity and wider  
 24 society. The Scottish Government's strategic aim in  
 25 dealing with the pandemic and in particular in the

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1 development and use of non-pharmaceutical interventions  
 2 or NPIs was to minimise the overall harm of the pandemic  
 3 through the whole of Scotland, not merely in the urban  
 4 areas but also in the most rural and remote areas where  
 5 people live. In April 2020, building on the  
 6 "Coronavirus: Action Plan" that had been published by  
 7 the four governments of the UK, the Scottish Government  
 8 explained the way it would take future decisions on its  
 9 pandemic response in a document entitled "The Framework  
 10 for Decision Making". This document sets out the  
 11 Scottish Government's principles and approach to dealing  
 12 with the pandemic, particularly in relation to the use  
 13 of NPIs.

14 A key part of the approach described and enshrined  
 15 within the framework was to marshal the many and  
 16 various harms of the pandemic into four categories or  
 17 "harms". The concept of "Four Harms", as the strategy  
 18 became known, was that broadly speaking the pandemic and  
 19 measures in response to it could cause harm in four  
 20 areas, namely:

21 Firstly, direct COVID-19 health harms. Primarily  
 22 this is the mortality and morbidity associated with  
 23 contracting the disease.

24 Secondly, the broader health harms. Primarily this  
 25 is the impact of the effective operation of the NHS and

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1 social care services associated with large numbers of  
 2 patients with COVID-19 and its consequential effects on  
 3 the treatment of illness.

4 Third, social harms: the harms to our wider society  
 5 in terms, for example, of education attainment as  
 6 a result of school closure.

7 And fourth, economic harms; for example, through the  
 8 closure of businesses and workplaces.

9 Indicators chosen as representing key aspects of  
 10 each harm were reported on an online portal called the  
 11 "Four Harms Dashboard" to support understanding of the  
 12 impact of the pandemic across the Four Harms. This  
 13 included key indicators on the direct health impacts,  
 14 such as trends in COVID-19 hospital admissions as well  
 15 as wider impacts on health and social services, societal  
 16 impacts and economic impacts, such as the number of  
 17 accident and emergency admissions and planned hospital  
 18 admissions.

19 I must emphasise that equalities impacts and issues  
 20 of fundamental human rights were considered alongside  
 21 the Four Harms. Inequalities were regarded as a factor  
 22 within each of the Four Harms. This ensured that  
 23 equality issues were included within the assessments  
 24 made of each of the Four Harms and not viewed in  
 25 isolation of the other factors. This approach is

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1 consistent with the aspirations of the  
 2 Scottish Government both before and after the pandemic  
 3 to build equality into policy-making across all areas of  
 4 government.

5 The complexity of the systemic challenge posed by  
 6 the rapid spread and evolution of the COVID-19 virus  
 7 meant that there was no single or individual correct  
 8 response. The Scottish Government had to address an  
 9 alarming situation that posed a threat to the whole of  
 10 society. It had to calibrate its decision-making to  
 11 address multiple issues, often under great time  
 12 pressure. It quickly became apparent, given the nature  
 13 of the challenges posed by the virus, that there were  
 14 few, if any, harm-free decisions open to governments,  
 15 including the Scottish Government. Measures designed to  
 16 curtail the spread of the virus reduced the direct  
 17 health harm, but, on the downside, risked causing  
 18 isolation and loneliness, economic upheaval and  
 19 disruption to education. On the other hand, a decision  
 20 not to impose or lift restrictions might be said to  
 21 lessen wider harms but only at the risk of possibly  
 22 increasing harm to health.

23 The Four Harms were interlinked and this was well  
 24 understood by the Scottish Government at the time. For  
 25 example, an increase in employment and poverty would

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1 have, over time, both physical and mental health  
 2 implications. The challenge was for the  
 3 Scottish Government and other governments to balance  
 4 risks and benefits and take decisions to reduce overall  
 5 harm as much as possible.

6 In conclusion, let me repeat and reaffirm something  
 7 that I said at the outset of this statement, that the  
 8 Scottish Government will listen to the evidence given at  
 9 these Impact Hearings with great respect and  
 10 consideration. The Scottish Government is committed to  
 11 learning from that evidence. The Scottish Government is  
 12 grateful to the Chair, my Lord, for the opportunity to  
 13 make this opening statement and my team and I hope that  
 14 we can be of assistance to the Inquiry in the weeks to  
 15 come.

16 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Mitchell.

17 Now, ladies and gentlemen, actually a little ahead  
 18 of time, we will take the break now, which will be for  
 19 20 minutes. So we'll come back not at 11.30, as the  
 20 programme says, but at 11.20, where we will hear from  
 21 Care Home Relatives Scotland, who I think are  
 22 represented by Ms Galbraith KC. So 11.20. Thank you  
 23 very much.

24 (10.59 am)

(A short break)

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1 (11.20 am)  
 2 THE CHAIR: Now, when you're all ready, if you please,  
 3 Ms Galbraith.  
 4 Opening statement by MS GALBRAITH  
 5 for Care Home Relatives Scotland and CHRS Lost Loved Ones  
 6 MS GALBRAITH: Good morning. My Lord, I represent Care Home  
 7 Relatives Scotland and CHRS and CHRS Lost Loved Ones,  
 8 which I will hereinafter refer to as "CHRS".  
 9 As at March this year, around 40,000 of Scotland's  
 10 population lived in residential care homes: children,  
 11 husband, wives, grandparents. The community is very  
 12 diverse in terms of age and range of disabilities. All  
 13 are individuals with thoughts, feelings, memories,  
 14 family bonds and, crucially, the same rights to life,  
 15 equality and dignity as those in wider society.  
 16 On behalf of CHRS it is submitted that during the  
 17 COVID-19 pandemic, residents in care homes and their  
 18 relatives suffered an unnecessarily disproportionate  
 19 impact on their lives which left them at times feeling  
 20 isolated, unheard and discriminated against. CHRS  
 21 recognises the challenge presented by the COVID-19  
 22 pandemic. However, it asks this Inquiry to consider  
 23 carefully the very particular impact experienced by  
 24 those in care homes and their relatives as a consequence  
 25 of the restrictions imposed. Many of these impacts are

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1 still being felt today, when the rest of society has  
 2 returned to normal and we're looking at the COVID years  
 3 with hindsight. For many, these consequences have been  
 4 permanent.  
 5 CHRS was established in August 2020 to support the  
 6 growing number of people who had been denied any  
 7 opportunity for meaningful contact with their loved ones  
 8 in residential care since shortly before the national  
 9 lockdown. This Inquiry will undoubtedly hear from such  
 10 individuals, from husbands who had to look through  
 11 a window at their distressed wife, reaching out to  
 12 a carer for a reassuring touch, or people watching their  
 13 confused and distraught parents through an online or  
 14 iPad communication with no ability to help or reassure.  
 15 One member spoke of visiting her mother with  
 16 advancing dementia in late summer 2020. She had to sit  
 17 2 metres away and watch her mother be physically  
 18 restrained from walking towards her for a cuddle.  
 19 A carer could sit beside her and hold her hand but not  
 20 her daughter. What is that if not discrimination? Why  
 21 were carers considered less of a risk to health than  
 22 parents or children? Relatives were not afforded the  
 23 same opportunity to interact with their loved one that  
 24 employed carers had.  
 25 Carers could go home at the end of a shift to

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1 interact with their own friends and family, as was  
 2 normal at various stages, and that was entirely  
 3 appropriate, but they could then go back into the care  
 4 home and be in contact with the residents, but those  
 5 residents' own relatives were not afforded that same  
 6 opportunity or equality. Why would adding a mum,  
 7 daughter or husband to the care team have increased the  
 8 risk? While some residents may have understood the  
 9 potential dangers of the pandemic and why they were  
 10 being kept isolated, others may not. Their mental state  
 11 may have been such that all they knew was being suddenly  
 12 left alone with no visits, no touch, not even allowed to  
 13 see others in the home. Faces became hidden behind  
 14 masks and skin hungry with no cuddles or hands to hold.  
 15 Perhaps they would be paraded out behind glass like  
 16 an exhibit at a reptile museum or a prisoner. Those who  
 17 did understand the problems posed by the pandemic and  
 18 the need for isolation rules were still left feeling  
 19 isolated and imprisoned in their environment when they  
 20 watched as restrictions eased for the rest of society  
 21 but not for them.  
 22 It is submitted that the visiting arrangements in  
 23 care homes, without consistent adherence to guidance,  
 24 became inhumane, discriminatory and had little apparent  
 25 regard for the rights or dignity of those involved.

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1 When the rest of the country began to experience  
 2 lightening of restrictions in July 2020, sadly those in  
 3 care homes were not afforded that dignity. For almost  
 4 a year guidance would not permit residents to leave the  
 5 home or to go out for a drive in the car. After  
 6 14 months, many residents were only receiving  
 7 half-hourly socially distanced visits and many had not  
 8 left their home in over a year. They had been  
 9 effectively imprisoned.  
 10 A literature review by the Care Inspectorate found  
 11 that meaningful connection is profoundly important to  
 12 people's emotional, mental and physical well-being and  
 13 their quality of life. There are countless stories of  
 14 sadness, isolation and suffering and it is anticipated  
 15 that the Inquiry will listen carefully as those unfold  
 16 over the coming weeks.  
 17 A lack of connection can lead to social isolation  
 18 and loneliness which can have a detrimental effect on  
 19 people's health and well-being, and many residents,  
 20 particularly young adults, had an active life outwith  
 21 the care home before the pandemic and dismantling those  
 22 opportunities and routines in one fell swoop had  
 23 a devastating effect.  
 24 It is not proposed to detail individual impacts in  
 25 this statement. The Inquiry will hear many stories over

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1 the coming weeks. However, one in particular I would  
 2 suggest is important, and it's the story of Anne, who  
 3 provides the foundation for Anne's Law. Anne developed  
 4 early onset dementia and moved to a care home at the age  
 5 of 60. Although she had to live apart from her dearly  
 6 loved husband, he visited every day and she had other  
 7 friends and family visiting her throughout the week.  
 8 She thrived from these visits. Her joy at receiving  
 9 cuddles and listening to her visitors' stories was  
 10 clear. So imagine how her life changed on  
 11 12 March 2020. Why was nobody visiting? Why was  
 12 everyone wearing masks? She celebrated her 35th wedding  
 13 anniversary but could only meet her husband's eyes  
 14 through a window. Carers, with appropriate PPE, could  
 15 spend time with her but her husband could not. A year  
 16 later, on their 36th anniversary, although they could  
 17 meet, her husband still had to wear gloves, an apron and  
 18 a mask. Not a smile or a kiss. Anne went 483 days  
 19 without seeing her husband's smile and she died in  
 20 November 2021. How would any one of us have felt to  
 21 have experienced such separation and loneliness?  
 22 Each story and impact will be important for the  
 23 Inquiry to hear in order that lessons are learned and  
 24 history is not repeated. In listening to this evidence,  
 25 the key message that CHRS would like the Inquiry to

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1 consider and which will be emphasised at every stage of  
 2 these hearings is that family members of those in care  
 3 homes should be seen as care-givers and healthcare  
 4 partners who play a vital role in a care setting. They  
 5 should never again be excluded, as happened from  
 6 March 2020, and, further, the right to a designated  
 7 essential care-giver should be clearly enshrined in law.  
 8 This Inquiry is also invited to give consideration  
 9 to the number of people that have died without any  
 10 meaningful contact with loved ones in the weeks or  
 11 months leading to their deaths. Whether they died as  
 12 a consequence of COVID or not, the key point is they  
 13 died without having seen, touched or perhaps even spoken  
 14 to those closest to them for months. Husbands, wives  
 15 and children died alone, and how would that feel? It's  
 16 probably near-impossible to comprehend the exquisite  
 17 loneliness of dying alone.  
 18 Between 12 August 2020, which is when CHRS was  
 19 formed, and 28 November, some three months, 3,500 people  
 20 died in a care home. They were dying at a rate of  
 21 300 a week. Over a 12-month period, 16,000 residents  
 22 died, many of whom hadn't seen loved ones until their  
 23 final hours. The life expectancy of those living in  
 24 care homes is consistently shorter than those of the  
 25 same age living elsewhere. The quality of life for the

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1 time they do have should be paramount.

2 The Inquiry has been and will continue to be  
 3 provided with documentation from CHRS which it is hoped  
 4 and anticipated will be carefully considered. While the  
 5 gravity of the COVID-19 pandemic was at all times  
 6 appreciated, CHRS strived from the early stages to  
 7 ensure that those in power considered the adverse  
 8 impacts that were being felt. The evidence provided  
 9 demonstrates that emphatic and urgent pleas were being  
 10 made from August 2020 to public health consultants, to  
 11 Scottish Government ministers and MSPs to ask that the  
 12 voices of those in care homes be heard and that urgent  
 13 action be taken to consider the very grave impact on  
 14 mental and physical health of being denied access to  
 15 their loved ones. From that time the cry was going out  
 16 for family members to be given essential care-giver  
 17 status and that cry remains.

18 CHRS asks that the Inquiry consider the forthcoming  
 19 evidence in the Impact Hearings with particular regard  
 20 to what is being sought in terms of Anne's Law, and  
 21 Mr Gale has already referred to Anne's Law and these  
 22 aims which is greatly appreciated. However, I would  
 23 just like to take a moment to repeat these aims, given  
 24 their importance. These are that: every care home  
 25 resident should be entitled to have a meaningful contact

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1 with one nominated person, despite any type of lockdown  
 2 the care home experiences. The nominated person must be  
 3 recognised as a partner in care and trusted to access  
 4 the care home in the same way that staff do; recognition  
 5 that the nominated person is there to provide emotional  
 6 and well-being care, something that a member of staff  
 7 cannot offer in the same way a family member can, as  
 8 much as it is known that they do try; to recognise that  
 9 many people residing in care homes have complex needs  
 10 and by allowing one nominated person to have meaningful  
 11 contact can and will help ease distress for both of them  
 12 and the families. This should include visiting to  
 13 continue as regular as it was before any lockdown; and  
 14 lastly to recognise that a nominated carer would also  
 15 help support the work of the care staff.

16 CHRS passionately believe that safe visiting can  
 17 happen and that view is shared by leading IPC experts.  
 18 Infection prevention and control measures applied in the  
 19 right way at the right time will keep people safe from  
 20 the harms of infection while protecting their human  
 21 rights through compassionate care.

22 The First Minister stated to Parliament on  
 23 7 September 2021, "We will introduce Anne's Law, giving  
 24 nominated relatives or friends the same access rights to  
 25 care homes as staff". It is submitted on behalf of CHRS

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1 that the current proposals fall far short of that  
 2 assurance. In the forthcoming hearings it is hoped that  
 3 the evidence will demonstrate the crucial role played by  
 4 relatives and friends in a care-giving context and it is  
 5 likely that CHRS will ask this Inquiry to make findings  
 6 and recommendations to ensure that this right is  
 7 enshrined in primary legislation and not simply left for  
 8 direction or guidance.

9 So, in conclusion, it is submitted that there has  
 10 been widespread disregard for fundamental human rights  
 11 and freedoms where the most vulnerable in our society  
 12 have been left isolated and discriminated against and it  
 13 is hoped that the findings and recommendations of this  
 14 Inquiry will ensure that this does not happen in the  
 15 future.

16 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed, Ms Galbraith.

17 Now, the next core participant to make their opening  
 18 statement is the Church of Scotland who I think is  
 19 represented by Mr Di Paola; is that correct? Thank you.  
 20 Mr Di Paola.

21 Opening statement by MR DI PAOLA  
 22 for the Church of Scotland/CrossReach

23 MR DI PAOLA: My Lord, ladies and gentlemen, good morning.  
 24 My name is Mr Di Paola and I'm here today on behalf of  
 25 the Church of Scotland in the guise of CrossReach.

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1 CrossReach offers care to people of all ages with  
 2 locations all over the country. It is one of the  
 3 largest voluntary sector care providers in Scotland,  
 4 with services including homelessness, mental health,  
 5 learning disabilities, criminal justice, substance  
 6 abuse, residential care for older people, day care, care  
 7 in education for children and young people. At this  
 8 Inquiry it seeks to speak both for those who were  
 9 supported by its services and the staff who delivered  
 10 that support.

11 CrossReach believes that it is important to  
 12 understand the context in which the health and social  
 13 care voluntary sector was operating even before the  
 14 start of the pandemic. This sector was already  
 15 significantly under-resourced due to years of  
 16 under-investment. It was into this already fragile  
 17 situation that the pandemic hit.

18 CrossReach recognises that all citizens of Scotland  
 19 faced significant disruption during the pandemic and all  
 20 were impacted by the advice and guidance issued by the  
 21 Scottish Government. The scale of disruption and the  
 22 choices being faced were almost unimaginable at the  
 23 time. However, it believes that there was a particular  
 24 impact on social care which had significant consequences  
 25 for those supported, some of which might have been

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1 avoided. This was due to a fundamental lack of  
 2 understanding about its nature and scope, which led to  
 3 guidance being issued which swung between being  
 4 non-existent for some services and misguided and  
 5 heavy-handed for others. Ultimately and in some  
 6 instances it led to those it was supposed to protect  
 7 being open to wider harms.

8 I will refer briefly to a number of impacts  
 9 experienced by CrossReach. First, difficulties created  
 10 by the guidance issued by the Scottish Government. It  
 11 took a significant effort to interpret and implement  
 12 guidance which came thick and fast, was often unclear,  
 13 sometimes unhelpful and came with short implementation  
 14 windows. Sector representatives had to intervene to  
 15 stop critical guidance from being issued by the  
 16 Scottish Government late on a Friday with impossibly  
 17 short lead-in times, often the following Monday morning.  
 18 The guidance changed too frequently to allow staff on  
 19 the front line to keep up with it. As a result, much  
 20 effort was expended in issuing regular updates which  
 21 could be easily understood by staff and supporting  
 22 implementation before it all changed again. It was also  
 23 clear that guidance was mandatory as it was enforced by  
 24 the regulator via inspection. The guidance was applied  
 25 across the board and failed to properly recognise the

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1 controls which care homes already had in place which  
 2 were not replicated in community settings.

3 Second, the rules of self-isolation. CrossReach  
 4 staff were identified as key workers and it was  
 5 critically important that these rules were followed to  
 6 reduce the risk of outbreaks in services. The rules  
 7 prevented staff from attending work if someone in their  
 8 household tested positive or had symptoms of COVID.  
 9 This was a sensible move, however, it fell outwith the  
 10 circumstances which allowed this time off to be paid.  
 11 Only if staff tested positive could they be paid.

12 CrossReach put in place a system whereby staff could  
 13 elect to mitigate the loss of pay by using holidays and,  
 14 if they did so, CrossReach would match those used. In  
 15 effect, the member of staff and employer each paid for  
 16 half of the time off. It wasn't until the Social Care  
 17 Fund was announced in June 2020 that the situation was  
 18 rectified. In terms of lessons learned for the future,  
 19 should self-isolation be mandated and there is reliance  
 20 on the goodwill of staff to do the right thing for  
 21 others, it is essential to ensure that financial  
 22 pressure to attend work is avoided for key workers.

23 Third, the supply, distribution and use of personal  
 24 protective equipment was hugely problematic. The supply  
 25 of PPE, initially at least, was a matter for care

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1 services to deal with under their normal purchasing  
 2 arrangements. The procurement and use of PPE was not  
 3 new to care homes, who were used to taking infection  
 4 control measures and dealing with infectious diseases on  
 5 a routine basis. However, because of the unprecedented  
 6 quantity of PPE needed, much earlier effort was directed  
 7 by CrossReach towards sourcing and distributing  
 8 good-quality PPE.

9 Whilst residential care settings were eventually  
 10 prioritised by the Government, housing support and daily  
 11 services felt relegated. These services in particular  
 12 experienced difficulties obtaining PPE, even in  
 13 situations where there was a confirmed outbreak. The  
 14 PPE shortage was a risk to the lives of service users  
 15 and staff and CrossReach believe that there was an  
 16 inequality in the support given to health services as  
 17 against social care providers.

18 Fourth, as guidance was issued to social care  
 19 settings by the Scottish Government, there was a failure  
 20 to distinguish between distinct types of care setting.  
 21 Recommendations which made sense from a COVID infection  
 22 control perspective and were appropriate in an ordinary  
 23 setting or, alternatively, a hospital setting did not  
 24 work where other risks to health or well-being specific  
 25 to the context were overlooked.

1 There was a significant lack of understanding of the  
 2 context of social care. Residential care homes, for  
 3 example, which had previously been inspected against  
 4 care standards to ensure they were as homely as possible  
 5 started to be assessed against the same clinical  
 6 standards as hospitals. Those supported in community  
 7 settings had their normal routines and support services  
 8 suddenly withdrawn. Whilst this was true in many  
 9 settings, the consequences for those supported through  
 10 social care was at times catastrophic. Whether  
 11 supported as a result of a physical disability, learning  
 12 disability or emotional trauma, the decision taken to  
 13 cut off regular routines had implications for supported  
 14 people which went to the heart of them being able to  
 15 live independently or cope emotionally due to the  
 16 circumstances that they were already in. Not consulting  
 17 with the representative bodies for social care providers  
 18 or with providers direct at an early stage meant that  
 19 opportunities were lost to ensure that guidance issued  
 20 allowed the significant expertise of those working in  
 21 social care to be harnessed rather than disempowered.

22 Social care operators work in different settings to  
 23 hospitals and other clinical care settings. They have  
 24 soft furnishings, places to congregate, communal spaces  
 25 to eat. They are home. They are not short-term,

1 high-level clinical settings. There appeared to be  
 2 a mistaken belief that the care services were akin to  
 3 clinical settings. This resulted in infection control  
 4 and hygiene requirements that were either overly onerous  
 5 or impossible to achieve. It also resulted in an  
 6 expectation that care settings could provide high-level  
 7 and critical clinical care that was not realistic to  
 8 achieve in terms of staffing, setting and equipment.

9 The guidance to separate those with COVID symptoms  
 10 from other care home residents, whilst understandable on  
 11 paper, took no account of the practicalities and  
 12 fundamentally misunderstood the impacts on the people  
 13 using the service, particularly people with dementia,  
 14 whose quality of life depends on having familiar  
 15 routines and surroundings. The general public were not  
 16 asked to move home when they were infected and yet one  
 17 set of guidance suggested that all infected residents  
 18 should be kept in one part of the building with  
 19 infection-free residents being cared for in another,  
 20 which would have necessitated uprooting them from their  
 21 familiar rooms. This should not have been expected of  
 22 vulnerable people in care. Also, the separation  
 23 expected within care settings posed additional practical  
 24 physical difficulties.

25 In substance misuse residential services, vulnerable

1 residents living chaotic lives and sometimes suffering  
 2 mental health difficulties were simply unable to comply  
 3 with the guidelines as set out and required support in  
 4 a different way. In adult care services, whilst one  
 5 harm was prevented, often another was created, seemingly  
 6 without any balancing exercise being done to determine  
 7 which was the greater risk or whether both could be  
 8 mitigated. This was true of having to balance emotional  
 9 harm against physical harm, as in many settings within  
 10 social care and outside of it, because sometimes it was  
 11 a case of creating a physical harm potentially greater  
 12 than the risk of infection for some.

13 The guidance for children's services was almost  
 14 non-existent in the early stages of the pandemic and,  
 15 when it was issued, the rights of children were not  
 16 upheld because a risk assessment approach was not  
 17 adopted. Some children in care were prevented from  
 18 seeing their family members and at one point the  
 19 self-isolation guidance could have led to a whole team  
 20 of staff having to isolate, leaving children with no  
 21 adults whatsoever. This would not have been tolerated  
 22 in a normal family setting and should not have been  
 23 thought appropriate in a children's care setting.

24 The fundamental impossibility of applying the  
 25 mandated infection control practices and services was

1 left to managers and staff to grapple with. Residents  
 2 without capacity could not be kept in their rooms and  
 3 asked to self-isolate without experiencing significant  
 4 distress. They could not abide by physical distancing  
 5 requirements when in communal areas and many could not  
 6 remember even simple instructions issued by staff about  
 7 what they could and could not do. Inspection standards  
 8 imposed on care settings were too clinically driven.  
 9 Care inspection evaluations which had previously focused  
 10 on the quality of care and outcomes for individuals  
 11 became too prescriptive and were almost entirely based  
 12 around infection, protection and control, using clinical  
 13 standards, and care providers were found wanting because  
 14 they could not react quickly enough and meet the  
 15 standard. Where a care home was found wanting in this  
 16 regard, their deficit was reported openly, which allowed  
 17 for public shaming through the press to occur. This was  
 18 not the same for hospitals or other settings.  
 19 Fifth, there were significant financial pressures.  
 20 CrossReach experienced income shortfalls and incurred  
 21 extra costs not adequately covered by payments from the  
 22 Scottish Government. There was a significant difference  
 23 to sustainability payments by various local authorities  
 24 and official guidance was inconsistently applied. The  
 25 "light touch" approach promised was often ignored.

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1 Financial difficulties were evident in all aspects of  
 2 CrossReach's work and cash flow difficulties were  
 3 experienced.  
 4 There was a rise in insurance premiums and major  
 5 difficulties in renewing cover which eventually led to  
 6 the withdrawal of cover for COVID-19 harms. This was  
 7 due to the police investigations into COVID-19 deaths  
 8 and the level of loss of society awards seen in  
 9 Scotland. This effectively forced CrossReach into  
 10 self-insurance in this respect. The sector called for  
 11 the same indemnity as was offered to the NHS in these  
 12 circumstances, but this was denied.  
 13 Public sector day centres closed without considering  
 14 alternative ways of providing support. People supported  
 15 by CrossReach for part of their care and support  
 16 packages had to be entirely supported by CrossReach  
 17 staff 24/7, requiring increased staffing which was only  
 18 possible via expensive use of agency staff, leading to  
 19 cash flow pressures.  
 20 PPE shortages caused significant price increases.  
 21 Some companies would supply only to the NHS, but where  
 22 it was available for purchase, it was bought from  
 23 private providers at a significant uplift, with some  
 24 companies charging up to seven times the normal rate.  
 25 Sixth, there was a considerable impact flowing from

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1 the transfer of residents to or from homes and  
 2 restrictions on visiting. There was at times  
 3 a breakdown in the necessary movement of people from the  
 4 community to care or clinical settings. When people  
 5 were transferring from the community to care homes,  
 6 there was a lack of clarity on responsibility for  
 7 testing prior to admission and in the early stages no  
 8 testing at all of those moving to care homes from  
 9 hospitals, even where the potential for COVID-19  
 10 infection was present in a ward.  
 11 Those who would ordinarily have required hospital  
 12 treatment for the many problems that the frail and  
 13 elderly can face were stuck in care homes. At one stage  
 14 there was a resistance to provide healthcare to these  
 15 individuals, even in acute situations. Key healthcare  
 16 support suddenly became very difficult to access, even  
 17 on a remote basis. One further area of difficulty in  
 18 care homes was the complete cessation of visits.  
 19 Managers were besieged by complaints from relatives and  
 20 having to manage some very emotional conversations.  
 21 There was no discretion given to managers in the early  
 22 stages of the pandemic in terms of being able to balance  
 23 the risk to health and well-being caused by the  
 24 potential of catching COVID-19 against that of being  
 25 isolated from family and friends.

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1 Managers could see significant deterioration in some  
 2 residents, particularly with dementia, which might have  
 3 been ameliorated should the early guidance have been  
 4 taken into consideration. CrossReach supported  
 5 essential visits to the dying wherever possible  
 6 throughout the pandemic, but the tardiness of the  
 7 guidance in care home settings in terms of allowing  
 8 social interaction caused untold harm for many residents  
 9 and their closest families at the time and could be seen  
 10 as an infringement of their human rights.  
 11 Finally, there was a huge impact on staff within the  
 12 sector. In whatever area of support they worked, they  
 13 were required to turn customary practice on its head and  
 14 deliver care, often of the most personal and intimate  
 15 kind, in a situation where they themselves were at risk.  
 16 Only those in the most vulnerable category were  
 17 furloughed. The majority of the workforce of CrossReach  
 18 turned themselves inside out to provide care and support  
 19 in new ways to supported people, even where face-to-face  
 20 services had to close. This was particularly important  
 21 in the mental health and addiction services, where the  
 22 risks associated with services being withdrawn could  
 23 have had catastrophic consequences for those relying on  
 24 them.  
 25 Care homes were effectively requisitioned by the

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1 Scottish Government but without the Scottish Government  
 2 taking any responsibility at the time for the  
 3 consequences of the guidance being applied. Care home  
 4 residents with COVID were not, in many cases, admitted  
 5 to hospital but were required to stay and be treated in  
 6 the care home. This put pressure on the care homes  
 7 without the resources, protections or status of the NHS.  
 8 There was a feeling of abandonment. This principle was  
 9 adopted without understanding that care home provision  
 10 is very distinct from nursing care or cottage hospital  
 11 settings, with neither the clinical skills nor equipment  
 12 to administer the treatment that may have been necessary  
 13 to treat patients with COVID.  
 14 During the course of the pandemic, resources were  
 15 ploughed into CrossReach to support staff to stay  
 16 resilient and to access support for themselves whilst  
 17 they supported others. The well-being of the workforce  
 18 remains fragile. We believe the strain of the pandemic  
 19 on staff coupled with the negative perceptions of social  
 20 care in some settings due to its treatment by the  
 21 Government regulator and the press has exacerbated the  
 22 recruitment and retention issues now prevalent across  
 23 the sector.  
 24 We recognise that the Scottish Government too poured  
 25 in welcome resources and there have been some

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1 longer-term benefits to both supported people and the  
 2 workforce as a result of their investment. Digital  
 3 solutions with social care forced by necessity to keep  
 4 people in contact at the time have now been widened to  
 5 access support in some areas. The well-being funds  
 6 which were made available have been put to good use to  
 7 support exhausted staff.  
 8 We welcome the opportunity provided by this Inquiry  
 9 to learn lessons from the strategic response to the  
 10 pandemic in Scotland and to be recommendations for the  
 11 future.  
 12 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Di Paola.  
 13 Now, the next core participant to speak is  
 14 Kirsty Solman. I'm afraid I don't know who represents  
 15 Ms Solman. You do. Thank you.  
 16 Opening statement by MS HOLT  
 17 for Kirsty Solman and Families of Children with Additional  
 18 Support Needs  
 19 MS HOLT: Good morning, my Lord, ladies and gentlemen. I'm  
 20 Rachel Holt and at today's hearing I represent the core  
 21 participant group Kirsty Solman and Families of Children  
 22 with Additional Support Needs.  
 23 The core participant group comprises seven  
 24 individuals and two charities, Children's Health  
 25 Scotland and the National Autistic Society Scotland. Of

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1 the individuals, all have provided statements to their  
 2 legal representatives and all but one wish to give oral  
 3 evidence to the Inquiry if called. Each individual  
 4 story is different but there are broad themes that can  
 5 be taken from each experience.  
 6 The common themes are that, whilst prior to the  
 7 pandemic the needs of the respective children were not  
 8 necessarily being fully met due to limited or restricted  
 9 services in the field of children's mental health, most  
 10 of the children were coping with life and in some cases  
 11 flourishing. Without exception our members reported  
 12 that the Scottish Government's strategic response to the  
 13 pandemic had a direct adverse impact on their child's  
 14 life. While all had a measure of sympathy for the  
 15 decision to impose a lockdown in March 2020, all  
 16 considered that the Scottish Government's subsequent  
 17 strategic responses to the pandemic failed to consider  
 18 their demographic, with significant long-term  
 19 consequences for their children.  
 20 This core participant comprises individuals of  
 21 extraordinary resilience who are raising  
 22 non-neurotypical children, many of whom have  
 23 comorbidities. For these children, the prolonged  
 24 closure of schools, the withdrawal of already limited  
 25 essential services and what seems like constantly

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1 changing rules caused and continues to cause significant  
 2 disruption to their lives.  
 3 In relation to the two charities who are members of  
 4 this group, while their evidence is in part anecdotal,  
 5 their overview of their members' struggles because of  
 6 the Scottish Government's strategic response to the  
 7 pandemic echoes and therefore reinforced the experiences  
 8 narrated by the individual members of the group.  
 9 Turning to an overview of the evidence of the  
 10 individual members of the group. One of the individual  
 11 members told us it was her opinion that the  
 12 Scottish Government's strategic response to the pandemic  
 13 caused her previously happy child to attempt to take his  
 14 own life five times. The child is currently 12 years of  
 15 age. He first attempted to take his own life  
 16 in November 2021, when he was ten years old. This  
 17 member's evidence is that prior to the pandemic she and  
 18 her husband struggled to get a diagnosis of autism for  
 19 her child. She considered that this was in part due to  
 20 services not taking her concerns seriously and poor and  
 21 inconsistent service provision. Once there was  
 22 a diagnosis of autism, the child was diagnosed as having  
 23 ADHD and during the pandemic as having anxiety. The  
 24 member says that prior to the pandemic, while there were  
 25 challenges for her child educationally due to resources

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1 issues, he managed academically, albeit he was behind  
 2 his peers. The member had to fight to get an education  
 3 plan put in place, again citing a reluctance on the part  
 4 of professionals to listen to and acknowledge the  
 5 concerns of she and her husband.

6 All that said, the member describes the child  
 7 pre-pandemic, while having a diagnosis of autism, ADHD  
 8 and being anxious, as a generally happy boy who was  
 9 coping with life. She stressed he needed routines and  
 10 coped when routines and structures were in place. She  
 11 explains that her child enjoyed out-of-school activities  
 12 and had three regular hobbies that he engaged in with  
 13 joy and enthusiasm. All in all, despite less than ideal  
 14 services and support, the member says that prior to the  
 15 pandemic and the Scottish Government’s strategic  
 16 response thereto, her child was doing well in the sense  
 17 that he enjoyed life despite his diagnoses and the  
 18 challenges those brought to his day-to-day life. She  
 19 said she and her husband were generally able to meet his  
 20 needs and they were satisfied that they were doing so.

21 Following the pandemic, the member reported that her  
 22 child’s health and well-being progressively declined.  
 23 He struggled to cope with the first national lockdown as  
 24 his routines and the necessary structure that enabled  
 25 him to manage life ended abruptly. The child’s

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1 extra-curriculum activities also ended abruptly. We  
 2 were told that as the child is a rule-follower and  
 3 a very literal thinker, the over-simplistic messaging  
 4 was problematic. The child’s anxiety increased and he  
 5 believed that if a person caught COVID, they would die  
 6 or end up in hospital, hooked up on machines, as was  
 7 being reported daily. The constant news stories which  
 8 were often reported in a sensational and dramatic manner  
 9 over numerous outlets became a source of anxiety for  
 10 him.

11 The child became obsessed with following the myriad  
 12 of rules, which became a bigger issue over time as the  
 13 rules kept changing. The child worried that his  
 14 grandparents, two of whom were key workers, would get  
 15 COVID and die as COVID was reported as a disease with  
 16 a very high mortality rate. The child withdrew from  
 17 family life, he withdrew from his parents and, when  
 18 restrictions eased, from wider family, such as his  
 19 grandparents.

20 The child spent increasingly lengthier periods in  
 21 his room. When school started, he struggled with the  
 22 mass mandate and the constant changes to the rules. The  
 23 member said she was aware her child’s anxiety had  
 24 increased exponentially at the start of the pandemic.  
 25 She sought assistance from services. As the child was

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1 already under Child and Adolescent Mental Health  
 2 Services, CAMHS, due to his diagnosis of ADHD, he was  
 3 offered a six-week session of talking therapies on  
 4 a remote platform. The member reports that the child  
 5 struggled to engage with remote therapy sessions as he  
 6 could not see body language and pick up on non-verbal  
 7 cues via a screen. The child had tended to cope in  
 8 social interactions by observing non-verbal cues and  
 9 body language, which he had learned to do. These  
 10 learned responses helped him understand the whole  
 11 context of his interactions with others.

12 We were told that during the therapy sessions the  
 13 child would pick his fingers until they bled but the  
 14 counsellor was not aware of this because she could not  
 15 see his hands on the screen. The child was able to give  
 16 the counsellor the responses he considered she sought  
 17 and her inability to fully assess him in person likely  
 18 impacted her approach to his care. The member says the  
 19 child continues to pick his fingers and he now wears  
 20 gloves to stop him doing so.

21 The child’s first suicide attempt was not treated  
 22 appropriately and, in the member’s view, was dismissed  
 23 with inadequate treatment from CAMHS. It was only after  
 24 the child’s third attempt on his life that he was  
 25 referred to a psychiatrist. The member considers that,

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1 prior to the pandemic, CAMHS was an underfunded and  
 2 under-resourced organisation but believes that it used  
 3 the pandemic as a means of not seeing children face to  
 4 face. This member feels that, had her son been seen  
 5 face to face by CAMHS when his anxiety levels first  
 6 increased, it would have allowed a more proactive  
 7 approach to his treatment as the full extent of his  
 8 presentation was not fully assessed during the remote  
 9 therapy sessions.

10 This witness raises many broader concerns about the  
 11 Government’s attitude to children with mental health  
 12 which go beyond the strategic response to the pandemic.  
 13 However, she is also adamant that, in responding to the  
 14 pandemic, the Government’s response was heavily focused  
 15 on the economy and on maintaining only a few essential  
 16 services. This member considers that the heavy focus on  
 17 the clinically vulnerable to the impacts of COVID meant  
 18 that the Government failed to consider the impacts of  
 19 the virus on other vulnerable members of society. She  
 20 is of the view that, while the strategic response to the  
 21 pandemic may have saved clinically vulnerable members of  
 22 society, it has caused the loss of many more members of  
 23 society who are or were vulnerable in other ways. This,  
 24 she claims, requires to be factored into an assessment  
 25 of the Scottish Government’s strategic response to the

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1 pandemic.  
 2 Other individual members of the group have recounted  
 3 similar experiences to the individual member whose  
 4 experience has just been set out. They speak of the  
 5 devastating impact of services being withdrawn, schools  
 6 being closed and, when re-opened, operating in new and  
 7 unusual ways; further, the difficulties of  
 8 home-schooling and their struggles to motivate their  
 9 non-neurotypical children.  
 10 Most, if not all, consider that the Government's  
 11 strategic response to the pandemic was too heavily  
 12 focused on the clinically vulnerable and not on  
 13 children, especially vulnerable children. Most feel  
 14 their child's development was adversely impacted by the  
 15 strategic response to the pandemic and some consider the  
 16 damage to their child caused by the impacts of that  
 17 response will be lifelong.  
 18 The stories of the individual members of the group  
 19 are often harrowing. There can be additional challenges  
 20 raising a child with additional support needs. Prior to  
 21 the pandemic, members' experiences were worsened by  
 22 inadequate provision of services and under-resourcing  
 23 and underfunding of other services, including schools.  
 24 However, the members and their children were generally  
 25 managing as life was structured and organised. The

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1 closure of schools, the withdrawal of what services  
 2 there were and the frequent introduction of new rules  
 3 which were often changed or abandoned after a short  
 4 period brought an end to the largely structured and  
 5 organised society that provided a constant and essential  
 6 backdrop to the lives of our members and their children.  
 7 The failure of many services such as CAMHS to return  
 8 to pre-pandemic service exacerbated matters. It seems  
 9 to our individual members that their children did not  
 10 feature in the Scottish Government's strategic response  
 11 to the pandemic and the consequences of that are ongoing  
 12 for them and for their children.  
 13 Turning to an overview of the evidence of the  
 14 organisations of the group. The two organisations who  
 15 are members have each provided a detailed statement  
 16 setting out the experiences of those they support.  
 17 Children's Health Scotland is a leading health charity  
 18 in Scotland. It is the only charity in Scotland  
 19 dedicated to informing, promoting and campaigning on the  
 20 healthcare needs and rights of all children and young  
 21 people. The National Autistic Society Scotland,  
 22 NAS Scotland, is part of the UK's leading charity for  
 23 people affected by autism. It offers a range of  
 24 services and support, including supported living,  
 25 befriending social groups, advice and information, local

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1 branches, outreach and training. Part of its services  
 2 include statutory functions which apply to adults only.  
 3 Accordingly, so far as this core participant is  
 4 concerned, the evidence from NAS Scotland refers only to  
 5 its charitable function, which provides support to,  
 6 among others, children and young people.  
 7 Children's Health Scotland is a small charity.  
 8 Prior to the pandemic, the employees worked in their  
 9 individual locations and made little use of technology  
 10 in furthering the aims of the organisation. When the  
 11 first lockdown happened, the organisation did what it  
 12 could by telephoning members. Many of the young people  
 13 to whom Children's Health Scotland offers support have  
 14 physical health limitations and disabilities. Those  
 15 young people were more concerned about the effect of the  
 16 pandemic on their health than many young people of  
 17 a similar age without such health difficulties.  
 18 Over time, Children's Health Scotland moved meetings  
 19 and engagement with others to Teams and Zoom. The  
 20 organisation engaged the services of a tech company,  
 21 which helped them build an online platform. Whilst this  
 22 was not the same as in-person meetings, the  
 23 representative we spoke to considered that her  
 24 organisation managed to provide confidential and secure  
 25 support to its members during the pandemic in this way.

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1 The representative with whom we spoke opined that  
 2 health ought not be defined as being an absence of  
 3 illness but as holistic well-being. The representative  
 4 said that, after the pandemic, there was a focus on the  
 5 fact that the response to it had isolated the elderly  
 6 but that there were limited investigations into the  
 7 response to the pandemic on children and the young. She  
 8 reports that the closure of respite and day centres  
 9 during the pandemic had an impact on the overall health  
 10 and well-being of many young people and their families.  
 11 She considers that the redeployment of resources to, for  
 12 example, vaccine centres resulted in those resources  
 13 being withdrawn from services for children and young  
 14 people, although that is anecdotal evidence only.  
 15 The representative considers that many NHS services  
 16 for children were slow to re-open after lockdowns for  
 17 reasons that are not clear to her. The representative  
 18 believes that, in terms of the decisions that the  
 19 Government made, their effect on children has been  
 20 "horrendous". She observes that even during the  
 21 world wars the schools remained opened and so the  
 22 magnitude of the decision to close the schools cannot be  
 23 underestimated.  
 24 Children's Health Scotland is aware that more  
 25 children remain off school with anxiety and more

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1 children are not attending school than at any other  
 2 point in time, according to their records. The  
 3 representative does not think that it is coincidental  
 4 that more children are refusing to attend school than  
 5 ever before and believes it to be linked directly to the  
 6 Scottish Government’s strategic response to the  
 7 pandemic. The representative states that her  
 8 organisation has recorded a massive increase in  
 9 childhood anxiety, which she believes is a huge barrier  
 10 for children engaging with their education.

11 The representative from Children’s Health Scotland  
 12 can offer a unique perspective on the effect on children  
 13 with additional support needs and their families of the  
 14 Scottish Government’s strategic response to the  
 15 pandemic. Her evidence echoes that of the individual  
 16 members but her insight into the effect on children of  
 17 the decisions of the Government has been gleaned from  
 18 hearing numerous stories directly from vulnerable  
 19 children and their families about how the decisions made  
 20 in response to the pandemic affected them.

21 At least one child of almost every member of the  
 22 core participant group, children of families with  
 23 additional support needs, has an autism diagnosis.  
 24 Their individual narratives about the effect of the  
 25 Government’s strategic response to the pandemic on their

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1 children and family were echoed by what we were told by  
 2 the representatives of NAS Scotland.  
 3 NAS Scotland told us, among other things, about  
 4 their concerns in relation to the oversimplistic  
 5 messaging, which not only raised anxiety levels for many  
 6 non-neurotypical people, but which failed to address  
 7 many important issues for non-neurotypical members, such  
 8 as exemptions from mandatory mask-wearing. While it was  
 9 understood by NAS Scotland that the desire was for  
 10 a pure message, it was felt this desire overlooked the  
 11 fact that many people who are neurodiverse were left  
 12 unsure of what they could and could not do and,  
 13 crucially, left without key information that would have  
 14 helped them navigate their own response to the pandemic  
 15 and the measures imposed.

16 NAS Scotland told us that while they attempted to  
 17 keep their website updated with changes to the rules,  
 18 that became increasingly challenging when the rules  
 19 started to change on an almost daily basis. To  
 20 conclude, the experience of each member of the core  
 21 participant group, families of children with additional  
 22 support needs, as a result of the Scottish Government’s  
 23 strategic response to the COVID-19 pandemic, is unique.

24 That said, all individual stories are linked by  
 25 common themes which highlight that a more nuanced and

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1 balanced strategic response to the pandemic which  
 2 considered and which made provision for the families of  
 3 children with additional support needs ought to have  
 4 been possible. Likewise, the two charity members of the  
 5 group reinforced those common themes and thereby  
 6 reinforced that a more nuanced and balanced strategic  
 7 response to the pandemic and one which made provision  
 8 for the families of children with additional support  
 9 needs ought to have been possible.

10 Thank you, my Lord, for the opportunity to present  
 11 this opening statement.

12 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed, Ms Holt.

13 Now, the next core participant is PAMIS and I think  
 14 we’re back to Ms Galbraith.

15 Opening statement by MS GALBRAITH  
 16 for PAMIS

17 MS GALBRAITH: My Lord, I appear on behalf of Promoting  
 18 a More Inclusive Society, PAMIS.

19 PAMIS is grateful to have this opportunity to  
 20 provide an oral submission at the start of these Health  
 21 and Social Care Impact Hearings. PAMIS is the only  
 22 charity that supports and works exclusively with  
 23 children, young people and adults with profound learning  
 24 and multiple disabilities, PMLD. After 31 years in  
 25 existence, PAMIS can state with confidence that the

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1 COVID-19 pandemic represented some of the most traumatic  
 2 and challenging times for people with PMLD and their  
 3 families. In their written opening statement, PAMIS  
 4 took the opportunity to include some photographs, and  
 5 this was done with the hope and intention of bringing  
 6 their submissions to life, to put faces to the  
 7 experiences and so that the real people who were  
 8 impacted can be seen, their voices heard, even if they  
 9 are not able to do so in person.

10 "Abandoned", "forgotten" and "invisible". These are  
 11 the words that come closest to describing the impact of  
 12 the response to the COVID-19 pandemic on those with  
 13 PMLD. As one of the most vulnerable and marginalised  
 14 groups in Scottish society, families had spent years  
 15 dedicating their life, love and energy to ensure the  
 16 provision of meaningful support packages of care for  
 17 their loved ones which would bring together a number of  
 18 different professionals and services and this vital  
 19 framework of support collapsed in March 2020 and the  
 20 Inquiry will hear that the feeling of abandonment  
 21 continues.

22 For people with PMLD and their families, there was  
 23 no feeling of all being in it together as there might  
 24 have been for others in society. People with PMLD have  
 25 a combination of intellectual, physical and sensory

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1 difficulties which are often compounded by serious  
 2 health problems. It's accepted that providing  
 3 appropriate care in the midst of a pandemic or public  
 4 health emergency will pose significant challenges, but  
 5 this applies all the more so to people with PMLD.  
 6 There appeared to be no plan A, plan B or indeed any  
 7 plan at all for people with PMLD and their families  
 8 during this time, and as days, weeks and months passed  
 9 after lockdown began, the silence from public bodies was  
 10 deeply disappointing and frustrating. Families did not  
 11 know what was happening and there seemed to be little  
 12 appetite to engage with them or listen to what they were  
 13 saying or asking for. The Inquiry will hear evidence of  
 14 various impacts over the forthcoming weeks and for  
 15 people with PMLD I would like to highlight some specific  
 16 examples.  
 17 There was an absence of guidance tailored to the  
 18 needs of people with PMLD and the guidance that was  
 19 available was interpreted inconsistently by local care  
 20 providers, meaning that the overall meaning and  
 21 objective was lost. There was an inconsistent approach  
 22 to the re-opening of day services and respite  
 23 facilities. In many cases, families felt that local  
 24 authorities used the situation as an opportunity to  
 25 close services without consultation.

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1 Care packages were reviewed during COVID-19 despite  
 2 the Scottish Government's reassurance that would not  
 3 happen. There were inconsistent approaches to allowing  
 4 family to visit relatives in care homes or supported  
 5 living settings. There was a lack of family involvement  
 6 in risk assessments regarding loss of contact, again  
 7 despite the Scottish Government's guidance recommending  
 8 such involvement.  
 9 There was an inconsistent approach to accompanying  
 10 people with PMLD into hospital and within ambulances.  
 11 Families had to ask repeatedly for shielding letters to  
 12 be provided and there were difficulties accessing PPE.  
 13 Importantly, allied health professionals and support  
 14 services were withdrawn and key respite services were  
 15 lost.  
 16 The practical effect of these feelings were that  
 17 families felt they were being kept on a knife-edge, with  
 18 little certainty or predictability for the future; for  
 19 example, families concerned they would not be able to  
 20 travel with their loved ones in an ambulance. One  
 21 mother has spoken of having to race to a hospital  
 22 because she was so concerned that clinicians there would  
 23 make a judgment about her child's quality of life and  
 24 decline treatment options. Another mother expressed  
 25 concern about care arrangements for her son if she and

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1 her husband became ill with COVID themselves, and she  
 2 was told the only option would be for him to be placed  
 3 in a care home. Some families became so worried that  
 4 they considered suicide pacts.  
 5 Health conditions deteriorated due to the lack of  
 6 basic and routine medical provision and in many cases  
 7 they have never recovered. The Inquiry will hear of  
 8 many experiences. However, I would like to reference  
 9 just a few particular examples that have been  
 10 highlighted by PAMIS.  
 11 One young woman with PMLD had injured her shoulder  
 12 and there was no option for a face-to-face appointment  
 13 with a GP. However, she was non-verbal and that meant  
 14 that a physical examination was essential. By the time  
 15 she could be physically assessed, she had developed  
 16 severe tissue damage. Provided with no support, her  
 17 family required to seek therapies in the private sector.  
 18 They were in the fortunate position of being able to do  
 19 so while others were not.  
 20 Another example comes from one mother explaining how  
 21 her son had gone down. Before the pandemic, he had been  
 22 actively engaging, but without the weekly support from  
 23 allied health professionals, he had simply withdrawn  
 24 into himself. It was difficult for the family to find  
 25 outside spaces and activities for him when he had been

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1 actively engaged beforehand. His mental and physical  
 2 state deteriorated and the family are legitimately  
 3 concerned he may simply never return to how he was  
 4 before.  
 5 Another young man with very complex needs had his  
 6 last day at school in March 2020 and after that was left  
 7 with no physiotherapy, no respite or day opportunities  
 8 and over the next two years his health and well-being  
 9 seriously deteriorated. By the time his mother managed  
 10 to obtain space at a day-care centre, two and a half  
 11 years later, he had deteriorated so much, he just  
 12 couldn't cope with attending the sessions, both  
 13 physically and cognitively. The future looks very bleak  
 14 for him and his single parent mother is not getting  
 15 sufficient help to cope.  
 16 One other young man was in a group home but was in  
 17 contact with and visited by his mum and dad several  
 18 times a week and came home once a week. He was an  
 19 affectionate son who loved nothing more than a hug. He  
 20 had limited communication and so most of his  
 21 communication was through touch. He needed to see  
 22 people's faces to understand their communication and so  
 23 COVID was devastating for him. He did not understand  
 24 why he couldn't see his parents, why he couldn't see  
 25 their faces, why he had to wave through windows or sit

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1 in the cold outside and not hold their hands. His mood  
 2 deteriorated significantly and he was sad all the time.  
 3 He is now able to see his parents but his mood has not  
 4 recovered. His family worry he will never be the same  
 5 again.  
 6 The abandonment felt continues today. So many  
 7 experienced allied health professionals have not  
 8 returned to service. People have retired or left  
 9 service providers for other employment, leaving a void.  
 10 Many services simply have not returned. In one example,  
 11 a mother had witnessed a change in her daughter's  
 12 physical, mental and cognitive condition during the  
 13 pandemic and, when services eventually did return, she  
 14 was allocated an inexperienced staff group. There was  
 15 a lack of allied health support to reconnect and provide  
 16 interventions and training. The mother's own health has  
 17 now declined and she has been admitted to hospital, but  
 18 herself requires to arrange for respite and support for  
 19 her daughter.  
 20 The withdrawal of front-line services and allied  
 21 support workers means that many with PMLD have their  
 22 long-term conditions compromised and that more people  
 23 will be lost in the future. Even if services have  
 24 returned, the lack of trust and confidence means there  
 25 is a genuine fear that organisational support could

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1 easily be withdrawn again in the future.  
 2 The Equality Act and the Human Rights Act prohibit  
 3 discrimination of people with PMLD. They were entitled  
 4 to expect that public bodies would comply with their  
 5 equality duties in substance with rigour and an open  
 6 mind. They are entitled to expect that public bodies  
 7 would have been proactive in prioritising care  
 8 arrangements. However, the reality was that people with  
 9 PMLD and their families felt at best an afterthought and  
 10 at worst forgotten and discriminated against.  
 11 Against that background, PAMIS appreciates that many  
 12 public bodies represented at this Inquiry have expressed  
 13 their willingness to listen and to learn. That  
 14 sentiment is to be welcomed because trust has been lost.  
 15 Many families remain fearful that services will never  
 16 return or those which have could be taken away again at  
 17 any time. The path to rebuilding relationships and  
 18 trust is a long and difficult one. The first step to  
 19 rebuilding trust requires that the stated commitment to  
 20 co-operation and transparency holds good through this  
 21 Inquiry. This is not a time for further broken promises  
 22 and PAMIS is confident that the Chair and Inquiry team  
 23 will ensure that core participants act with candour.  
 24 PAMIS welcomes the beginning of the public hearings  
 25 and commends the Chair's and Inquiry team's commitment

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1 to ascertaining the truth. PAMIS is ready to contribute  
 2 towards a process which is robust, exhaustive, fair and  
 3 ensures accountability. Lessons can and must be learned  
 4 so that suffering of people with PMLD is avoided in  
 5 future pandemics and public health emergencies.  
 6 Moving forward, PAMIS hopes that people with PMLD  
 7 and their families are involved as partners at a local  
 8 and national level in developing appropriate policies,  
 9 guidance and solutions and this Inquiry represents an  
 10 opportunity for that change to begin to materialise.  
 11 Thank you.  
 12 THE CHAIR: Thank you, Ms Galbraith.  
 13 Now, we've been moving with more alacrity than might  
 14 have been expected. I do have time to hear the next  
 15 participant plainly before lunchtime or we can start  
 16 lunch early and finish early, but I appreciate that  
 17 Mr Blair, who I think is acting for the next core  
 18 participant, for the Royal College of Nursing, might not  
 19 want to have his schedule disrupted and it might not be  
 20 suitable to him. But I'm willing to hear him if he  
 21 wants to speak now.  
 22 MR BLAIR: My Lord, I'm entirely content to speak now.  
 23 THE CHAIR: Well, even if you speak now, we'll still have an  
 24 early lunch, but we'll finish earlier in any event so  
 25 I'm very grateful for that. Thank you, Mr Blair.

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1 Opening Statement by MR BLAIR  
 2 for Royal College of Nursing Scotland  
 3 MR BLAIR: My Lord, on Thursday 26 March 2020 millions of  
 4 people across Scotland and throughout the rest of the UK  
 5 emerged from their homes for the first "Clap for Carers"  
 6 event. That day and for the following nine Thursdays  
 7 the public gathered on their doorsteps and applauded the  
 8 NHS and other key workers helping to fight COVID-19.  
 9 Amongst those receiving the public support were the  
 10 48,500 Scottish nursing staff and students who formed  
 11 the membership of RCN Scotland.  
 12 While the intention behind the initiative was  
 13 a noble one and the public support welcome, behind this  
 14 was a nursing and healthcare workforce which had been  
 15 underfunded and under-resourced for years and without  
 16 enough of the relevant PPE to do the work required of it  
 17 safely, both for nurses and for patients.  
 18 For RCN Scotland, care for patients, their safety  
 19 and well-being must be at the forefront. It is what  
 20 nurses do. But as a result of that underfunding,  
 21 under-resourcing and the decision-making on PPE, a very  
 22 stretched workforce had to do their very best to deliver  
 23 on the front line what the public expected, often at  
 24 great personal cost. RCN Scotland is clear that, unless  
 25 something is done about the funding and resourcing

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1 issues, taking account now also of the effect of long  
 2 COVID on the workforce, public acknowledgement alone  
 3 will not be anywhere near enough to see the NHS through  
 4 another pandemic.  
 5 In this Inquiry RCN hopes to be a critical friend of  
 6 the Scottish Government and of all health and social  
 7 care providers, particularly NHS Scotland, to emphasise  
 8 where there was good practice during the pandemic but  
 9 also to highlight where lessons must be learned in order  
 10 to provide future support for key workers, patients and  
 11 the public at large.  
 12 The Royal College of Nursing is also a core  
 13 participant to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry and will take  
 14 that opportunity to address these points and the  
 15 decision-making at the UK Government level as well. The  
 16 Royal College of Nursing is the representative voice of  
 17 nursing across the four nations of the UK and is the  
 18 largest professional union of nursing staff in the  
 19 world. As the Inquiry will be aware from the RCN's  
 20 written submissions, RCN Scotland is a distinct  
 21 directorate of the UK-wide Royal College of Nursing.  
 22 RCN Scotland brings two important perspectives to  
 23 this Inquiry's work which it hopes will be of  
 24 assistance. Firstly, from the outset of the pandemic it  
 25 was a key stakeholder in a number of Scottish Government

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1 decision-making bodies. Its views were heard as part  
 2 of, amongst others, the Workforce Senior Leadership  
 3 Group, the Clinical Professional Advisory Group, the  
 4 Louisa Jordan Programme Board and the Pandemic Response  
 5 in Adult Social Care Group. It also remained in contact  
 6 with all of Scotland's NHS health boards, advising them  
 7 of its concerns through each stage of the pandemic.  
 8 It is hoped that in due course RCN Scotland's  
 9 associate directors, Norman Provan and Eileen McKenna,  
 10 through their witness evidence, can assist the Inquiry  
 11 in understanding the manner in which Scottish Government  
 12 decision-making was undertaken throughout the pandemic  
 13 and in particular the extent to which third party  
 14 stakeholders were involved in that process.  
 15 Secondly, my Lord, the Royal College of Nursing is  
 16 of course a representative organisation. It represents  
 17 nearly 50,000 nursing staff and students in Scotland.  
 18 Each of those nurses has a story to tell about the  
 19 pandemic experience. Those stories include the student  
 20 nurses who were sent out on to the wards to provide  
 21 further support when they would otherwise have been in  
 22 the classroom. They include the retired nurses who  
 23 returned to front-line nursing. They include those who  
 24 worked in intensive care and those who provided care in  
 25 the community for vulnerable patients. They included

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1 nurses in the NHS and those working in the private  
 2 sector. They include the large cohort of nurses now  
 3 suffering from the effects of long COVID, having  
 4 contracted COVID, in many cases on repeated occasions at  
 5 work. They include innumerable accounts of nurses going  
 6 above and beyond to ensure the best for their patients.  
 7 They include countless stories of Scottish nurses  
 8 putting their own physical and mental health at risk in  
 9 order to keep the Health Service functioning.  
 10 The RCN therefore has a privileged perspective when  
 11 it comes to what was happening in our hospitals and our  
 12 care homes on a day-to-day basis from March 2020  
 13 onwards. Those stories from the RCN's members are not  
 14 offered solely in the interests of Scotland's nurses.  
 15 The RCN is proud to represent its members' interests,  
 16 but it believes strongly that those interests align with  
 17 the interests of patients. A strong, properly resourced  
 18 nursing profession is essential to ensuring the health  
 19 of Scotland's people.  
 20 My Lord, the Inquiry will have seen the  
 21 RCN Scotland's written submission and this afternoon  
 22 I don't intend to rehearse what is said in that  
 23 submission with reference to each of the Inquiry's terms  
 24 of reference. Rather, I'd seek to highlight three key  
 25 themes which run through the RCN Scotland response and

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1 which form key areas of focus in its ongoing engagement  
 2 with this Inquiry. Those are firstly Scotland's nursing  
 3 workforce, secondly, issues with the procurement and  
 4 supply of PPE and, thirdly, the impact of the pandemic  
 5 on the health of Scotland's nurses. As will be clear  
 6 from the written submission, these themes cut across  
 7 a variety of the Inquiry's terms of reference.  
 8 Turning to the first issue, Scotland's nursing  
 9 workforce. There is simply not enough nursing staff in  
 10 Scotland to provide the care our population needs.  
 11 Evidence and experience show that having the right  
 12 numbers of nurses with the right skills in the right  
 13 place at the right time improves health outcomes, the  
 14 quality of care delivered and patient safety.  
 15 Over the years, the Scottish Government has made  
 16 a number of commitments relating to the nursing  
 17 workforce, however it has been difficult to track the  
 18 delivery and impact of those commitments. The RCN heard  
 19 from its members throughout the pandemic that there were  
 20 concerns regarding patient safety and staff well-being  
 21 as a result of shortages of staff on Scotland's wards  
 22 and in Scotland's care homes. Some of that can be  
 23 attributed to COVID-specific issues. As the largest  
 24 clinical profession, nurses were, proportionately  
 25 speaking, significantly more exposed to the virus than

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1 other Scottish workers, leading to high incidences of  
2 sickness absence.

3 However, the workforce problem is one that predates  
4 the pandemic. Over the last five years the number of  
5 nursing vacancies and the vacancy rate have risen  
6 steadily, including for long-term vacancies, being posts  
7 unfulfilled for three months or longer. At no point has  
8 the planned establishment been achieved. In fact, the  
9 increase in vacancies indicates that the gap between  
10 planned staff and actual staffing is widening. There  
11 have been historic problems with funding sufficient  
12 student nursing courses domestically to meet the planned  
13 establishment.

14 During the pandemic, this manifested with demands  
15 for longer working hours and compromised nurse to  
16 patient ratios. Even when pulling in resource from  
17 nursing students and the retired, the NHS did not reach  
18 the planned establishment which is being aimed for  
19 during normal times. The pandemic, in the RCN's  
20 submission, simply emphasised an underlying systemic  
21 weakness in Scotland's Health Service, that there are  
22 not enough nurses. That has been clear in the  
23 post-pandemic experience, where a desire to return to  
24 more run-of-the-mill healthcare services and to deal  
25 with the backlog of non-pandemic cases has faced

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1 a continuing capacity shortage. Scotland's nurses  
2 remain overworked because there simply are not enough  
3 nurses to provide sufficient support to Scotland's  
4 population.

5 It is essential that the Scottish Government and  
6 NHS Scotland learn from the COVID experience. Proper  
7 resourcing and workforce planning is necessary to ensure  
8 that the health sector never again faces the strains  
9 which it did in 2020.

10 Turning to the second theme, my Lord, the  
11 availability of appropriate PPE was a recurring issue  
12 for the RCN and its members during the pandemic. As  
13 early as 9 April 2020, Theresa Fyffe, the then director  
14 of RCN Scotland, wrote to the Chair of the Health and  
15 Safety Executive to highlight an unconscionable lack of  
16 PPE and the risk which this posed to its members as well  
17 as nurses and healthcare workers more generally. Those  
18 concerns extended to hospitals, GP surgeries,  
19 care homes, hospices and community nursing visits.

20 Notwithstanding those concerns, RCN Scotland's  
21 experience was that in the early days of the pandemic,  
22 the Scottish Government and the NHS in Scotland took  
23 a highly effective approach to the provision of PPE and  
24 was responsive to developing concerns. RCN Scotland's  
25 leadership was aware on more or less a daily basis of

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1 how much PPE there was in the country and to where it  
2 was being deployed. In the context of an international  
3 PPE shortage, the Government and the NHS should be  
4 commended for this.

5 However, as the pandemic progressed, the RCN's  
6 concerns grew. In particular, it considered that it was  
7 inappropriate for nursing staff to be fitted with simple  
8 surgical masks when providing care to patients. Nursing  
9 is perhaps the most hands-on caring role. The concern  
10 was that a loose-fitting surgical mask was unlikely to  
11 provide much protection in the context of an airborne  
12 virus. However, calls for the provision of FFP3 masks  
13 were not met with a positive response. Unsurprisingly,  
14 concerns about costs were raised. However and perhaps  
15 more concerningly, the RCN encountered consistent  
16 resistance to the idea that an FFP3 was necessary at  
17 all.

18 RCN Scotland consistently argued that the evidence  
19 indicated that the virus was airborne and that proper  
20 masking was essential. That argument was challenged by  
21 decision-makers within the Scottish Government, who  
22 continued for a prolonged period to argue that the virus  
23 was spread through droplets, the implication being that  
24 the provision of FFP3 masks would be disproportionate in  
25 those circumstances.

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1 Further, the RCN noted repeated reliance on the  
2 so-called hierarchy of control mechanisms. In theory,  
3 masks may not be necessary in situations where, for  
4 example, proper levels of ventilation were maintained.  
5 However, time and time again nurses found that the other  
6 points in the hierarchy of control were aspirational at  
7 best. There were also continued concerns that the  
8 provision of PPE was focused on acute secondary care  
9 institutions, leaving those working in the community and  
10 primary care under-resourced.

11 Eventually the Scottish Government accepted that  
12 FFP3 masks should be provided. However, even at that  
13 point, the decision was qualified and FFP3 would only be  
14 provided if a member of staff requested it and a risk  
15 assessment concluded it would be necessary. Overall the  
16 RCN is concerned that the Scottish Government's response  
17 to this issue was both too slow and ultimately  
18 inadequate. RCN Scotland continued to receive reports  
19 from nurses who are concerned that they were infected  
20 with COVID-19 at work as a result of a lack of effective  
21 PPE.

22 That turns to the final theme, my Lord. The Inquiry  
23 is about to commence a prolonged series of  
24 Impact Hearings. It is essential that those include  
25 hearing about the profound impact which the pandemic had

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1 on Scotland's nurses. The issues highlighted above in  
2 terms of workforce planning and provision of PPE as well  
3 as the general strain placed on the health sector by the  
4 pandemic had a severe effect on the nursing profession.  
5 Those effects were felt in the mental and physical  
6 health of those providing care to patients. Many nurses  
7 reported and continued to report the trauma and its  
8 consequences of seeing so many people, many more than  
9 would ever be usual, dying whilst at work.

10 It was quite simply impossible to provide nursing  
11 care in an absolutely safe manner during the pandemic.  
12 The airborne nature of the virus, the type of PPE  
13 provided and the fact that much nursing care is  
14 literally delivered hands-on meant that the nurses were  
15 putting themselves at risk by simply turning up for work  
16 each day.

17 In that context, it is unsurprising that nurses have  
18 seen a disproportionate death rate from COVID-19 as  
19 compared against the general population once certain  
20 personal factors such as age are taken into account.  
21 Whilst it is unsurprising, that does not render it any  
22 less a matter of extreme regret. Even for those who  
23 survived infection, there have been long-term  
24 consequences for many of the RCN's members.

25 The RCN has received and continues to receive

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1 a significant volume of reports from nurses who have  
2 contracted extremely debilitating symptoms from  
3 occupationally acquired long COVID. Many nurses have  
4 been absent from work sick since the early months of the  
5 pandemic and some may never be able to return to work.

6 Whilst full pay was continued for all NHS nurses who  
7 were absent with long COVID during the pandemic,  
8 since September of this year the NHS has reverted to  
9 treating these cases in line with other capability  
10 issues and it is anticipated that nurses will  
11 accordingly lose their jobs. As well as this, nurses  
12 and healthcare workers in the private care sector who do  
13 not have the same pay and conditions as NHS staff have  
14 reported issues regarding their financial situation in  
15 relation to sick pay for illness as a result of COVID.

16 On the subject of long COVID, RCN Scotland notes the  
17 Inquiry's position as regards the extent to which  
18 long COVID falls within the terms of reference as  
19 currently expressed. It is a matter of significant  
20 regret that the Inquiry considers that the ongoing  
21 effects and future treatment of long COVID do not fall  
22 within the terms of reference. Given the significant  
23 effect this syndrome has had on the clinical workforce,  
24 it is the RCN's view that long COVID and its ongoing  
25 effects represent another matter which places strain on

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1 the ability of the Health Service to respond to any  
2 future crisis.

3 Lastly, in terms of the effect of the pandemic on  
4 nurses, the RCN in Scotland and across the UK is  
5 concerned by the approach taken by the NHS to RIDDOR  
6 reporting, particularly in relation to nurses who  
7 contracted COVID. The Inquiry will no doubt be aware of  
8 the requirements on employers in terms of the Reporting  
9 of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences  
10 Regulation 2013. RCN Scotland repeatedly experienced  
11 resistance from health boards to the suggestion that  
12 they should be reporting incidences of COVID which  
13 appear to have been acquired at work. That resistance  
14 is likely to render some of the data unsafe. It also  
15 likely inhibited the HSE's ability to investigate  
16 potential concerns in the workplace.

17 RCN Scotland also sought to encourage the Health and  
18 Safety Executive to take a more robust approach to  
19 enforcing boards' duties to make such reports. It found  
20 the HSE to be equally resistant to these approaches and  
21 considers this again to be a matter of very significant  
22 regret.

23 In conclusion, my Lord, returning to the opening  
24 image of the NHS clap for carers, whilst it is essential  
25 both for the welfare of the clinical professions and for

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1 patients that public support for the nursing and  
2 healthcare front line continues, it is also essential  
3 that lessons are learned, both from what went well and  
4 what did not, and it is essential that future plans are  
5 informed by the lived experiences of nurses. The  
6 human-rights-based approach must include consideration  
7 of the human rights of Scotland's nursing profession.

8 Turning to the work of this Inquiry, the RCN  
9 continues to bang its own drum in support of nurses  
10 across Scotland and the UK and to ensure a workforce  
11 properly resourced and ready for the next set of  
12 challenges, whatever they may be.

13 It hopes to assist the Inquiry in any way that it  
14 can.

15 THE CHAIR: Thank you, Mr Blair. I'm very grateful.

16 Right. It's still only 12.40 but I think we will  
17 take lunch there. Can I ask you all please to be back  
18 at 1.40? I think at 1.40 we're going to hear from  
19 Scottish Care. Again I'm not entirely sure — I don't  
20 have a firm — is it Ms O'Neill that's going to — yes,  
21 it is. Sorry, I didn't know that definitely. If you  
22 can be ready at 1.40, please.

23 (12.40 pm)

(The short adjournment)

24 (1.40 pm)

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1 THE CHAIR: Good afternoon. Everyone here? Good. I think  
2 it's Ms O'Neill now.

3 Opening statement by MS O'NEILL  
4 for Scottish Care

5 MS O'NEILL: Thank you, my Lord. This opening statement is  
6 made on behalf of Scottish Care and describes  
7 Scottish Care's particular interest in the part of the  
8 Inquiry's work which focuses on the impacts of strategic  
9 decision-making in relation to the themes of health and  
10 social care insofar as those are matters related to the  
11 Inquiry's terms of reference. It does not address other  
12 issues that the Inquiry may consider at later stages of  
13 its work. Nonetheless this is also the first occasion  
14 on which Scottish Care has had the opportunity to make  
15 a statement in the context of a hearing of the  
16 Scottish COVID-19 Inquiry and is grateful to the Chair  
17 for the opportunity to do so.

18 In the circumstances, Scottish Care would wish to  
19 begin by acknowledging that the COVID-19 pandemic  
20 brought great trauma and pain to many people who  
21 received social care in care home settings, acknowledge  
22 the challenges faced by front-line staff and acknowledge  
23 the impact upon friends and family members who were in  
24 many cases bereaved as a result of the pandemic and who  
25 in other cases were unable to be with family members

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1 when they wanted to be.  
2 While Scottish Care's participation in this part of  
3 the Inquiry's work is principally for the purpose of  
4 ensuring that the Inquiry understands the impacts of  
5 strategic decision-making on those who delivered social  
6 care, it does so with an acute awareness of the impacts  
7 experienced by those who received that care. It will  
8 listen carefully to the evidence given during those  
9 hearings by those who can speak to that impact and on  
10 behalf of those who cannot give evidence themselves. It  
11 will do so in person where possible. Its chief  
12 executive, Dr Macaskill, is present in the hearing today  
13 and will do so virtually where it's not possible to be  
14 here in person.

15 Scottish Care is a membership organisation and  
16 a registered charity representing the independent social  
17 care sector in Scotland. It works with its members and  
18 those who commission, regulate and use social care with  
19 the aim of creating conditions that support the  
20 provision of sustainable human-rights-based care and  
21 support. It has approximately 350 members which provide  
22 around 900 services, with some members operating several  
23 care homes or organisations that provide care at home.

24 During the pandemic and as is well known,  
25 Scottish Care's members were at the forefront of the

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1 front-line response to the pandemic, caring for older  
2 people and people with disabilities in residential  
3 settings and/or in individuals' own homes.  
4 Scottish Care was also directly and deeply involved in  
5 supporting its members in the delivery of those services  
6 and in communicating to the Scottish Government and  
7 other decision-makers the experiences, concerns and  
8 fears of those delivering social care services.  
9 Scottish Care's involvement in supporting its members  
10 and the response of the Scottish Government and others  
11 to Scottish Care and the social care sector during the  
12 pandemic are matters that Scottish Care anticipates  
13 being examined by the Inquiry at a later stage.

14 In relation to these Impact Hearings, Scottish Care  
15 considers that it can assist the Inquiry by providing  
16 evidence about the impact of strategic decision-making  
17 on care providers and on individual social care workers.  
18 Those impacts are wide-ranging and continue to be felt.  
19 By way of a small number of examples, they include the  
20 following: first, the impacts on the health of care  
21 workers who contracted COVID-19 and whose risk of  
22 infection was contributed to by strategic decisions.  
23 Those include the prioritisation of the NHS in relation  
24 to the procurement of PPE and the failure to mandate the  
25 use of PPE in March and April 2020, when PPE was

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1 available only after positive or suspected cases had  
2 been identified. The failure to prioritise testing for  
3 social care staff resulted in staff having to take  
4 longer absences from work after coming into contact with  
5 a person who was COVID positive. By contrast, by  
6 mid-March 2020, NHS staff were receiving tests following  
7 such contact so that they could return to work after  
8 a 48-hour period. This resulted in the care sector  
9 having to operate with a reduced workforce despite the  
10 increased challenges it was facing. This in turn led to  
11 staff shortages and also had a negative financial impact  
12 on social care staff who were, given their role, unable  
13 to work during periods of self-isolation.

14 Second, the psychological and emotional impact on  
15 social care providers of strategic decisions that made  
16 it difficult for them to provide effective support for  
17 those in their care. One example was the difficulty  
18 that care home operators experienced in obtaining  
19 healthcare support for residents. Care home providers  
20 and care workers reported to Scottish Care a sense of  
21 what might be called "clinical abandonment" -- and  
22 I note, my Lord, that the word "abandonment" has been  
23 used in a number of opening statements already today --  
24 that sense being reported in the early part of the  
25 pandemic, with care homes struggling to access GP

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1 services or to have GPs come into care homes to see  
 2 patients.  
 3 Many factors contributed to this difficulty , but  
 4 Scottish Care considers that they include strategic  
 5 decisions . So, for example, clinical guidance issued by  
 6 the Scottish Government in March 2020 created a belief  
 7 that care home residents who had contracted COVID-19  
 8 should not be transferred to hospital. Although the  
 9 guidance was later clarified , the practice of care home  
 10 staff being strongly discouraged to transfer COVID  
 11 positive residents to hospital remained. In many  
 12 instances, it was appropriate for the resident to remain  
 13 in their care home, but the presumption of a blanket ban  
 14 in transferring residents was unhelpful and placed  
 15 enormous pressure upon care home staff as well as being  
 16 hugely damaging to individuals with ongoing and  
 17 developing clinical conditions.  
 18 Third, the impact on the morale of social care  
 19 providers and individual social care workers of  
 20 criticism which resulted from inconsistencies in  
 21 national guidance. A particular example was public  
 22 criticism of social care providers in relation of the  
 23 provision of PPE to their workers but without  
 24 acknowledgement that national guidance prescribed  
 25 different PPE requirements for staff working in social

1 care compared with those working in healthcare settings.  
 2 On occasions, media shared photographs taken of social  
 3 care workers while they were providing care, together  
 4 with criticism of the way in which PPE was being used.  
 5 Fourth, the impact on care providers of strategic  
 6 decisions made about scrutiny and oversight. One  
 7 example was the announcement by the Scottish Government  
 8 in May 2020 of arrangements for "enhanced professional  
 9 clinical and care oversight of care homes", which  
 10 instructed health boards and health and social care  
 11 partnerships to establish multidisciplinary teams to  
 12 scrutinise and support care homes. The result of this  
 13 decision was that, in addition to inspections from the  
 14 Care Inspectorate, care homes were inspected and visited  
 15 by teams from Public Health Scotland, infection  
 16 prevention and control specialists and appointees of the  
 17 health board nurse director among others. This approach  
 18 frequently resulted in contradictory advice and guidance  
 19 being provided to staff and led to a clinical approach  
 20 to care homes from practitioners who did not have any  
 21 expertise in a social care context.  
 22 In particular , infection prevention and control  
 23 measures appropriate to an acute hospital setting were  
 24 imposed on care homes by staff from an NHS background  
 25 where, in the view of Scottish Care and its members,

1 those measures were not appropriate. An example was the  
 2 failure to recognise care homes as the homes of  
 3 individuals with dementia. Personal items which were  
 4 often critical for residents' well-being were assessed  
 5 as infection risks and removed from residents' rooms,  
 6 often causing real upset to those residents.  
 7 Social care workers felt that in many cases their  
 8 experience and expertise was not respected by those who  
 9 provided oversight and that their autonomy to make  
 10 decisions in the best interests of their residents was  
 11 reduced. While improvements were made over time,  
 12 Scottish Care undertook research in 2021 into the impact  
 13 of this oversight and scrutiny model being imposed upon  
 14 the sector. Findings included a significant reduction  
 15 in staff morale during an already challenging time.  
 16 Finally , the financial impact on social care  
 17 providers of funding decisions. The immediate financial  
 18 pressures faced by independent social care providers,  
 19 including due to the increased cost of PPE and loss of  
 20 staffing , meant that there was an urgent need to  
 21 establish financial support. This process took time to  
 22 establish and for the relevant criteria to be developed.  
 23 Social care providers were not eligible to apply for  
 24 business support funds that were available to other  
 25 small businesses and a separate funding process was

1 developed by the Health and Social Care Directorate  
 2 within the Scottish Government specifically for social  
 3 care providers. Difficulties arose as a result of the  
 4 approach to funding that was adopted. Those  
 5 difficulties involved payments having to be applied for  
 6 retroactively and multiple changes to the terms on which  
 7 they were available.  
 8 The availability of funding was regularly extended  
 9 on the week, if not the day, that the fund was due to  
 10 end. This type of intervention did not allow for  
 11 longer-term financial viability and business planning  
 12 and affected the stability of care providers. Due to  
 13 its lasting financial impact, coupled with the rising  
 14 cost of living , the sector is currently experiencing the  
 15 highest level of care home closures in Scottish Care's  
 16 existence.  
 17 Scottish Care is hopeful that the Inquiry will hear  
 18 directly from individual care providers and social care  
 19 workers about the impact on them of strategic  
 20 decision-making. There are, however, reasons to believe  
 21 that many providers and workers will hesitate to come  
 22 forward to give evidence to the Inquiry. For many  
 23 involved in the sector, the pandemic was an extremely  
 24 traumatic period during which they were put under  
 25 extreme pressure, were exposed to significant risks to

1 their health and to their livelihood and witnessed the  
 2 extreme suffering of those for whom they cared.  
 3 Scottish Care understands that for many of those  
 4 affected, they do not wish to revisit that trauma.  
 5 There is also hesitation on the part of some  
 6 individuals as a result of the ongoing effect of  
 7 Operation Koper, the name given to the investigation  
 8 resulting from the Lord Advocate's announcement  
 9 in May 2020 that the death of any care home resident due  
 10 to COVID-19 or presumed COVID-19 was to be reported to  
 11 the Procurator Fiscal.  
 12 This decision and the subsequent reporting and  
 13 investigation of such deaths has caused trauma within  
 14 the care home sector and Scottish Care knows that  
 15 individual providers and care home workers remain  
 16 anxious about the potential consequences for them of  
 17 Operation Koper.  
 18 Scottish Care is able to assist the Inquiry in  
 19 relation to these impacts because of its direct and  
 20 immediate involvement in supporting the social care  
 21 sector throughout the pandemic. It was in constant  
 22 receipt of information, concerns and questions from its  
 23 members about the impact of the pandemic on them, on the  
 24 social care workforce and on those for whom they were  
 25 providing care.

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1 Its work during that period, in addition to  
 2 extensive engagement with the Scottish Government, local  
 3 authorities and regulators, included substantial work to  
 4 ensure that its members were aware of legislative  
 5 changes and guidance issued by the Scottish Government  
 6 by Public Health Scotland, by COSLA and by the  
 7 Care Inspectorate and the impact that such changes and  
 8 guidance would have on their operations.  
 9 Amongst a wide range of activities and in order to  
 10 actively support its members, Scottish Care delivered  
 11 webinars on COVID-19 twice a week from 17 March 2020.  
 12 Those were then added to by the hosting of surgeries to  
 13 provide a forum in which members could ask Scottish Care  
 14 questions and share information with each other. These  
 15 provided Scottish Care with feedback from members in  
 16 relation to what was happening in the care sector in  
 17 each part of the country and supplemented the daily  
 18 intelligence it was receiving from its regional staff  
 19 based throughout Scotland.  
 20 Scottish Care looks forward to working with the  
 21 Inquiry to ensure that the impacts of strategic  
 22 decision-making on its social care providers and social  
 23 care workers are well understood. It will assist the  
 24 Inquiry in relation to this part of its work and in  
 25 later phases of the Inquiry's work to the greatest

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1 extent possible.  
 2 THE CHAIR: Thank you.  
 3 Now, the next core participant that we're to hear  
 4 from is the Scottish Vaccine Injury Group, Mr Bryce,  
 5 I believe.  
 6 MR BRYCE: My Lord.  
 7 THE CHAIR: Thank you.  
 8 Opening statement by MR BRYCE  
 9 for the Scottish Vaccine Injury Group  
 10 MR BRYCE: It's customary, I've noted, to begin these  
 11 statements by expressing gratitude to the Chair both for  
 12 being designated with core participant status and for  
 13 being given leave to appear at this stage in the  
 14 Inquiry. The Scottish Vaccine Injury Group especially  
 15 is grateful because it is a group of people who have  
 16 suffered, as has been set out in our opening statement,  
 17 a degree of stigmatisation and public calumny. Quite  
 18 often members of the group have been characterised as  
 19 anti-vaxxers, which particularly wounds them since by  
 20 definition they would not be vaccine-injured if they had  
 21 not taken the vaccine. So I do expressly endorse the  
 22 remarks of gratitude.  
 23 I have lodged an opening statement and the Inquiry  
 24 has that and I adopt it. I will seek to move through it  
 25 quite quickly because I want to focus on the submissions

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1 made at the end of the statement about the nature of the  
 2 evidence which we would wish to formulate and present to  
 3 the Inquiry.  
 4 THE CHAIR: You can be sure that we will have read it —  
 5 MR BRYCE: I knew that.  
 6 THE CHAIR: — and that we will analyse it in detail, so  
 7 feel free to skip to the parts you want to without  
 8 hesitation or fear.  
 9 MR BRYCE: I knew that.  
 10 The group, as is known, is one of the unusual groups  
 11 in that it has core participant status in both the UK  
 12 and the Scottish Inquiry. The participation in the  
 13 Scottish Inquiry is under Term of Reference (d), the  
 14 design and delivery of vaccine strategy; the  
 15 participation in the UK Inquiry is in relation to  
 16 Module 4, vaccines and therapeutics.  
 17 A word or two first about who the Scottish Vaccine  
 18 Injury Group are. The Scottish Vaccine Injury Group  
 19 were formed in September 2021 to apply for core  
 20 participant status in this Inquiry and to provide  
 21 tailored support for Scottish people who have suffered  
 22 an adverse reaction to the vaccine. Initially  
 23 membership was restricted to those who had themselves  
 24 suffered an adverse reaction but it became apparent that  
 25 there were a number of people who had bereavements as

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1 a result of vaccine injury and, from November 2022,  
 2 those people have been allowed to join. There are  
 3 currently a total of 258 members in the group, of  
 4 whom 15 are bereaved people.  
 5 The founding members of the group are  
 6 Ruth O'Rafferty who has been permitted to come to the  
 7 hearing room today, John Watt and Alex Mitchell. A few  
 8 of the group's members are now full-time carers.  
 9 They've had to give up their jobs to care for a loved  
 10 one and some are still extremely ill. The group liaises  
 11 with similar groups internationally, including  
 12 Australia, US and several European nations. The group  
 13 has its own website and people who are watching who have  
 14 an interest in this — may I plug the website?  
 15 THE CHAIR: Adverts are allowed.  
 16 MR BRYCE: Thank you very much, my Lord.  
 17 The website is [www.scottishvaccineinjurygroup.org](http://www.scottishvaccineinjurygroup.org)  
 18 and it provides everybody with a vaccine—injury—related  
 19 problem in Scotland with information and support. It is  
 20 to be stressed that the group is entirely voluntary and  
 21 all the help that it gives to the vaccine—injured is  
 22 also done on an entirely voluntary basis, even though  
 23 the people providing the assistance have challenging  
 24 health issues. One of the submissions which we would be  
 25 wanting to make to the Inquiry is that resources for the

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1 vaccine—injured should be being provided primarily by  
 2 health and social care services in Scotland, not by  
 3 a voluntary group operating on a shoestring.  
 4 It is appropriate that the Inquiry should  
 5 investigate vaccine injury because it has already been  
 6 explored by the Scottish Ministers. The Four Harms  
 7 which are to be the subject matter of the Inquiry  
 8 include direct health impacts of COVID—19 but also other  
 9 non—COVID health impacts. The letter by the minister  
 10 says that there will be a person—centred, human—rights  
 11 approach and the submission for the group is that the  
 12 scope and sequelae of vaccine injury would be  
 13 encompassed by a person—centred, human—rights—based  
 14 approach to a non—COVID health impact. So, in my  
 15 submission, we fall squarely within the terms of the  
 16 Inquiry.  
 17 Now, there has been correspondence with the Inquiry  
 18 from which it appears that there is some concern that  
 19 the group may think that it has a wider ambit in the  
 20 Scottish Inquiry than it actually does. As I have made  
 21 clear, it's a matter of primary legislation that matters  
 22 of drug safety, regulation and approval are reserved  
 23 matters. They are not — even if the Scottish Inquiry  
 24 had wanted to make those matters part of the subject  
 25 matter, it could not do and the group is fully aware of

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1 that. The group is also aware that excluded from the  
 2 Scottish Inquiry are such other issues as the question  
 3 of the delictual immunity which has been vested in the  
 4 vaccine manufacturers. That is also a reserved matter.  
 5 As far as the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme is  
 6 concerned, that is a UK matter and questions such as the  
 7 sufficiency of the level of the award or the fact that  
 8 one has to establish a 60% level of disability before  
 9 one qualifies for the award, that can't be dealt with by  
 10 this Inquiry. However — and that is of some interest  
 11 incidentally to the group because a number of its  
 12 members have received VDPS payments — what is relevant  
 13 here and a submission that will be made is that the  
 14 Scottish Government ought to have publicised the  
 15 existence of the VDPS and funded advice agencies to  
 16 assist with the making of applications under the scheme.  
 17 A submission which will be made is that the  
 18 vaccine—injured have been let down by the Scottish legal  
 19 profession, which has not shown an interest in taking up  
 20 the issue of making VDPS claims.  
 21 The two core issues on the basis of which the  
 22 application for leave to appear in relation to health  
 23 and social impacts were made are to do with, first of  
 24 all, the experience of systemic barriers to diagnosis.  
 25 As set out anecdotally in the statement, there are

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1 people who have been diagnosed with vaccine injury and  
 2 other people with identical symptoms who have not and  
 3 there is an experience by the vaccine—injured of  
 4 resistance by the medical profession, by NHS Scotland,  
 5 to identify their injuries.  
 6 The other issue of course is stigma, which I've  
 7 already touched upon. There has been some notoriety  
 8 when an MSP tweeted about vaccine injury in derogatory  
 9 ways. Even those who have clear diagnoses of vaccine  
 10 injury are afraid to talk about it in their social  
 11 circles.  
 12 The Inquiry may be aware that the opening statement  
 13 of Anna Morris KC to the UK Inquiry on behalf of the  
 14 vaccine—injured was actually taken down from YouTube and  
 15 there is still the experience of social media sites  
 16 censoring groups set up for the vaccine—injured.  
 17 So what should have been done? The submission of  
 18 the vaccine—injured is going to be this: the roll —out of  
 19 the COVID—19 vaccine programme in Scotland, leaving  
 20 aside the matters of drug safety and regulation — those  
 21 are clearly UK matters — but the roll—out was a matter  
 22 for the Scottish Ministers and I've set out in detail  
 23 the legislation on the basis of which that was done.  
 24 Critically, what that means is that the  
 25 Scottish Government had sole control over the

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1 advertising and information environment. The  
 2 consequence of that is that it fell to or ought to have  
 3 fallen to the Scottish Government to publicise because  
 4 all vaccines produce adverse effects, it's only a matter  
 5 of how much, and the Scottish Government should have  
 6 prepared the public for the possibility of vaccine  
 7 injury, not just to ensure that the medical system  
 8 identified, recognised and responded to those, but that  
 9 people themselves knew because some people knew  
 10 straightaway when they received the vaccine but some  
 11 people have taken a long time to realise. So our  
 12 submission is that it was for the Scottish Government to  
 13 have a publicity campaign during the roll-out to alert  
 14 vaccine recipients to the possibility of vaccine injury.

15 The group's submission is that there should have  
 16 been a media and professional awareness campaign  
 17 simultaneously with the roll-out to raise awareness of  
 18 vaccine injury. Medical professionals would then have  
 19 been on the look-out for symptoms and the public would  
 20 have been alerted to the possibility of injury and the  
 21 need to seek appropriate treatment. Instead there was  
 22 this stigma around vaccine injury.

23 Now, I want to say a word or two more about stigma  
 24 before I turn to what I want principally to say about  
 25 the evidence which we would like to develop for the

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1 Inquiry. One of the consequences of the background of  
 2 stigmatisation, first of all, the group's members are  
 3 often told that their post-vaccination physical symptoms  
 4 are actually psychosomatic. This stigma is sufficient  
 5 to compound other problems because people who have got  
 6 vaccine injury can have challenges with mobility, living  
 7 arrangements, relationships and career, and that is  
 8 compounded by it being said to them that the reason why  
 9 they're not well is that they're not mentally well.  
 10 This stigmatisation is such that members of the group  
 11 have been providing informal counselling and support for  
 12 members dealing with depression and even suicidal  
 13 ideation.

14 Another of the principal submissions which the group  
 15 would wish to make to the Inquiry is that it should not  
 16 fall to a voluntary group to deal with issues such as  
 17 that. The issue around suicide risk is one on which  
 18 NHS Scotland or the mental health charities should be  
 19 giving specific training to deal with the  
 20 vaccine-injured who have got those symptoms.

21 So if I may turn to the evidence which the group  
 22 hopes to develop for the Inquiry. It's at page 7 of my  
 23 statement. The group has had internal discussions  
 24 amongst its own members and also discussions with its  
 25 legal team. We've attempted to develop a proposal which

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1 balances the restrictions on the jurisdiction with the  
 2 substance of the subject matter which the group would  
 3 wish the Inquiry to consider. It is thought we can get  
 4 this down to about five witness statements.

5 Now, I was greatly heartened when Mr Gale, this  
 6 morning, mentioned that it was hoped to reach the  
 7 evidential part of the vaccine-injured evidence  
 8 by February. I would just like to flag up that if we  
 9 are to do even this modest programme that I'm proposing,  
 10 it will take quite a bit of time and I'm laying this out  
 11 now in the hope that we can have a dialogue with the  
 12 Inquiry as to what can be done and the programme — the  
 13 time within which it can be done.

14 What we propose, five witnesses: broadly speaking,  
 15 somebody who has got a clear diagnosis of vaccine injury  
 16 and possibly also an award from the VDPS scheme. The  
 17 only reason that that might be relevant would be to  
 18 support that the person concerned does have vaccine  
 19 injury; another member of the group with similar  
 20 symptoms but who has not been able to obtain diagnosis,  
 21 so that we can pull out this question of why some people  
 22 get diagnoses and why some people do not; thirdly,  
 23 a person of skill to illuminate the systemic barriers to  
 24 diagnosis; we would also like, fourthly, evidence to be  
 25 led from a bereaved family member of a person whose

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1 death has been clearly attributed to vaccine injury; and  
 2 lastly, because it is a matter to which the group  
 3 attaches particular significance, a witness to the  
 4 prevalence of suicidal ideation amongst persons  
 5 suffering from or bereaved by vaccine injury and to the  
 6 support needs of such persons.

7 As far as the person of skill is concerned, I have  
 8 set out that the group has informal contacts with  
 9 a number of medically skilled people actually throughout  
 10 the world, some of whom are known to provide advice in  
 11 litigations pro bono, but there is a question perhaps as  
 12 to what value the Inquiry would attach to such a skilled  
 13 witness, so I set out that as a matter in which dialogue  
 14 with the Inquiry would be grateful appreciated.

15 There is one last matter which does not fall  
 16 squarely within the health and safety impacts but does  
 17 have a — does touch upon it and is going to be  
 18 relevant, in my submission, at some point during the  
 19 Inquiry. It is this: that although there have been  
 20 a number of coroners' inquests in England where vaccine  
 21 injury has been found to be established by coroners,  
 22 there has, as far as I can found out — and I'm making  
 23 enquiries — been not a single fatal accident inquiry.  
 24 Now, while this Inquiry has restrictions on it,  
 25 jurisdictional restrictions on it, in terms of subject

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1 matter such as, for example, drug safety and regulation,  
 2 I do not think a fatal accident inquiry would be subject  
 3 to such restrictions and it is a matter which I would  
 4 seek to have canvassed in the Inquiry as to why there  
 5 hasn't been a fatal accident inquiry so far in Scotland.  
 6 That may not fall within these impacts. I simply flag  
 7 it up as something which, in my submission, is of  
 8 relevance to the Inquiry overall.

9 THE CHAIR: Thank you, Mr Bryce. Can I say --- and I'm sure  
 10 I'm not speaking out of turn --- that Mr Gale or a member  
 11 of his team will be more than happy to discuss all these  
 12 matters with you, including the scheduling of any  
 13 evidence you might wish to offer us.

14 MR GALE: I think, my Lord, perhaps just to be clear for  
 15 Mr Bryce, I did indicate that it was anticipated and  
 16 hoped that his group, if I can put it that way, would be  
 17 accommodated within the period between February and  
 18 Easter. I cannot offer a precise timing for that and if  
 19 it requires further preparation and further discussions,  
 20 it may be pushed back in that period, but we hope to do  
 21 it in that period.

22 MR BRYCE: I'm extremely grateful to hear that and all I'm  
 23 really flagging up is that it will be a time-consuming  
 24 exercise and the time needs to be used. I'm very much  
 25 obliged.

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1 THE CHAIR: Thank you. Very good.  
 2 Now, next, the penultimate core participant today is  
 3 the Scottish Healthcare Workers' Association,  
 4 Mr Webster KC.

5 Mr Webster, thank you.  
 6 Opening statement by MR WEBSTER  
 7 for the Scottish Healthcare Workers' Coalition

8 MR WEBSTER: My Lord, Scotland's healthcare workers have  
 9 served the people of Scotland with courage and  
 10 conviction. As it was for many of Scotland's  
 11 key workers during the acute phase of the pandemic, they  
 12 were the people who placed themselves at risk for the  
 13 benefit of others. We recall how they worked tirelessly  
 14 to protect and care for others. We recall them trying  
 15 to manage the constraints and inadequacies of resources  
 16 available to them, both for those in their care and to  
 17 care for and protect themselves. We recall them  
 18 physically and emotionally exhausted by the work they  
 19 did for us.

20 The acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic may be  
 21 behind us but the disease and its consequences are not.  
 22 COVID-19 continues to be an ongoing and very real threat  
 23 to the health of individuals and to Scottish society.  
 24 Sadly, people are still dying of COVID and they are  
 25 still suffering from the disabling effects of

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1 long COVID. There are many who continue to suffer  
 2 long-lasting effects of the disease without adequate  
 3 recognition or support, without any clear understanding  
 4 of when, if ever, their symptoms may abate and not  
 5 knowing whether they will ever return to anything  
 6 resembling their former lives and careers.

7 For many, future uncertainty of care and support,  
 8 both medically in terms of symptoms and rehabilitation  
 9 and financially in terms of employment security and  
 10 state-assisted welfare, are a further crippling burden.  
 11 They are the ongoing victims of the pandemic.

12 This Inquiry must now repay a nation's indebtedness  
 13 to these individuals by investigating and reporting with  
 14 similar courage and conviction to that shown by them as  
 15 they faced the virus. Scotland's healthcare workers  
 16 seek truth, accountability and recognition for the harms  
 17 that they have suffered and continue to suffer and  
 18 reassurance that their suffering is not an inevitable  
 19 fate to be repeated in future pandemics.

20 The Scottish Healthcare Workers' Coalition is  
 21 a grass roots organisation comprising healthcare workers  
 22 of all types, doctors, nurses, those in professions  
 23 allied to medicine and hospital and social care staff  
 24 concerned as to the long-term effects of COVID-19. They  
 25 have coalesced in seeking information and support as to

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1 not only the physical effects of the virus but also in  
 2 respect of what became apparent as an all too common,  
 3 woeful and discriminatory response by Government,  
 4 healthcare providers and employers to their  
 5 circumstances.

6 They look to this Inquiry to record their  
 7 experiences. The Inquiry has determined to make this  
 8 its first endeavour. So let us recognise and  
 9 acknowledge widely and fully the sacrifices made, the  
 10 risks taken and the exhaustion and the fear that was  
 11 endured. This Inquiry needs to identify, record and  
 12 chronicle the broad-reaching emotional consequences of  
 13 the pandemic, including those arising from long COVID  
 14 for these workers. The Inquiry must also ascertain and  
 15 preserve evidence of the economic impacts for these  
 16 workers and the effect of the virus on societal  
 17 infrastructure, including again the effect of  
 18 long COVID. But then the Inquiry must turn to our  
 19 decision-makers, then and now. It must show no fear or  
 20 favour in ascertaining the facts of what decisions were  
 21 taken and why they were taken and to understand the  
 22 analysis or lack of analysis that was undertaken.

23 It must discover whether our elected Scottish  
 24 representatives and their offices truly followed the  
 25 science, both in the early stages of the pandemic and as

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1 our knowledge increased. Did they reflect upon and  
 2 reasonably weigh the risks and advantages? Did they put  
 3 public money to good and effective use and did they take  
 4 reasonable steps to protect the workforce that they sent  
 5 out to do battle with the disease?  
 6 Now, long-term post-viral illness was known before  
 7 COVID-19, so the question must be posed: was that risk  
 8 recognised at all and, if it was, was it reasonably  
 9 balanced in the decision-making that occurred in the  
 10 early stages of the pandemic? How prepared was Scotland  
 11 in its distinct preparations for the arrival of the  
 12 virus to meet the needs of its population? Were  
 13 unnecessary lives lost or blighted amongst Scotland's  
 14 healthcare and social care workers? Were, as  
 15 a consequence, unnecessary lives lost amongst those they  
 16 strove to care for? These are the overarching issues  
 17 for this party to the Inquiry.  
 18 How has Scotland responded to the sequelae of the  
 19 disease in economic and social terms, both for society  
 20 at large and for those front-line workers we placed our  
 21 trust in? The Inquiry must look at what our Scottish  
 22 elected representatives and public bodies have left us  
 23 with as a long-term response to the consequences of the  
 24 pandemic in employment, health and social security  
 25 terms. Are they continuing to gather information,

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1 collate, analyse and plan in the light of ongoing  
 2 long-term illness? Have they put in place protocols and  
 3 funding to manage future risks of long-term illness?  
 4 Have they considered the effect on healthcare and  
 5 key workers of long-term disease? Have they done so to  
 6 inform the state's response to not only those who  
 7 continue to suffer but also future generations? Have  
 8 they taken appropriate steps to care for, provide for  
 9 and support those who continue to suffer? I ask: have  
 10 they learnt anything? I ask: have they learnt enough?  
 11 The legacy left by the state and the resilience of the  
 12 state to provide for the future of those still suffering  
 13 from the disease are the other overarching concerns for  
 14 this party.  
 15 The long-term effects of COVID-19 are many and  
 16 varied. Long COVID is a multi-system illness. There  
 17 are over 200 documented symptoms for long COVID. Severe  
 18 fatigue, shortness of breath, loss of smell, muscle  
 19 ache, memory loss, chest pain, insomnia, cardio-vascular  
 20 irregularities, dizziness, paraesthesia and joint pain  
 21 are just some of the many recognised symptoms. To  
 22 narrate the same is to lay the basis for an  
 23 understanding for the potential for and reality of  
 24 long COVID having a significant impact not only on  
 25 day-to-day functioning but also on a worker's ability to

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1 remain in or return to employment.  
 2 As much as long-term post-viral illness was  
 3 recognised before the world had heard of COVID-19, the  
 4 existence of long COVID as a common descriptor for  
 5 prolonged symptoms and disability after the acute phase,  
 6 that is to say following infection, is now well  
 7 recognised. But it was not always so and regrettably  
 8 the Inquiry is likely to hear of professional ignorance,  
 9 if not antipathy, to the needs of those with long COVID.  
 10 So it's against that background that the Scottish  
 11 Healthcare Workers' Coalition come to this Inquiry in  
 12 the expectation that the Inquiry will throw a searing  
 13 light on the actions, practices and feelings of health  
 14 and social care providers as employers and the  
 15 Scottish Government as the policy lead and directing  
 16 force in the management of the challenges of the  
 17 COVID-19 infection and long COVID in particular.  
 18 We trust that this Inquiry will hear from witnesses  
 19 who will speak to the debilitating effect of acute and  
 20 chronic symptoms in COVID and long COVID in health and  
 21 professional terms. If so, the Inquiry will hear of the  
 22 frustration of this workforce at the inappropriate  
 23 protective equipment provided to them and the inadequate  
 24 protection afforded to them in the workplace. They will  
 25 speak to the financial and economic consequences for

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1 them as they have struggled and continue to struggle  
 2 with the constraints of COVID and long COVID. They will  
 3 speak to their frustration and despair of seeing  
 4 professional careers falter and end as a result.  
 5 Concerningly and really as a matter of national  
 6 shame, they will speak to sceptical, unsympathetic and  
 7 unaccommodating employers with poor employment practices  
 8 and lamentable state financial protection for long COVID  
 9 sufferers. They will speak to employers in the health  
 10 and social care sector, who frankly ought to have known  
 11 better, not responding to the individual needs of their  
 12 workforce as those with long COVID wrestled to manage  
 13 the particular effects for them and their own personal  
 14 circumstances, and to employers unappreciative of  
 15 long COVID, inappropriately pressurising staff suffering  
 16 from long COVID to return to work to meet the need  
 17 demanded by the pandemic and then being unsympathetic in  
 18 their approach to symptom-induced desires for shorter  
 19 hours of working and prolonged periods of ill health  
 20 absence after returning to the workplace. They will  
 21 speak to loss of earnings and loss of employment.  
 22 Our health and social care workers have worked  
 23 tirelessly at exceptional risk to themselves to save  
 24 lives and provide care. What they deserve is an  
 25 investigation that will look to see whether the

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1 Scottish Government, health boards and other health and  
 2 social care providers have proper regard to their safety  
 3 and welfare when planning for and responding to the  
 4 pandemic, both as regards the protection of health and  
 5 well-being of those individuals and also the protection  
 6 of their ability to remain healthy to care for others.  
 7 So we ask a number of legitimate questions.  
 8 Firstly, was proper consideration given by the  
 9 Scottish Government and Scottish health boards to the  
 10 risks for health and social care workers in the  
 11 workplace? Was there independence of thought and  
 12 analysis from Westminster and the UK Government? More  
 13 specifically, as long-term post-viral illness was known  
 14 before the pandemic, it was a foreseeable consequence of  
 15 COVID-19, so we ask: was it foreseen? Were the likely  
 16 long-term consequences identified, weighed and acted  
 17 upon appropriately in the assessment of the conditions  
 18 of which health and social care workers would have to  
 19 work. If not, why not?  
 20 Did NHS Scotland, individual health boards and  
 21 employers recognise and respond to the distinct needs of  
 22 their workers with long COVID as knowledge expanded?  
 23 Long COVID was being reported as early in the pandemic  
 24 as mid-2020, so what steps were taken in Scotland to  
 25 re-assess risk and identify appropriate precautionary

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1 steps once empirical evidence emerged?  
 2 Was the prevalence of risk of long COVID in the  
 3 health and social care workforce separately assessed  
 4 here or was an opportunity missed at the early stage of  
 5 the pandemic to warn healthcare and social care workers  
 6 and the public at large of the risks of long COVID and  
 7 the importance of appropriate and adequate protective  
 8 measures?  
 9 Let me say this on protective measures. The public  
 10 may view the provision of personal protective equipment  
 11 in the health and social care settings to be a story of  
 12 privilege, profligacy and perfidy as to the needs of  
 13 front-line staff. That is a perception that this  
 14 Inquiry must address and expose. Were those who took  
 15 personal risks to care for us placed at unnecessary risk  
 16 due to inadequate assessment or the means of exposure  
 17 and manners of protection, especially in the context of  
 18 long COVID? Was the precautionary principle recognised  
 19 and adhered to? If not, why not? And as our knowledge  
 20 of the disease improved, was a change in guidance  
 21 appropriate and was any such change effective? And if  
 22 not, why not?  
 23 Looking beyond PPE, we now recognise COVID-19 as  
 24 entailing airborne transmission, so did the  
 25 Scottish Government, health boards and employers

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1 appreciate the potential and the need for high-quality  
 2 and effective air filtration and ventilation in health  
 3 and social care settings to mitigate risk? And did they  
 4 take steps to mitigate the risk and then meet the need?  
 5 Did they, by the end of 2022, put in place appropriate  
 6 standards for future air quality in such settings?  
 7 The only way to avoid long COVID is to avoid  
 8 catching COVID-19 in the first place. Long-term  
 9 morbidity was not only a factor that ought to have been  
 10 part of the pre-pandemic planning, it must also have  
 11 been part of the information-gathering and planning for  
 12 the next pandemic.  
 13 So looking forward, have appropriate and adequate  
 14 steps been taken to monitoring gathered data as to the  
 15 long-term effects of the disease in order to better  
 16 understand the needs of this essential part of our care  
 17 workforce in the future and as to how the disease will  
 18 continue to and how future viral pandemics may impact on  
 19 the provision of healthcare and social care in Scotland  
 20 in the future?  
 21 Has the Scottish Government set about and funded the  
 22 gathering of relevant data to record, assess and weigh  
 23 the effects of long COVID in individuals and the social  
 24 and economic cost of workplace absenteeism and the cost  
 25 of financial support for people with long COVID on sick

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1 leave and, finally, also the extra demands of the social  
 2 care sector to support people with this debilitating  
 3 illness? Has the Scottish Government set about  
 4 assessing the emotional and financial effect on  
 5 individual well-being and finances for those with  
 6 long COVID? Has that Government ensured that, in the  
 7 light of what was known by the end of 2022, that  
 8 NHS Scotland and Social Security Scotland is adequately  
 9 informed, funded and resourced to provide the specialist  
 10 help and support that this cohort of sufferers needs?  
 11 Is the legacy fit for purpose?  
 12 Let me touch on one other matter at this point in  
 13 time. We say this phase of the Inquiry is the  
 14 appropriate stage to consider the issue of  
 15 discrimination for it resonates in the extent to which  
 16 proper and adequate care was offered to health and  
 17 social care workers both during the pandemic's acute  
 18 phase and subsequently; that's to say for those who are  
 19 still suffering. We ask: was COVID-19 and long COVID  
 20 recognised and responded to by Government, health boards  
 21 and employers in a manner that looked to and adequately  
 22 assessed discriminatory effect? Did they assess the  
 23 need for protection in an informed, nuanced and  
 24 equality-sensitive manner that avoided discrimination in  
 25 the workplace? Looking forward, should long COVID be

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1 recognised as a disability under the Equality Act and  
2 should long COVID be formally recognised as an  
3 occupational illness?

4 Most significantly for this group, the Inquiry must  
5 also recognise that the debilitating symptoms of  
6 long COVID have and have had a material effect on the  
7 ability of those suffering to retain employment and  
8 maintain a career. The Scottish Healthcare Workers'  
9 Coalition submits that the long-term burden of the  
10 pandemic has fallen disproportionately and in  
11 a discriminatory manner in that regard and it is  
12 expected that the Inquiry will address the question of  
13 whether Article 14 Convention rights against  
14 discrimination have been breached.

15 So as we embark upon the work of the Inquiry,  
16 I exhort you, sir, never to lose sight of the need to  
17 conclude the Inquiry with clear findings of fact. It  
18 will only be with an understanding of what was  
19 considered and what was ignored, what was weighed and  
20 what was discounted and what was done and what was not  
21 done that lessons can begin to be learnt for the future.

22 I admonish the Inquiry team that there therefore  
23 needs to be rigour in giving careful and discrete  
24 attention to the consequences for this particular cohort  
25 of society who risked so much for us all. This party

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1 looks forward to and expects the Inquiry to produce  
2 background research specific to the risks undertaken by  
3 Scotland's healthcare and social care workforce and the  
4 interplay of long COVID in the assessment of and the  
5 response to those risks. There also needs to be  
6 understanding of the practical consequences of long-term  
7 COVID-related illness and the steps taken to avoid and  
8 mitigate the same and there needs to be accountability  
9 for failures, oversights and indifference.

10 This Inquiry must, without fear or favour, be seen  
11 to address the issues I have outlined and the related  
12 questions that for now time and space does not allow us  
13 to be stated before the Inquiry. And time must not be  
14 allowed to denude this Inquiry of effect. COVID-19  
15 continues to reap its deadly consequences. People will  
16 die from COVID-19 during the period of this Inquiry.  
17 Many others will continue to suffer its consequences  
18 through long COVID. The Inquiry must report at  
19 intervals to ensure that lessons learnt can be  
20 implemented and suffering alleviated.

21 It would be all too easy, in the many disparate  
22 issues the Inquiry will have to consider and report  
23 upon, to lose sight of this cohort's concerns and fears.  
24 I offer no apology for pleading their case as a special  
25 case. For them the future is uncertain in so many ways.

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1 They are, as I've said, the ongoing victims of the  
2 pandemic and they look to this Inquiry to provide some  
3 answers. Could and should the Scottish Government and  
4 health boards have done more and what they ask is: was  
5 their suffering unavoidable?

6 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much, Mr Webster. That brings us  
7 to the last core participant's submission for today.  
8 Refugees for Justice, Mr Kiddie.

9 MR KIDDIE: Somewhat ahead of schedule.

10 THE CHAIR: For the good, I imagine.

11 Opening statement by MR KIDDIE  
12 for Refugees for Justice

13 MR KIDDIE: My Lord, Inquiry counsel, ladies and gentlemen,  
14 I appear here today as junior counsel for  
15 Refugees for Justice, as instructed by that group's  
16 solicitors, who are Birnberg Peirce. My learned senior,  
17 Hugh Southey, is also instructed.

18 I want to start by quoting some of our evidence so  
19 far. First, I'll quote Baroness Helena Kennedy KC, who  
20 chaired the independent Inquiry commissioned by Refugees  
21 for Justice, which also investigated similar issues as  
22 these public proceedings shall consider.

23 Speaking of the vulnerability of asylum seekers and  
24 refugees, she concluded in her report as follows, in her  
25 words:

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1 "... it is the current systems of asylum  
2 determination and support that make them [vulnerable]  
3 ... it places people into marginalised social and  
4 economic situations, without adequate support, and  
5 leaves them there with ever-diminishing hope for the  
6 future."

7 And she says:

8 "For those who have experienced trauma, this same  
9 system can compound the problem."

10 We have heard almost countless stories of  
11 re-traumatisation and further trauma as a result of  
12 treatment.

13 I now also want to quote Manisha Keister, who is one  
14 of the co-ordinators of Refugees for Justice and herself  
15 an asylum seeker. Speaking of her own experience of  
16 lockdown during the coronavirus pandemic and of how she  
17 was treated at that time, she says:

18 "We weren't even allowed to talk to other people due  
19 to COVID. We had little understanding of what was  
20 happening. Why were we there? How long would we be  
21 there? When would we move? I felt like an animal.  
22 That's the way they made me feel, so I just complied."

23 These are just a few examples of evidence  
24 demonstrating how decisions of the Scottish Government  
25 about matters such as lockdown had a particular impact

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1 on vulnerable asylum seekers. Lockdown was obviously  
 2 challenging for us all, yet it was particularly  
 3 challenging for victims of trauma who were marginalised  
 4 and lacked support networks. In this context  
 5 Refugees for Justice welcomes this Inquiry’s particular  
 6 focus on the position of refugees in these proceedings  
 7 so far.  
 8 My purpose today is to introduce Refugees for  
 9 Justice and then to highlight the following three  
 10 principal points: first, that refugees individually and  
 11 collectively are particularly vulnerable in society;  
 12 secondly, that the Scottish Government should have taken  
 13 account of the vulnerability of refugees; and, thirdly,  
 14 that over the course of the material time in which this  
 15 Inquiry is interested, being the years 2020, 2021 and  
 16 2022, it appears that the Scottish Government failed to  
 17 take account of the vulnerability of refugees in its  
 18 strategic decision—making in response to COVID—19.  
 19 By way of introduction, Refugees for Justice, also  
 20 known as “R4J”, is a core participant in these Inquiry  
 21 proceedings, being a group that was founded over the  
 22 course of said material time. R4J was founded by asylum  
 23 seekers and refugees who were directly personally  
 24 affected by the impacts of the Scottish Government’s  
 25 said failure and who therefore decided to establish

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1 their group in reaction to that failure. Thus, in  
 2 a very real sense R4J is a campaign group led by  
 3 refugees and asylum seekers and for refugees and asylum  
 4 seekers. It also has strong connections not only with  
 5 the refugee and asylum seeker community at large but  
 6 also with other groups and organisations which exist to  
 7 help these people; for example, the Scottish Refugee  
 8 Council and Refuweege, both of which have produced  
 9 witness statements for R4J for the purpose of these  
 10 proceedings.  
 11 Here two points bear clarification. First, R4J  
 12 represents the interests both of those who had by the  
 13 material time already been recognised as refugees and  
 14 also of those who had by then not yet been thus  
 15 recognised so were considered asylum seekers. For  
 16 brevity, moving forwards, in these proceedings at large  
 17 the term “refugees” may be used for both.  
 18 The second point for clarification is that, while at  
 19 the material time and indeed nowadays asylum was  
 20 a reserved matter in terms of the Scotland Act 1998,  
 21 nonetheless the Scottish Government was still  
 22 responsible for the overall strategic response to  
 23 COVID—19 in Scotland, including in respect of issues  
 24 likely to affect the experience of refugees and asylum  
 25 seekers for better or for worse. Therefore,

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1 contextually, UK Home Office policy remains relevant for  
 2 consideration, given it contributed to the particular  
 3 needs and vulnerabilities of refugees in Scotland and  
 4 the Scottish Government ought to have been aware of this  
 5 and it also ought to have taken account of it.  
 6 So now moving on to R4J’s first principal point for  
 7 this Inquiry, it is that refugees are particularly  
 8 vulnerable in society. By the very nature of their  
 9 status, they are people who have been displaced from  
 10 their home nations by reason of hostilities,  
 11 persecution, oppression, discrimination, natural  
 12 disaster, economic adversity and other similar causes.  
 13 Therefore, they come to us out of disruption and  
 14 dispossession and find themselves abroad in our country,  
 15 which is foreign to them, in extremely disadvantaged  
 16 circumstances, including past trauma and very often  
 17 trauma—induced mental health difficulties, severance  
 18 from home contacts, including family and loved ones, and  
 19 uncertainty as to future outcome.  
 20 R4J’s second principal point is that the  
 21 Scottish Government should have taken account of this  
 22 vulnerability of refugees. For example, as said, R4J  
 23 commissioned its own Inquiry into asylum provision in  
 24 Scotland which had particular reference to failures  
 25 during COVID—19 and where I have already quoted that

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1 Inquiry’s Chair, Baroness Helena Kennedy KC, who said of  
 2 the appropriate approach to vulnerability — again her  
 3 words:  
 4 “We have heard almost countless stories of  
 5 re—traumatisation and further trauma as a result of  
 6 treatment in the UK. It is very clear ... that  
 7 trauma—informed approaches should be the norm in how  
 8 we treat asylum seekers.”  
 9 In R4J’s written submissions, as already submitted  
 10 to the Inquiry, public law, human rights law as well as  
 11 good practice all require this vulnerability to be taken  
 12 into account. Yet R4J’s third principal point is that  
 13 over the course of the material time it appears on the  
 14 basis of available evidence that the Scottish Government  
 15 failed to take account of the vulnerability of refugees  
 16 in its strategic decision—making in response to  
 17 COVID—19. In terms of the accounts of R4J members,  
 18 their overall experience of lockdown included the  
 19 Mears Group rounding people up to relocate them out of  
 20 and away from safe homes and into overcrowded  
 21 hostel—type accommodation, typically by summary means on  
 22 little or no notice and at a time when more general  
 23 advice to the populous at large was to isolate and to  
 24 stay at home. And their experience also included  
 25 removal or curtailment of financial provision, for

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1 example, resulting in the effect that they could no  
 2 longer top up their mobile phones in order to maintain  
 3 contact with loved ones back home or indeed even with  
 4 legal or other advisers, and inadequate access to  
 5 medical, dental and mental health assistance and  
 6 inadequate official communication in respect of  
 7 vaccination, self-testing and self-isolation, including  
 8 official guidance, and overall the Scottish Government  
 9 failed to take account of this type of experience in its  
 10 decision-making. Much of this is also reflected by the  
 11 terms of Baroness Kennedy’s said Inquiry, as already  
 12 mentioned.

13 Whilst some of the matters above were not directly  
 14 the responsibility of the Scottish Government, they had  
 15 an impact on the way that refugees experience decisions  
 16 of the Scottish Government, such as lockdown. For  
 17 example, lockdown limited the opportunity of refugees to  
 18 build support networks. However, so far there is no  
 19 evidence that these matters were considered or that  
 20 consideration was given to mitigating them.

21 Finally, therefore, in conclusion, R4J welcomes this  
 22 opportunity for this official Scottish COVID Inquiry to  
 23 find and to recommend as follows: first, that refugees  
 24 are indeed particularly vulnerable in society; secondly,  
 25 that the Scottish Government failed to take account of

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1 this vulnerability in its strategic decision-making for  
 2 COVID; and, thirdly, therefore, that the  
 3 Scottish Government should take account of this  
 4 vulnerability in relevant future such strategic  
 5 decision-making. Indeed we would even go so far as to  
 6 invite this Inquiry to consider recommending a statutory  
 7 requirement to take account of the vulnerability of  
 8 refugees going forwards.

9 That concludes the opening submission for Refugees  
 10 for Justice and thank you for very much, my Lord, for  
 11 this opportunity to make it.

12 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Kiddie. That’s  
 13 all. Well, as Mr Kiddie observed at the beginning of  
 14 his submission, we are well ahead of schedule, for which  
 15 I thank you all. We will adjourn now and reconvene at  
 16 10 o’clock tomorrow morning. Thank you.

17 (2.43 pm)

18 (The hearing adjourned until  
 19 Wednesday, 25 October 2023 at 10.00 am)  
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